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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1955, the senior author of this Article was one of the
attorneys for the losing taxpayers in a case before the United
States Supreme Court involving the taxability of the two-thirds
penalty portion of a Clayton Act' recovery.2 Justice William
0. Douglas alone, it seemed, appreciated the subtle argument of
taxpayer's counsel, although his solitary dissent was without
opinion. His curiosity stimulated, the author began to take
notice of the frequently recurring phenomenon of Justice Doug-
las' dissenting silently and alone in favor of the taxpayer. Thus
began his interest in Justice Douglas' treatment of tax cases, one
which grew into a comprehensive review of all tax cases in the
Supreme Court3 during Justice Douglas' tenure. 4
The evolution of Justice Douglas' behavior in tax cases will
be developed in detail in Part II of this Article. In general, the
data reveal that during his first years on the Supreme Court,
115 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
2 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
' The cases considered were only those arising under income, estate, gift and excise
taxes. Social Security taxes, for example, were excluded.
' The study was interrupted in 1965 and resumed in 1972 with the collaboration of
the other authors.
[Vol. 122:235
DOUGLAS-FEDERAL TAX CASES
Justice Douglas wrote many tax opinions for the Court, usually
sustaining the Government's position. Then a change occurred.
He began to dissent more frequently, usually in favor of the
taxpayer. And he often dissented alone, without opinion, or with
only a few words. In the last decade and a half particularly,
Justice Douglas' positions in tax cases have been marked by a
strong disposition in favor of taxpayers' positions, a lack of
sympathy with the administration of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, the agency charged with enforcing the tax statutes,5 and an
increasing failure to explain his votes in well-reasoned opinions.
Assisted by the statistical tables we have compiled, we will
attempt to pinpoint where and how Justice Douglas changed
course in tax cases. In addition, in Part III we will take a
comparative look at his work in other areas of law in which the
interpretation of a federal statute is involved. In Part IV our
effort will be speculative, groping for explanations of Justice
Douglas' approach to tax cases and his attitude toward the IRS.
In Part V we will reflect on Justice Douglas' performance in
federal tax cases as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
In a 1948 speech on the role of dissent in the Supreme
Court, Justice Douglas said: "The judge that writes his own
predilections into the law in disregard of constitutional principles
or the legislative or executive edicts that he interprets is not
worthy of the great traditions of the bench."' And similarly,
speaking eleven years later "On Misconception of the Judicial
Function and the Responsibility of the Bar," Justice Douglas
said:'
The legislature of course passes laws that favor or
disfavor certain groups. Judges who enforce these laws
according to their terms, however, can not fairly have
attributed to them the partiality of those who passed the
laws. It is the very essence of a government of laws that
the predilections of judges not carry the day, and that
the law as written by the lawmakers be applied equally
to all. This I had assumed to be elementary.
7
In a sense, this Article will measure Justice Douglas' perfor-
mance in the tax field against his own standard.
5 Before March 15, 1952, the Internal Revenue Service was known as the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. T.D. 6038, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 443. Throughout the article we refer
only to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or the Treasury.
6 Douglas, The Dissenting Opinion, 8 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 467, 469 (1948).
7 Douglas, On Misconception of the Judicial Function and the Responsibility of the Bar, 59
COLu m. L. REv. 227 (1959).
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II. THE RECORD
In examining the development of Justice Douglas' approach
to federal tax cases, we have broken his tenure on the Court
(from 1939 to 1973) into four separate periods." Our discussion
of each period begins with an analysis of statistical data pre-
sented in three tables.' The first of these tables (Table I) shows
the number of tax cases won by the taxpayer in each period, and
the number in which Justice Douglas voted for the taxpayer.10
Table II exposes those cases, period by period, in which Justice
Douglas differed with the majority of the Court. It also indicates
the extent to which Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter.
Subtables divide the cases into two groups, one including those
which the taxpayer won, and the other, those in which the
Government won. Table III indicates the way in which Justice
Douglas expressed his dissenting views. The cases are again
divided by period, with notation of the number of cases in which
Justice Douglas wrote an opinion, joined an opinion and dis-
sented without opinion. (Tables IV and V, listing for compara-
tive purposes all tax cases in which a member of the Court
dissented alone or without opinion, appear with Tables I
through III in the Appendix but are not reproduced in the
textual discussion detailing each individual period. 1 ) These
compilations lay bare the fleshless pattern which led us to dig
below the statistics in search of explanation.
Following this statistical analysis, our discussion of each
period turns to an examination of selected tax cases which
illustrate Justice Douglas' approach to construction of the Code,
his attitude toward the IRS, and the degree of attention and
concern which Justice Douglas has given to tax questions as
T The points at which the periods break were selected for the following reasons: (1)
The 1943 Term marked the beginning of a clear shift in justice Douglas' voting pattern.
(2) A radical alteration of Justice Douglas' voting pattern began in the 1959 Term. (3)
The dramatic change that began in the 1959 Term seems to have ended in the 1964
Term. (4) No events have occurred since 1964 that warrant another break.
9 Appendix, Tables I-III, infra. At the beginning of the analysis of each period, the
portions of Tables I, II and III relevant to that period, as well as those portions of Tables
I, II and III which are relevant to prior periods, are set out in the text. Thus, for
example, Table I-I in the text contains the portion of Table I which relates to Period 1.
Similarly, Table 11-3 contains the portions of Table II which deal with Periods 1, 2 and 3.
By doing this we hope to facilitate an understanding of the pattern which develops over
time.
We have omitted criminal cases from Tables I, II, III, IV and V, since the
considerations affecting judgment in such cases often differ greatly from those in other
tax cases. The criminal cases are included, however, in Tables VI and VII. We have also
omitted from our statistical computations and Tables I, II, III, IV, V and VI cases in
which the Court disposed in a very short opinion of a case on all fours with a com-
panion case which the Court had decialed in a full opinion.
" In the Appendix this Table is expanded to show the number of cases in each
volume of United States Reports as welL
ii The Appendix to this Article also contains Table VII, which records Justice
Douglas' action in every tax case in this study.
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reflected in the quality of his opinions. Part II concludes with
observations about Table VI, which divides the cases into various
substantive categories of tax law.
A. Period 1. 1939-1943: Government Years
The statistics for the years 1939-1943 disclose Justice Doug-
las' strong support for the Government's positions during that
period. He voted for the Government in 82% of the tax cases
which the Court decided. He endorsed the taxpayer's position
less often than did the Court, and registered no dissents in favor
of the taxpayer.
TABLE I-1 (SUMMARY)
TAX CASES DECIDED BY SUPREME COURT, 1939-1973
Number
Douglas
Volumes Number Number Won for
Period U.S. Reports of Cases by Taxpayer Taxpayer
1(1939-1943) 307-19 91 22 (25%) 16(18%)
TABLE 11-1
CASES IN WHICH DOUGLAS DIFFERED WITH THE COURT
Number of
Cases in Number Number
which Douglas Douglas Percentage Douglas Percentage
Period Participated in Minority in Minority Alone Alone
All Cases
1 91 6 V2 7% 0 0%
Won by Taxpayer
1 22 6 29% 0 0%
Won by Government
1 68 0 0% 0 0%
TABLE III-1
How DOUGLAS MADE HIS DISSENTING VIEWS KNOWN
Number of Number Percentage
Cases in Number Number Dissent Dissent
which Douglas Douglas Wrote Without Without
Period Participated in Minority Dissent Opinion Opinion
All Cases
1 91 6 1 1 1%
Won by Taxpayer
1 22 6 1 1 4%
Won by Government
1 68 0 0 0 0%
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Out of 91 cases in which he participated, Justice Douglas
wrote the opinion of the Court on 29 occasions. That figure
represents slightly over 30% of the cases in which Justice Doug-
las voted with the majority. In only one case did he dissent
without either joining or writing an opinion.
It is also worth noting that in this early period Justice
Douglas dissented in only a handful of cases (6 out of 91). He
was not alone in any of those dissents. 12 Further, in 4 of the 6
cases, two other justices joined him. As the years unfold, that
degree of solidarity erodes and is replaced by increased dissent,
often solitary.
Our examination of Justice Douglas' opinions in this period
reveals an inclination to construe the taxing statutes favorably to
the Government. In part, at least, this seems to have been due to
a judicial attitude supportive of the IRS in its efforts to resolve
the difficulties inherent in administering the tax system. The
opinions also reflect thought and attention.
1. Approach to the Statute
Two cases in this period involved taxpayers whose hardship,
due to unique factual circumstances, might have been considered
compelling enough to warrant deviation from the literal com-
mand of the statute-without doing violence to the basic statu-
tory scheme-in order to sustain their positions. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court in both cases, refused exceptional
treatment.' 3 In J.E. Riley Investment Co. v. Commissioner'4 the
taxpayer mined gold in Alaska. Because of slow mail service to
and from the taxpayer's remote location, it used income tax
forms from earlier years to avoid delinquency. When the tax
collector sent 1933 forms to the taxpayer for use in reporting its
1934 income, he did not call attention to a change in the law that
had created a percentage depletion deduction, 15 and under
which the taxpayer could have elected the new benefit or con-
tinued on the old cost depletion system. Unaware of the statu-
12 During this period, Justice Roberts dissented alone 4 times; Justice McReynolds
dissented alone twice; and Justices Reed and Butler each dissented alone once. Addition-
ally, Justices Roberts and McReynolds dissented twice without opinion; Justices Black and
Douglas and Chief Justice Hughes each dissented once without opinion. See Appendix,
Tables IV-V, infra.
13 Both cases were decided by a unanimous Court, but the concern here is not with
conformity, or even the implication of "correctness" which unanimity sometimes creates.
It is simply to note that justice Douglas could plausibly have construed the statute
favorably to the taxpayers and that he did not do so. This contrasts with his approach in
later periods.
I I1 U.S. 55 (1940).
15 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 114(b)(4), 48 Stat. 680, 710 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 613).
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tory change, the taxpayer made no election. Since the taxpayer
had a zero basis, no cost depletion was possible. It was found that
if the taxpayer had known of the new statutory alternative, it
would have elected percentage depletion. The statute provided
that a failure to elect the percentage depletion method for 1934
would deny the taxpayer the right to use that method later.
Thus, because of tardy mail service the taxpayer failed to claim a
benefit through which it would have reduced its tax liabilities
substantially. In the following year the taxpayer filed an
amended 1934 return, taking a deduction for percentage deple-
tion and claiming a resultant refund. The Commissioner denied
the claim on the ground that amendment was impermissible
after the due date of the return.' 6
Justice Douglas noted the taxpayer's hardship, but upheld
the Commissioner. According to his interpretation, the oppor-
tunity to elect percentage depletion was "afforded as a matter of
legislative grace"' 7 to be availed of only in strict accordance with
the congressional requirements. Justice Douglas recognized that
the purpose of the statutory provision barring amendments was
to preclude taxpayers from switching from one depletion basis to
another with the benefit of hindsight. Although the taxpayer in
Riley could not have gained from such a switch, so that the
purpose of the statute was not in tension, Justice Douglas found
no authority to justify an exception. It was irrelevant to Justice
Douglas that slow mail delivery had denied the taxpayer the
choice Congress intended it to have. For the Justice Douglas of
this early period, such hardship ivas perhaps "the basis for an
appeal to Congress . . ." but not a "ground for relief by the
courts from the rigors of the statutory choice which Congress has
provided.'
Justice Douglas approached Scaife Co. v. Commissioner ' 9 as he
did Riley. In Scaife the taxpayer's vice president had instructed its
treasurer to place a value of $1,000,000 on the corporation's
capital stock for purposes of the capital stock tax. 20 By mistake,
the value was declared at $600,000. When the error was discov-
,6 Apparently the taxpayer could have sought permission of the Commissioner to
amend its return in August, 1935, when it first learned of the statutory provision for
percentage depletion. See 311 U.S. at 57, 58. The Court did not rely on that fact,
however. The basis of the Court's opinion was that the Commissioner could not accept a
tardy election; it did not matter whether the taxpayer's delay was or was not reasonably
justified.
1
7 Id. at 58.
'"Id. at 59.
19314 U.S. 459 (1941).
2 0 Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 105(a), 49 Stat. 1017, repealed, Act of June 21,
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 401(a), 79 Stat. 148.
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ered, a new return was prepared declaring the greater value,
and the taxpayer remitted the additional tax that resulted. The
taxpayer sought to base its capital stock tax on the higher
valuation, because the higher valuation would result in a lower
taxable income for purposes of the excess-profits tax imposed by
section 106(a) of the Revenue Act of 1935.21 Like the provision
in Riley, the statute applicable in Scaife required that the valua-
tion appear on the taxpayer's return for the year of the election
that fixed the value of its stock and permitted no amendment
after the due date of the return for that year.22 Finding the
change untimely, the Commissioner refused to accept the new
capital stock tax return and the additional sum.
Justice Douglas wrote for the Court to sustain the
Commissioner's subsequent refusal to recompute the taxpayer's
excess profits tax on the basis of the stock's higher valuation.
Once again he recognized the harshness implicit in rejection of
the taxpayer's attempt to amend its return. Nevertheless, he
chose to extend 23 Riley, concluding that if the Court were to
adopt the taxpayer's position it would be "performing a legisla-
tive, . . . not a judicial, function. 24
A second notable facet of Justice Douglas' approach to
statutory construction during this first period was his tendency to
resolve ambiguity in favor of the Government; he construed
narrowly the exceptions from the general rule which required all
income to be reported. Maguire v. Commissioner25 required a
construction of section 113(a)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1928.26
The taxpayer in Maguire had acquired a share of a testamentary
trust established by her father. She contended inter alia that the
basis to her of the property left by the will was its fair market
value at the time the trustees delivered it to her. The Govern-
ment claimed that the basis of property left in trust was its value
(here lower) at the time the trustees received it from the ex-
ecutor. By her contention the taxpayer sought to avoid taxation
21 49 Stat. 1019 (1935), repealed, Act of Nov. 8, 1945, ch. 453, § 122(a), 59 Stat. 568.
22 The Commissioner hadstatutory power to extend the due date for 60 days under
appropriate regulations. He had promulgated no such regulations, however, and the
taxpayer had sought no extension. 314 U.S. at 462.
2 In Riley Justice Douglas said, "We are not dealing with an amendment designed
merely to correct errors and miscalculations in the original return." 311 U.S. at 58.
-4314 U.S. at 462. On the question of whether hardship to the taxpayer is a factor to
be considered in tax cases, compare Riley and Scaife with Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358
U.S. 59, 61 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at text accompanying notes 85-86
infra; United States v. Lewis, 940 U.S. 590, 592 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed
at text accompanying notes 76-81 infra; Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44,49 (1944)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at notes 69-75 infra & accompanying text.'- 313 U.S. 1 (194).
26 45 Stat. 819 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014).
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on the amount by which the property had appreciated while in
the hands of the trustees.
The statute provided that in all cases other than those
specifically excepted, the basis was to be the value "at the time of
the distribution to the taxpayer. ' 7 In the excepted cases, the
basis was to be the value at the time of the testator's death.
Justice Douglas did not hold that the case before him came
within one of the explicit exceptions, but he read those excep-
tions as evidence of a general legislative purpose to fix basis as
value at the time when the property was distributed by the
estate's executors. With that legislative purpose as his guide,
Justice Douglas held that the basis of the property was its value
when the executors transferred control to the trustees. Thus, he
ruled that the statutory phrase "distribution to the taxpayer"
included a distribution to a trust of which the taxpayer was a
beneficiary.
Although Justice Douglas relied primarily on his own judg-
ment, inferentially drawn, as to what Congress must have meant,
he expressed a further reason for rejecting the taxpayer's posi-
tion:
The creation of such an opportunity for manipulation
of tax liability cannot be lightly presumed. Similarly, we
cannot assume in absence of explicit provisions that
Congress intended to create substantial periods of time
following the date of death during which the value of
the property bequeathed would have no incidence as
respects subsequent gains or losses.28
That argument suggests that during this period Justice Douglas
approached questions of construction of the tax statute on the
general premise that increment in the value of property should
not escape income taxation in the absence of an explicit congres-
sional decision to that effect.
Justice Douglas based his opinion for the Court in Helvering
v. Clifford29 on a similarly expansive view of the intended reach
27 Section 113(a)(5) provided in part:
If personal property was acquired by specific bequest, or if real property was
acquired by general or specific devise or by intestacy, the basis shall be the fair
market value of the property at the time of the death of the decedent. If the
property was acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent, the basis in
the hands of the estate shall be the fair market value of the property at the time
of the death of the decedent. In all other cases if the property was acquired
either by will or by intestacy, the basis shall be the fair market value of the
propert at the time of the distribution to the taxpayer.
28 313 U.S. at 8.2,9 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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of the tax statute; he was expansive despite an arguably available,
narrow basis for decision urged on the Court and rejected in an
opinion by Justice Douglas on the same day as Clifford was
decided.3 0 In Clifford the taxpayer had established an irrevocable
trust for the benefit of his wife, with provision for reversion of
the corpus to himself at the end of a five year term. As trustee,
however, the taxpayer retained substantial control over the trust
property. The issue before the Court was whether the husband
remained taxable on the trust income to which only the wife was
entitled. The court of appeals had found the taxpayer not liable
under the statute.
In reversing the court of appeals, Justice Douglas based his
opinion on the proposition that the "broad sweep" of the statu-
tory definition of income
indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full mea-
sure of its taxing power .... Hence our construction of
the statute should be consonant with that purpose.
Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or
conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive
genius may construct as a refuge.., should not obscure
the basic issue. That issue is whether the grantor after
the trust has been established may still be treated, under
this statutory scheme, as the owner of the corpus.
31
In accord with that approach, the issue was to be resolved as
a matter of factual determination based on a realistic view of the
trust and "all the circumstances attendant on its creation and
operation. '' 32 Reviewing the record, Justice Douglas found a
sufficient basis for the conclusion that the taxpayer had not
ceased to be the owner of the trust property.
There was some evidence of a congressional view which ran
contrary to the approach by which Justice Douglas resolved the
case.33 Congress had specifically provided for taxing the settlor
30 The authors believe it was within the pale for the Court to have decided that since
the income of a revocable trust was taxable to the settlor under § 166 of the 1939 Code,
the income of a short term trust (whose corpus would be returned to the settlor upon
termination) was taxable, a fortiori, to the settlor. In effect, a short term trust with
reversion of corpus is one as to which the settlor has exercised a power to revoke ab initio.
That would have been a more contained, narrower, less legislative basis for decision in
Clifford. But cf. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the
Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 779, 799-801 (1941). Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court, explicitly rejected that approach in Helvering v. Wood, 309 U.S. 344 (1940).
31 309 U.S. at 334.
3"Id. at 335.
" See id. at 338 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts said that prior to the
enactment of § 166, which taxed the income of certain revocable trusts to the grantor,
there could be no doubt that trust income was taxable to the trust, as a separate taxpaying
entity. Section 166, he claimed, modified that rule only as to the trusts defined therein.
Congress had specifically rejected a proposal to include a trust like the Clifford trust in
the modification. Therefore, the statutory purpose was to tax the Clifford trust income to
the trust, not to the grantor.
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on the income of a revocable trust, but had rejected a Treasury
recommendation 34 for similar treatment of the income of short
term irrevocable trusts, such as the one before the Court in
Clifford. Justice Douglas concluded, however, that since Congress
intended the definition of income to sweep broadly, its failure to
adopt the Treasury's recommendations "cannot be said to have
subtracted from [the definition of income] what was already
there." 35 Rather, he reasoned that Congress had merely in-
tended to refuse any per se rule regarding short term trusts,
thus leaving the cases to be determined by triers of fact on a
case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances basis. Twice, then, Jus-
tice Douglas relied in Clifford on the "income" definition (or lack
of definition) to reach his result.
Riley, Scaife, Clifford and Maguire illustrate an early tendency
on the part of Justice Douglas to construe the statute against the
taxpayer. The statutory provisions involved in those cases could
have been construed against the Government without doing
violence to the legislative purpose or scheme. At that time,
however, Justice Douglas believed in giving scope to the statute
and disregarded harsh results as not within the province of the
Court to correct.
2. Attitude Toward the Internal Revenue Service
Two of Justice Douglas' opinions from this first period
illustrate a conscious deference to the role of the IRS. Helvering
v. Reynolds36 involved the retroactive applicability of a 1935
Treasury regulation interpreting the Revenue Act of 1934. The
taxpayer relied upon a prior case, Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Co.,
37
which squarely ruled against the retroactivity of a different
regulation. Justice Douglas limited that case to its special facts. In
the case before him, he noted that "[t]he magnitude of the task
of preparing regulations under a new act may well occasion
some delay," and that to refuse to apply the 1935 regulation in
question retroactively would be to "introduce into the scheme of
the Revenue Acts refined notions of statutory construction which
would, to say the least, impair an important administrative re-
sponsibility in the tax collecting process."38 This he would not
do.
Justice Douglas' opinion in Reynolds reflects a willingness to
34 Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 151 (1934).
35 309 U.S. at 337.
36 313 U.S. 428 (1941).
37306 U.S. 110 (1939).
38 313 U.S. at 433.
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defer to the Commissioner when pragmatic reasons supported
the administrative action. Although it would seem to have been
possible to place less weight on the practical difficulty which the
Commissioner faced, Justice Douglas chose to exercise judicial
power to broaden rather than constrict the Commissioner's au-
thority. A similar attitude is evident in Textile Mills Securities Corp.
v. Commissioner,39 in which the corporate taxpayer claimed, and
the Commissioner disallowed, expenses incurred for publicity,
nontrade advertising, and other forms of public relations in
connection with a campaign for the passage of the Settlement of
War Claims Act of 1928. A Treasury regulation, not the statute,
stated that such expenses were not deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses of a corporation.40 Justice Douglas,
again writing for the Court, rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the regulation was contrary to statute (which allowed ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses) 4' and hence invalid. Since
there was no "clear Congressional action to the contrary, 42
Justice Douglas ruled that the administrator's interpretation of
the statutory phrase "ordinary and necessary expenses" could
properly be inferred from a policy recognized in the law of
contracts which opposed the "business" of procuring private
legislative favors. On that basis, he concluded simply, "The
general policy being clear it is not for us to say that the line was
too strictly drawn.
43
3. Quality of Opinions
In addition to some already discussed,44 a number of the
cases indicate that in this first period Justice Douglas devoted
considerable time and thought to the writing of tax opinions.
The point here is not that Justice Douglas' conclusions were
always "right." It is only to emphasize that he supported his
judgments with reasoning and analysis which demanded atten-
tion and were at least arguably correct. Although several cases
tempt exposition, 45 only two, 46 reasonably representative, will be
discussed.
39314 U.S. 326 (1941).
40 Treas. Reg. 74, art. 262 (1931) (the pertinent portion of which is now contained in
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20 (1973)).
41 Revenue Act of 1928, § 23(a), ch. 852, 45 Stat. 799.
42 314 U.S. at 339.
43 Id.
4 4 E.g., Mapuire, Clifford and Reynolds.45 See especiall, e.g., Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943); Helvering v.
Gambrill, 313 U.S. 11 (1941); Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941).
46 Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523 (1943); United States v. Stewart,
311 U.S. 60 (1940).
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United States v. Stewart4 7 involved the taxability, under the
Federal Farm Loan Act of 191648 and the Revenue Act of
1928, of capital gains resulting from transactions in certain
farm loan bonds. The issue was a narrow one of statutory
construction, not obviously significant to basic conceptual or
schematic issues in the administration of the income tax. Justice
Douglas' opinion for a nearly unanimous Court discloses a close
reading of the statute in the perspective which Congress had
established, accompanied by a detailed consideration of the
taxpayer's arguments.
The taxpayer had purchased the farm loan bonds with a
view to their appreciation in value, and not for their interest.
When the taxpayer made his purchase he relied upon statements
of the Farm Labor Board which he had reasonably understood
to mean that his profits on resale of the bonds would be exempt
from federal income tax. Subsequently the taxpayer realized a
profit on his disposition of the bonds, and the Commissioner
included that profit in the taxpayer's income. After he paid the
additional tax assessed, the taxpayer sued for a refund.
The applicable Revenue Act included in gross income all
"gains, profits, and income derived from ... sales, or dealings in
property, whether real or personal .... ",50 Section 22(b)(4) of
that Act specifically exempted "[i]nterest upon . . . securities
issued under the provisions of the Federal Farm Loan Act," but
that provision was inapposite because the taxpayer's gains were
clearly not "interest." The taxpayer relied, rather, on section 26
of the Federal Farm Loan Act, which provided that
farm loan bonds issued under the provisions of this Act,
shall be deemed and held to be instrumentalities of the
Government of the United States, and as such they and
the income derived therefrom shall be exempt from
Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation. 51
He contended that the capital gains at issue constituted exempt
"income derived" from the bonds within the meaning of section
26.
Justice Douglas noted, as a first proposition, that the term
"income" was, by itself, broad enough to refer to capital gains,
such as those at issue, as well as to interest received by a
47311 U.S. 60 (1940).
48 39 Stat. 360.
49 45 Stat. 791.
50 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(a), 45 Stat. 797.
51 Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, ch. 245, § 26, 39 Stat. 380.
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bondholder. He reasoned further, however, that the phrase
"income derived therefrom" suggested a distinction between
income derived from the mere fact of ownership (interest) and
income realized from transactions in the bonds (capital gains).
Only the first, he stated, was definitely within the statutory
exemption.
Justice Douglas found support for this view in the legislative
history. Congress passed the Farm Loan Act in 1916. The same
session of Congress adopted the Revenue Act of 1916,52 which
dealt with the farm loan bonds in precisely the same manner as
the Revenue Act of 1928, exempting only interest.53 Because
Justice Douglas concluded that the exemption in the 1916 tax
statute was a "legislative interpretation" of the Farm Loan Act by
the same Congress which had passed that Act, he ruled that "the
express exemption of interest alone makes tolerably clear that
capital gains are not exempt.
54
Justice Douglas next considered five arguments which the
taxpayer had advanced. First, the taxpayer relied on debates and
comments in the legislative history of section 26 which referred
in a general way to the importance of the exemption provision or
to the fact that it created an advantage for the farm loan bonds
over other investments. Justice Douglas found these statements
to be inconclusive, because "not sufficiently discriminating in
their analysis or criticisms to throw light on the narrow issue
involved.
55
Second, Justice Douglas found unpersuasive the taxpayer's
reliance on administrative interpretations. The taxpayer referred
to an unpublished memorandum by the General Counsel of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, but Justice Douglas indicated that
the memorandum was not precisely on point. In any case, an
administrative ruling issued two years later went directly against
the taxpayer's position.
The taxpayer's third argument referred to a 1938 amend-
ment to section 26. The taxpayer maintained that this amend-
ment, which provided that "all income, except interest,
derived"5 6 from farm loan bonds was includible in income,
implied that prior to 1938, capital gains and other noninterest
income were entitled to exemption. Justice Douglas cited legisla-
tive materials to show that the purpose of the amendment as it
52 39 Stat. 756.
53 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 453, § 4, 39 Stat. 758.
54311 U.S. at 65.
I55d. at 65-66.
56 Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 817, 52 Stat. 578.
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was originally phrased was unrelated to the taxpayer's case.
Although the form of the amendment as ultimately enacted did
suggest a relevance to the taxpayer's type of transaction, Justice
Douglas saw no convincing indication that the amendment was
intended to change, rather than clarify, the law as it related to
those transactions. He concluded that "even if a contrary impli-
cation were to be assumed, it would not override so belatedly the
clear inference, based on a long series of revenue acts exempting
only interest, that capital gains were taxable.
'57
Fourth, the taxpayer reviewed several other statutory ex-
emption provisions in an effort to show that Congress had
employed the word "interest" when interest was all it desired to
exempt, and had reserved the word "income" for situations in
which it intended to grant a broader exemption, as in section 26.
Although he found this argument "suggestive," Justice Douglas
gave it little weight in view of the multitude of other factors
involved in the congressional choice of phrasing and Congress'
longstanding exemption of interest only in successive Revenue
Acts.
Finally, Justice Douglas rejected the taxpayer's argument
that he had reasonably relied on statements of the Farm Loan
Board which allegedly interpreted the statutes to exempt the
taxpayer's capital gain. Justice Douglas noted that those state-
ments were really no more specific than the statute, but he held
in any case that the Board had no authority to render authorita-
tive opinions as to tax consequences. Taking this argument
together with the taxpayer's other four arguments, Justice Doug-
las found their collective force insufficient to overcome the basis
for his original construction of the exemption.
The thoroughness of Justice Douglas' opinion in the Stewart
case is impressive but in this regard it is not exceptional for this
period. In later periods, however, Justice Douglas' opinions have
evidenced much less detail.
Unlike the Stewart case, resolution of Virginian Hotel Corp. v.
Helvering58 required a broad consideration of the dynamics of
the statutory scheme of income taxation. The taxpayer had
depreciated certain assets from 1927 to 1937 according to an
estimated useful life which the Commissioner determined, in
1938, was too short. The Commissioner therefore computed a
deficiency for 1938. To determine the proper basis for deprecia-
tion in 1938 and later years, the Commissioner subtracted the
57 311 U.S. at 68.
58319 U.S. 523 (1943).
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total amount of depreciation taken between 1927 and 1937 from
the original cost of the assets.
The taxpayer had sustained net taxable losses for each of
the years 1931 through 1936, and the Commissioner stipulated
that as a result "the entire amount of depreciation deducted on
the income tax returns for those years did not serve to reduce
the taxable income. ' 59 The taxpayer did not challenge the
Commissioner's redetermination of the useful life of the assets.
It claimed only that in computing the new basis for depreciation
the Commissioner should not have subtracted the amount de-
ducted during the loss years which was in excess of the amount
which the taxpayer would have claimed if it had properly esti-
mated the assets' useful lives, and which was of no tax benefit in
any event. Had the taxpayer deducted depreciation at only the
proper rate during the loss years, then, in computing the new
depreciation basis, the Commissioner could now subtract from
the original cost only the aggregate of the proper deductions.
Since the taxpayer's excessive depreciation rate had not reduced
his taxes during the loss years, the taxpayer argued that there
was no reason in 1938 to decrease his current and future
depreciation basis by the amount of the excessive depreciation
originally shown. The lower basis determined by the Commis-
sioner would result in a smaller deduction and hence a greater
tax liability for 1938 and following years.
Justice Douglas' opinion for the 5-4 majority upholding the
Commissioner began with an analysis of the phrasing of the
statute. Section 113(b)(1)(B) of the Revenue Act of 193860 pro-
vided that depreciation was to be computed each year on a basis
equal to the original cost of the property, less adjustments for
depreciation "to the extent allowed (but not less than the amount
allowable) under this Act or prior income tax laws." The paren-
thetical phrase, Justice Douglas explained, meant that the basis
of the property must be diminished each year by at least the
amount of depreciation which would be properly claimed,
whether or not that amount was actually taken. Thus, deprecia-
tion could not "be accumulated and held for use in that year in
which it [would] bring the taxpayer the most tax benefit.
6 1
The taxpayer's argument, however, centered on the phrase
"to the extent allowed." The taxpayer acknowledged that if an
erroneously large deduction had saved it money, then the deduc-
5 9 Id. at 524.
60 Ch. 289, § 113(b)(1)(B). 52 Stat. 493-94.
61 319 U.S. at 525.
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tion had surely been "allowed." But it argued that when Con-
gress used the term "allowed" it meant to encompass only cases
in which the taxpayer had received a dollar benefit.
Justice Douglas recognized the compatibility of the
taxpayer's position with the purpose of the statute, but he did
not believe that the meaning of the statutory language was
determinable solely by its purposes.62 Instead he based his hold-
ing first on his understanding of the dynamics of a taxpayer's
claim to a deduction and our system for audit and disallowance.
Under our federal tax system there is no machinery for
formal allowances of deductions from gross income.
Deductions stand if the Commissioner takes no steps to
challenge them. Income tax returns entail numerous
deductions. If the deductions are not challenged, they
certainly are "allowed," since tax liability is then deter-
mined on the basis of the returns. Apart from contested
cases, that is indeed the only way in which deductions
are "allowed." And when all deductions are treated alike
by the taxpayer and by the Commissioner, it is difficult
to see why some items may be said to be "allowed" and
others not "allowed."
63
Then, finding no "clear and compelling" reasons for interpreting
"allowed" as used in section 1 13(b)(1)(B) differently from its
meaning in this "general setting of the revenue acts,' '64 Justice
Douglas rejected the taxpayer's contention.
Virginian Hotel is a hard case. The taxpayer sought to deny
the government a windfall at the taxpayer's expense. The
taxpayer's position was consonant with the purpose of the stat-
ute, and four justices accepted that position because of its appeal
to fairness. Justice Douglas' judgment may or may not be more
compelling than the taxpayer's argument. It is clear, however,
that he rested his decision on pragmatic elements involved in the
complex task of administering the federal income tax, and that
he carefully explained the considerations in his opinion.
The cases and statistical data permit one to form an overall
picture of Justice Douglas' approach in federal tax cases during
his first years on the Court. His voting record did not differ
significantly from that of the Court as a whole. Although he
voted for the taxpayer in a fair percentage of the cases, he
62 That purpose was "to make sure that taxpayers who had made excessive deduc-
tions in one year could not reduce the depreciation basis by the lesser amount of
depreciation which was 'allowable.'" Id. at 526.
3
1d. at 527 (footnote omitted).6 4 Id. at 528.
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generally supported a broad view of the statutory scheme, di-
rected toward enforcement and protection of the revenue, and
he rejected constrictive interpretations of the Code which tax-
payers urged, as well as taxpayer pleas for exceptional treatment
where a literal reading of the statutes would prove harsh. He
construed special exemptions and deductions in the context of
what he saw as the overriding legislative goal and schema of a
progressive income tax. He gave substantial deference to the
agency charged with administering the statute. His opinions
reveal attention to legislative history and considerable concern
for the practical necessities of administering the tax system.
B. Period 2. 1943-1959: A Shift to the Taxpayer
Statistics for the lengthy second period65 of Justice Douglas'
tenure indicate a clear shift in attitude. In this period he voted
for the taxpayer in 47% of the cases in which he participated,
almost three times the 18% figure for 1939-1943. Moreover,
the increase did not reflect the record of the Court as a whole.
The Court held for the taxpayer in only 25% of the cases, the
same percentage as in the prior period. As a result, Justice
Douglas differed from the majority of the Court in a far greater
number of cases in this period than he had previously. Although
he had never done so during the first period, Justice Douglas
dissented in favor of the taxpayer in 29 (31%) of the 87 cases
decided for the government during this second period. He was a
member of the minority in over 28% of all the cases, more than
four times as often as in Period 1.
The second period also witnessed a sharp decline in the
percentage of cases in which Justice Douglas explained his posi-
tion in a written opinion. During these years he participated in
116 tax cases, voting with the majority in 83, but he wrote for the
Court in only 10 (12%) of those cases. More significantly, in a
number of cases Justice Douglas dissented without any opinion
at all, or, on occasion, with only a very brief statement. In 15 of
the 33 cases in which Justice Douglas was in the minority, he
failed to write or join any dissenting opinion. 66 This figure
-lhis second period is quite long (16 years) as compared to the first period (4
years); nevertheless, the number of cases is only 20% greater (116 as compared to 91).
11 Although the Court had overruled the court of appeals in a number of these cases,
it does not seem proper to assume that Justice Dou las' silent dissents intended to
indicate a reliance on the lower courts' reasoning. There are cases in which ustice
Douglas stated his reliance on the court of appeals, e.g., Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S.
499, 505 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting). During this period Justice Burton dissented
without opinion 4 times (3 of those with Justice Douglas); Justices Black and Jackson each
dissented twice without opinion; and Justices Reed and Roberts each dissented once
without opinion. See Appendix, Table V, infra.
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TABLE 1-2 (SUMMARY)
TAX CASES DECIDED BY SUPREME COURT, 1939-1973
Number
Douglas
Volumes Number Number Won for
Period U.S. Reports of Cases by Taxpayer Taxpayer
1(1939-1943) 307-19 91 22 16
(25%) (18%)
2 (1943-1959) 320-59 126 32 54 (of 116)
(25%) (47%)
TABLE 11-2
CASES IN WHICH DOUGLAS DIFFERED WITH THE COURT
Number of
Cases in Number Number
which Douglas Douglas Percentage Douglas Percentage
Period Participated in Minority in Minority Alone Alone
All Cases
1 91 6 7% 0 0%
2 116 33 28% 11 9%
Won by Taxpayer
1 22 6 29% 0 0%
2 29 4 14% 2 7%
Won by Government
1 68 0 0% 0 0%
2 87 29 33% 9 10%
TABLE 111-2
How DOUGLAS MADE HIS DISSENTING VIEWS KNOWN
Number of Number Percentage
Cases in Number Number Dissent Dissent
which Douglas Douglas Wrote Without Without
Period Participated in Minority Dissent Opinion Opinion
All Cases
1 91 6 1 1 1%
2 116 33 8 15 13%
Won by Taxpayer
1 22 6 1 1 4%
2 29 4 0 4 14%
Won by Government
1 68 0 0 0 0%
2 87 29 8 11 13%
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contrasts sharply with that of the first period, since in those years
Justice Douglas dissented silently in only one case.
Justice Douglas also began in this period to stand alone. In
11 cases, in 9 of which he favored the taxpayer, his vote was the
only one in the minority.6 7 The occasions of this phenomenon
are closely linked with the incidence of his silence: of the 15
unexplained dissents, 9 were solitary, and 8 of those 9 favored
the taxpayer.
Two additional factors should be kept in mind. First, the
statistical break between Periods 1 and 2 is quite sharp. Second,
as the cases suggest, the break develops progressively and con-
tinuously throughout Period 2.68 The nature and development
of the change, which seems to have begun in 1943-44, and
progressed through 1958-59, is evident from an examination of
the cases.
1. Approach to the Statute
Commissioner v. Harmon69 held that a husband and wife who
irrevocably elected community property treatment under an
option provided by state law were not entitled to the income
splitting benefits accorded by Poe v. Seaborn70 to couples who
lived under a mandatory community property law. Justice Doug-
las' lengthy dissent in Harmon7' explored and criticized the
distinctions on which the Court rested its decision. The basis of
his argument, stated in his conclusion, was that
... Poe v. Seaborn has been carved out as an exception to
the general rules of liability for income taxes. If we are
to create such exceptions we should do so uniformly.
We should not allow the rationale of Poe v. Seaborn to be
good for one group of states and for one group only.
7 2
This passage marks perhaps the first occasion on which Justice
Douglas articulated a philosophy leading to decisions against the
Government when he finds such results necessary in order to
67 During this period justice Roberts dissented alone 3 times; Justices Rutledge,
Burton, Jackson, Black and Harlan each dissented alone twice; and Justice Whittaker
dissented alone once. See Appendix, Table IV, infra.
'8 To illustrate both factors we have broken the statistical analysis for Period 2 into
two subparts in Tables I, II and III in the Appendix.
69323 U.S. 44 (1944).
70 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Prior to Justice Douglas' tenure, the Supreme Court had held
in Poe that a husband and wife in a state which had traditionally applied community
property concepts could each report one half of their combined income, despite the fact
that the entire income might have been earned by only one spouse, and thus diminish the
Sprogressive rates.
3 - . at 49.
72 Id. at 56.
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treat favorably those taxpayer litigants whose position he be-
lieves to be essentially similar to that of others who have been
granted favor by Congress, rejecting opportunities for nice but
rational distinctions within the legislative framework. The Justice
Douglas of 1941 might have accepted the Court's distinction in
order to retain the broad reach of the tax statute, 3 requiring
that exceptions come from Congress, not the courts. 4 There are
strong indications that he in fact agreed with the Court's result in
Harmon, but was willing to reach it only by overruling, not
distinguishing, Poe v. Seaborn, a case which he believed to be in
conflict with the conceptions he had articulated in Helvering v.
Clifford.75 Justice Douglas could, of course, have concurred in the
Harmon result and still criticized the Court for its rationale, but
he chose otherwise.
In United States v. Lewis7 6 the taxpayer had reported, in the
year of receipt, a bonus which he believed rightfully his. The
amount of the bonus had been incorrectly computed, however,
and in a later year he was required to return the portion to
which he was not entitled. A deduction in the year of return
would not produce a benefit equal to the tax he had paid, but the
Court, in order to preserve the basic concept of the annual
accounting period, held that he could not adjust the earlier
year's tax. Thus the majority concluded, "We see no reason why
the Court should depart from . . .well-settled interpretation
merely because it results in an advantage or disadvantage to a
taxpayer. '7 7 Justice Douglas based his dissent,7 8 however,
squarely on his sense of the inequity to the taxpayer: "Many
inequities are inherent in the income tax. We multiply them
needlessly by nice distinctions which have no place in the practi-
cal administration of the law."'7 9 This statement indicates an
approach quite different from that in Riley, Scaife and other cases
of the earlier period. Furthermore, Justice Douglas' conclusion
seems to be fundamentally inconsistent with his view in Virginian
Hotel,80 in which the problem was similar and the taxpayer's
73 Cf. Maguire v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 1 (1941); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940), both cases discussed at notes 25-35 supra & accompanying text.
'4Cf. Scaife Co. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 459, 462 (1941); J. E. Riley Investment
Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55, 59 (1940), both cases discussed at notes 14-24 supra &
accompanying text.
7 5 "The truth of the matter is that Lucas v. Earl and Helvering v. Clifford on the one
hand and Poe v. Seaborn on the other state competing theories of income tax liability."
Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. at 56. For the discussion of Clifford, see notes 29-35
supra & accompanying text.
76340 U.S. 590 (1951).
"Id. at 592.7$1d.
9 1d. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
so For the discussion of Virginian Hotel, see notes 58-64 supra & accompanying text.
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"equities" no less poignant. In both cases the taxpayer's early
returns were based on excusable misconceptions of facts,8 ' yet
Justice Douglas would require one taxpayer to accept the harsh
consequences of his error, while eight years later he would
permit the other to recoup.
Cases decided during the latter half of this period continued
the trend illustrated by Harmon and Lewis. In Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner82 the taxpayers had liquidated a corporation in
1937. They properly reported the profits as capital gains over
the years of receipt, 1937-1940. In 1944 the taxpayers paid a
judgment rendered against the old corporation, as they were
required to do, and they claimed an ordinary business loss
deduction. Thus the taxpayers had had their profits from the
liquidation taxed at the lower capital gains rates, but sought to
deduct related losses from income which would otherwise have
been taxable at the higher ordinary income rates. The Commis-
sioner contended that the loss should have the same character as
the profits of the earlier years, i.e., that it should be treated as a
capital loss (with reduced tax benefit).
The Court agreed with the Commissioner. The character of
the loss was to be determined by reference to the source transac-
tion. The source of the loss was the "exchange" of a capital asset,
the stock, upon liquidation of the corporation. The Court held
that it was not inconsistent with the annual accounting concept to
determine the nature of the loss in that fashion, because, con-
trary to the taxpayer's position in Lewis, there was no attempt to
reopen and adjust the 1937-1940 tax years. The 1944 tax would
be computed according to the taxpayer's 1944 income.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, 83 did not believe that the
Government's position could be accepted without violating the
annual accounting concept established in Lewis and other cases.
Rather, he stressed that "if [Lewis] is the law, we should require
observance of it-not merely by taxpayers but by the Govern-
ment as well."'84 As in Harmon, Justice Douglas did not take the
opportunity to distinguish and thus limit a previous case with
which he disagreed-Lewis-but voted instead to expand its
scope. While there may be strong arguments against it, the
majority's treatment of the annual accounting issue was not
8 The errors in both cases were in good faith, see United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S.
590, 591 (1951); Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523, 531 (1943) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
82 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
83 Id. at 7.84 1d. at 10.
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patently meritless. Justice Douglas' opinion did not address the
majority's theory, however, and seems to rest on a somewhat
personal conception of fair play between government and tax-
payer.
Justice Douglas' dissent in Peurifoy v. Commissioner"5 relied on
his sense of hardship to the taxpayer. The Court held that
construction workers who stayed at one job for periods of
between eight and a half and twenty and a half months, and who
maintained permanent residences elsewhere, could not deduct
expenses for board, lodging and transportation at the site of
their jobs. Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's refusal to
rule that those expenses were necessarily incurred "away from
home." Although he cited no authority for the proposition, he
did "not believe that Congress intended such a harsh result [as
the majority's] when it provided a deduction for traveling
expenses."86
This concern with the statutes' harsh results sharply conflicts
with Justice Douglas' approach in Riley8 7 and Scaife,88 cases
decided in the first period. In those cases it was he who said that
the harshness of results in some cases was not a ground for
judicial relief.
Notwithstanding the change in attitude which these opinions
suggest, Justice Douglas continued to approach occasional cases
of statutory interpretation as he did in the earlier period.8s9 In
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Commissioner"0 an insurance
company distributed what it termed "excess interest dividends"
to certain policyholders who left their policies on deposit after
maturity. The decision to pay these "excess interest dividends"
was discretionary with the board of directors of the company,
9'
but their decisions were made and announced before the year in
which the payments accrued. On these facts the taxpayer claimed
that, as a matter of law, the payments were deductible as "in-
terest" paid for the use of the depositors' funds.92 Justice Doug-
las, writing for the Court, held against the taxpayer since he
85 358 U.S. 59, 61 (1958).
86 Id. at 62.
87 For the discussion of Rile),, see notes 14-18 supra & accompanying text.
ss For the discussion of Scafe, see notes 19-24 supra & accompanying text.
, These cases, however, were perhaps not close. Of the 5 occasions during this
period on which Justice Douglas wrote for the majority in favor of the Government, 4
were unanimous decisions. In the fifth, Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
(holding a prize received for winning a musical contest to be a discharge of a contractual
obligation, not a gift) Justice Jackson dissented without opinion.
321 U.S. 560 (1944).
81 The payment of "excess interest dividends" was not contingent upon any cumula-
tion of earnings or surplus. Id. at 562.
92 According to the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 203(a)(8), 47 Stat. 225.
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found the payments to "have a degree of contingency which the
notion of 'interest' ordinarily lacks. ' 93 In a passage that recalls
the rationales of Maguire and Clifford, he reasoned: "If we
expanded the meaning of the term [interest] to include these
excess interest dividends, we would indeed relax the strict rule of
construction which has obtained in case of deductions under the
various Revenue Acts." '94
In United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, Inc.,95 decided
near the end of this period in 1955, Justice Douglas construed
section 122(d)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 193996 which
allowed a taxpayer to carryback and deduct any Excess Profits
Tax "paid or accrued" in any taxable year, in which the taxpayer
incurred a net operating loss. The operation of complementary
sections of the Code led him to conclude that the words "paid or
accrued" did not entitle a taxpayer which kept its books on the
accrual basis to compute the section 122(d)(6) deduction on the
cash basis, "a basis that is inconsistent with the method of
accounting which it employs. '97 Justice Douglas' justification for
the result again echoed his early approach:
This taxpayer argues the inequity of the results which
would follow from our construction of the Code. But as
we have said before, "general equitable considerations"
do not control the question of what deductions are
permissible .... We can only take the Code as we find it
and give it as great an internal symmetry and consis-
tency as its words permit ....
The fact that the construction we feel compelled to
make favors the taxpayer on the cash basis and dis-
criminates against the taxpayer on the accrual basis may
suggest that changes in the law are desirable. But if they
are to be made, Congress must make them. 98
"3321 U.S. at 564.
94 Id.
"'349 U.S. 232 (1955).
.i' Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 105(e)(3)(C), 56 Stat. 807, amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 122(d) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(d)).
"1 349 U.S. at 235.
9"Id. at 236. Compare Olympic Radio with Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 56
(1944) (Douglas, J., dissenting), reproduced at text accompanying note 72, supra.
See also Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958) (Douglas, J.,
stating that the capital gains treatment "has always been narrowly construed so as to
protect the revenue against artful devices."); Alison v. United States, 344 U.S. 167, 170
(1952) (Court authorizing taxpayers, victims of embezzlement, to take deduction for loss
in year of discovery, rather t an year of theft; finding loss "sustained" in that year, in
accord with Regulation requiring that deduction be taken in year of theft ordinarily but
not always. "An inflexible rule is not needed; the statute does not compel it." (Douglas, J.,
dissented.) But see Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237, 240 (1955) (Douglas, J.,
wvriting for the Court) a companion case to Olympic, holding for the taxpayer on a related
issue:
But the rule that general equitable considerations do not control the
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The six cases discussed demonstrate an unsteady change in
some areas of statutory construction during this period. Some
cases suggest that Justice Douglas wanted to avoid "inequitable"
consequences to the taxpayer at bar, and thus gave weight to
considerations which did not influence him during his first five
years on the Court.99 At the same time he continued to construe
the Code against the taxpayer in cases in which the results
apparently did not offend his sense of fairness.
2. Attitude Toward the Internal Revenue Service
Justice Douglas' opinions during this period only infre-
quently expressed his attitude towards the Internal Revenue
Service. A comparison of two cases, however, suggests that his
conception of the proper deference owed the agency was in a
state of flux.
Robertson v. United States,' decided in 1952, involved a
taxpayer who had written a symphony during the years
1936-1939, for which he received a prize in 1947. He computed
his 1947 tax as though the income had been received ratably
over the period 1937-1939. The Commissioner did not object to
spreading the income, a technique authorized by section 107(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,101 but claimed that the
amount should be spread over the three-year period ending with
the receipt of the prize, 1945-1947. The Treasury regulation
which construed section 107(b) 10 2 supported the Commissioner's
interpretation. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, surveyed
the legislative history, found that it supported the Com-
missioner's position, and held for the Government. He also
noted simply: "That is the construction given by Treasury Regu-
lations ... ; and while much more could be said, it seems to us
that that construction fits the statutory scheme."'
0 3
On the other hand, his dissent in United States v. Korpan, 1
04
decided in 1957, suggests a less deferential attitude toward the
measure of deductions or tax benefit cuts both ways .... [W]here the benefit
claimed by the the taxpayer is fairly within the statutory language and the
construction sought is in harmony with the statute as an organic whole, the
benefits will not be withheld from the taxpayer though they represent an
unexpected windfall.
" Seealso Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256, 263 (1943) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (construing charitable deduction for estate tax).1 0 0343 t .S. 711 (1952).
101 Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 220, adding Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 107(b) (now
INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1302).
10 2Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.107-2, 8 Fed. Reg. 15010 (1943).
103 43 U.S. at 715-16.
104 354 U.S. 271 (1957).
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Service. In Korpan the critical issue was whether pinball machines
constituted "slot machines" for the purpose of application of a
special tax on gaming devices. 10 5 A Treasury regulation' 0 6 stated
that pinball machines of the type in question were subject to the
tax, and the Court agreed that the legislative history sustained
the Government's position. Justice Douglas' two-line "dissent
from the conclusion that . . . pin ball machines are games of
chance within the meaning of the statute"' 0 7 did not address the
regulation at all.
3. Quality of Opinions
Several factors suggest that Justice Douglas did not devote as
much attention to tax cases in this period as he had previously.
As mentioned earlier, he failed to give any indication of his views
in almost half of his dissents. In a number of the instances in
which he did express his dissenting views, his opinions were not
as thorough as those in the earlier periods. 0 In Arrowsmith, for
example, he simply failed to join issue with the majority's
analysis. In Lewis and Korpan as well, his short dissents cited no
authority, and failed to explain his thinking. Furthermore,
despite an apparent conflict with the orientation of his majority
opinion in Virginian Hotel, his Lewis opinion ignored the earlier
case. This tendency is most apparent, however, in Justice Doug-
las' treatment of two sets of companion cases, Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner'°9 and Commissioner v. Sullivan;"10 General
American Investors Co. v. Commissioner"' and Commissioner v. Glen-
shaw Glass Co.
112
In Tank Truck the taxpayer sought to deduct fines paid as
penalties for violations of a state law" 3 which set a maximum
weight limit for trucks using the state's highways. It was estab-
lished that profitable operation of the taxpayer's business re-
quired that it violate truck weight limitation. Accordingly, the
taxpayer argued that the fines were deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. 14 Justice Clark's opinion for a
105 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4461.
106 Treas. Reg. 59, § 323.22, 7 Fed. Reg. 10835 (1942).
107 354 U.S. at 277.
10 8 But see, e.g., Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630 (1946) (Douglas, J., writing for the
Court in favor of a taxpayer); Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 49 (1944)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at notes 69-75 supra & accompanying text.
19 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
110 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
111 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
112 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
113 No. 142, § 1, [1945] Pa. Laws 328, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 903 (1971).
14 See Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 121(a), 56 Stat. 819, amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A) (now INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 162).
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unanimous Court rested on the proposition "that a State [should]
not be thwarted in its policy. 11 5 He reasoned that
[c]ertainly the frustration of state policy is most
complete and direct when the expenditure for which
deduction is sought is itself prohibited by statute. If the
expenditure is not itself an illegal act, but rather the
payment of a penalty imposed by the State because of
such an act, as in the present case, the frustration
attendant upon deduction would be only slightly less
remote, and would clearly fall within the line of
disallowance.'
1 6
The deduction was denied.
Justice Douglas wrote a shorter opinion, also for a unanim-
ous Court, upholding a taxpayer's deduction in Sullivan.1 7 But
read in light of Justice Clark's Tank Truck opinion, Justice Doug-
las simply fails to illuminate the crucial issues. The taxpayer in
Sullivan had leased premises and paid employees to conduct a
gambling enterprise illegal under Illinois law. The state had
outlawed not only the operation of the enterprise, but also, and
more significantly, the payment of rent for premises used to
carry on the enterprise."" The chief question before the Court
was whether the taxpayer could deduct his rental payments as
ordinary and necessary business expenses.' 19 Justice Douglas'
opinion relied on a Treasury regulation' 2" which permitted a
taxpayer to deduct the federal excise tax on wagers.' 21 This
regulation, he held,
-seems to us to be recognition of a gambling enterprise
as a business for federal tax purposes. The policy that
allows as a deduction the tax paid to conduct the busi-
ness seems sufficiently hospitable to allow the normal
deductions of the rent and wages necessary to operate it
.... That is enough to permit the deduction, unless it is
clear that the allowance is a device to avoid the conse-
quences of violations of a law, as in . . . Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, or otherwise con-
travenes the federal policy expressed in a statute or
regulation, as in Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner.... 122
"5 356 U.S. at 35.
" 6 Id. (citation omitted).
117356 U.S. 27 (1958).
' ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 336 (1945).
"'See Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 121(a), 56 Stat. 819, amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162).
120 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-i, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 51.
121 Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 471(a), 65 Stat. 529-30, adding Int. Rev. Code of
1939, §§ 3285(d), 3290.
122 356 U.S. at 28-29. For a discussion of Justice Douglas' Textile Mills opinion,
written in Period 1, see text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
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But this argument ignores the thrust and the scope of the
Tank Truck opinion which was handed down the same day as
Sullivan, and which he joined. Justice Douglas wrote that the
payments in Sullivan were deductible because the enterprise was
recognized as a "business for federal tax purposes"; the deduc-
tion sought did not amount to the federal government's paying a
portion of a state imposed fine; and the deduction was not
contrary to a federal policy expressed in a statute or regulation.
None of these considerations, however, suffices to reconcile
Sullivan with Tank Truck. The second is contrary to the terms of
Tank Truck. Justice Clark's woi-ds, that the "frustration of state
policy is most complete and direct when the expenditure for
which deduction is sought is itself prohibited by statute," 123 ap-
pear to render Sullivan an a fortiori application of Tank Truck
because the rental in Sullivan was manifestly illegal under state
law. Additionally, since Tank Truck itself was built on deference
to state policy, Justice Douglas' third consideration, the effect on
federal policy, further confuses the scope and rationale of that
case. 124
Apparently Justice Douglas intended to distinguish the cases
largely on the basis of the Treasury regulation which he cited.
But that regulation was irrelevant to the stated issue, which was
the possible frustration of state policy by allowance of the rental
and salary deductions. First, the act of paying the federal excise
tax, unlike the taxpayer's payment of rent, is lawful conduct.
Second, for the federal government to subsidize a payment of
excise taxes to itself does not involve a frustration of state policy.
Moreover, as Justice Douglas employed it in deriving his first
consideration, the regulation demonstrates only that the enter-
prise was a "business for federal tax purposes." There was
nothing in Tank Truck, however, to suggest that that taxpayer's
trucking enterprise was not also a "business for federal tax
purposes."
The result is somewhat bewildering. Although Sullivan and
Tank Truck may be distinguishable, Justice Douglas' opinion does
not reconcile the cases and fails seriously to address the issues.
As a result the reader is left with only a confused sense of the
law. 1
25
123 356 U.S. at 28-29. For a discussion of Justice Douglas' Textile Mills opinion,
written in Period 1, see text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
123 56 U.S. at 35.
J24 ustice Douglas' treatment of these last 2 considerations is unsatisfing in another
way; he does not deal with the question why they would or would not appq to the case at
hand.
125 It is the authors' belief that the Douglas result in Sullivan is more compatible with
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A comparison of Glenshaw Glass126 and its companion case,
General American Investors, 127 presents a similar enigma. Glenshaw
Glass raised the question whether a taxpayer must include in
income amounts received as punitive damages for fraud and
violations of the federal antitrust laws. General American Investors
involved the taxability of "insider profits" recovered by a corpo-
ration under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.128 Chief Justice Warren wrote a full opinion for the Court
in Glenshaw Glass, concluding that the receipts there involved
were taxable income. The Chief Justice wrote a very brief opin-
ion in General American Investors, holding that Glenshaw Glass
controlled. He said that the Court could find no relevant differ-
ence between the receipts in Glenshaw Glass and those involved in
General American Investors. Justice Douglas dissented without
opinion in Glenshaw Glass,12 9 but concurred in the result in the
General American Investors'3" case. He offered no explanation as
to the basis on which he, alone among the members of the Court,
was able to distinguish the cases. One is left only to guess at his
reasoning.1
31
This second period marks a substantial and significant shift
in Justice Douglas' attitude toward the congressional plan of
income taxation. He frequently voted for the taxpayer in cases
which the Court decided for the Government, an event which
never occurred in the 91 cases of Period 1. His early concern
that Congress, not the Court, should be the arbiter of "fairness"
in issues of tax policy weakened early in Period 2, and continued
to diminish in strength. There was an accelerating tendency for
him not to state the reasons for his votes, accompanied by an
increased frequency of dissents overall. A greater proportion of
his opinions fail to satisfy the student who asks, "Why?"
Another event of note occurred near the end of this period.
In 1958 Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the Court in
the statute than the one he agreed to in joining justice Clark's opinion in Tank Truck. See
Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
1089, 1111-12 (1964), cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 692-94 (1966).
126 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
127 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
128 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970).
129 348 U.S. at 433.
13
0 Id. at 436.
131 Taxpayer's counsel in Glenshaw Glass had offered the Court a possible basis for
distinguishing General American Investors. In granting certiorari because of a presumed
conflict between the two cases as decided below, the Court implicitly denied the distinc-
tion, which was argued for at that early stage. Brief for Respondent, William Goldman
Theaters, Inc., In Opposition to Certiorari at 2, Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426 (1958). The Warren opinion for the Court thought so little of it, it was
ignored. Justice Douglas' position could be explained by an acceptance of that distinction,
but again one can only speculate. See Brief for Respondent, William Goldman Theaters,
Inc. at 16-17, id.
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Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.132 That opinion sustained the
Commissioner's position. In the more than fifteen years that
have elapsed since then, Justice Douglas has not written a tax
opinion for the Court that supported the Government.1 33 In-
deed, he has written for the Court in only one tax case since
Lake. 1
34
C. Period 3. 1959-1964: Extreme Years
The statistical data for the years 1959-1964 are extraordi-
nary. The trends which began and developed in the second
period, sixteen years long, accelerated dramatically during these
six years. This period, involving only 35 cases, and substantially
shorter than the preceding two periods, is marked off because it
demonstrates an extremity in Justice Douglas' voting pattern that
is not seen in any other series of Court Terms. The statistics for
the fourth and final period, 1964-1973, indicate a blunting of the
extreme tendencies which distinguish this third period.
In the years 1959-1964, Justice Douglas voted for the tax-
payer in 73% of the tax cases, as compared with 47% in Period 2
and 18% in Period 1. Furthermore, the Court's judgments lend
added significance to that datum. A majority of the Court held
for the taxpayer only 17% of the time (in 6 out of 35 cases), the
lowest percentage of taxpayer success in any of the four periods.
Thus Justice Douglas differed from the majority of the Court in
54% of the cases in this period, as compared with 28% in the
preceding period. In every one of his dissents Justice Douglas
voted for the taxpayer. This contrasts sharply with the first
period, when each of his dissents favored the Government.
The frequency of opinionless and nearly opinionless dissents
also grew significantly, as did the percentage of occasions on
which Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter. No other justice
joined Justice Douglas in 9 of the 18 cases in which he dissented.
Those solitary stances were in cases representing more than 27%
of the tax cases in which Justice Douglas participated. In 6
of those 9 solitary dissents, he dissented without opinion.135 In
132 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
J33justice Douglas did, however, write concurring opinions in support of the
Government's position. See Appendix, Table VII, infra. But cf. Federal Power Comm'n v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S. 458 (1973) (decision in which Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court, holding for the Commission and construing the 1963
Tax Reform Act as permitting the Commission to abandon flow-through valuations of
the property of the respective utilities).
a4 Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding for the taxpayer).
135 He, together with Justice Black, also dissented without opinion in one other case,
United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1963). Justice Black also dissented alone in one case
during this period. No other justice dissented alone or without opinion during this
period. See Appendix, Tables IV, V, infra.
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TABLE 1-3 (SUMMARY)
TAX CASES DECIDED BY SUPREME COURT, 1939-1973
Number
Douglas
Volumes Number Number Won for
Period U.S. Reports of Cases by Taxpayer Taxpayer
1(1939-1943) 307-19 91 22 (25%) 16(18%)
2 (1943-1959) 320-59 126 32(25%) 54 (of 116)
(47%)
3 (1959-1964) 360-76 35 6(17%) 24 (of33)
(73%)
TABLE 11-3
CASES IN WHICH DOUGLAS DIFFERED WITH THE COURT
Number of
Cases in Number Number
which Douglas Douglas Percentage Douglas Percentage
Period Participated in Minority in Minority Alone Alone
All Cases
1 91 6 7% 0 0%
2 116 33 28% 11 9%
3 33 18 54% 9 27%
Won by Taxpayer
1 22 6Y2 29% 0 0%
2 29 4 14% 2 7%
3 6 0 0% 0 0%
Won by Government
1 68 0 0% 0 0%
2 87 29 33% 9 10%
3 27 18 67% 9 33%
TABLE 111-3
How DOUGLAS MADE HIS DISSENTING VIEWS KNOWN
Number of Number Percentage
Cases in Number Number Dissent Dissent
which Douglas Douglas Wrote Without Without
Period Participated in Minority Dissent Opinion Opinion
All Cases
1 91 6 1 1 1%
2 116 33 8 15 13%
3 33 18 8 7 21%
Won by Taxpayer
1 22 6 1 1 4%
2 29 4 0 4 14%
3 6 0 0 0 0%
Won by Government
1 68 0 0 0 0%
2 87 29 8 11 13%
3 27 18 8 7 26%
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2 others he wrote brief dissents, totaling twelve lines, which
failed to explain his views in any detail. In the remaining one,
Justice Douglas relied on the opinion of the court of appeals
below. Justice Douglas produced 3 full dissenting opinions, but
all were in cases in which one or two other justices joined him.
Justice Douglas wrote no opinions for the Court during this
period, although he wrote 2 concurring opinions. Consequently
there are few opinions to help explain the extreme shift in his
voting pattern.
1. Approach to the Statute
In Knetsch v. United States136 the question was whether certain
payments made by a sixty-year-old taxpayer to an insurance
company constituted deductible "interest paid . . . on indebted-
ness" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. 137 The
transaction was extremely complicated:
On December 11, 1953, the insurance company
sold Knetsch . . . 30-year maturity deferred annuity
savings bonds [with a life insurance provision, in the
total amount of $4,000,000] and bearing interest at
2-1/2% compounded annually. The purchase price was
$4,004,000. Knetsch gave the Company his check for
$4,000 and signed [nonrecourse notes of] $4,000,000...
for the balance. The notes bore 3-1/2% interest and
were secured by the annuity bonds. The interest was
payable in advance, and Knetsch on the same day pre-
paid the first year's interest, which was $140,000. Under
the Table of Cash and Loan Values made part of the
bonds, their cash or loan value at December 11, 1954,
the end of the first contract year, was to be $4,100,000.
The contract terms, however, permitted Knetsch to
borrow any excess of this value above his indebtedness
without waiting until December 11, 1954. Knetsch took
advantage of this provision only five days after the
purchase. On December 16, 1953, he received from the
company $99,000 of the $100,000 excess over his
$4,000,000 indebtedness, for which he gave his notes
bearing 3-1/2% interest. This interest was also payable
in advance and on the same day he prepaid the first
year's interest of $3,465. In [his] return for 1953,
[Knetsch] deducted the sum of the two interest pay-
ments, that is $143,465, as 'interest paid. . . within the
taxable year on indebtedness,' under § 23(b) of the 1939
Code.
136364 U.S. 361 (1960).
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a).
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The second contract year began on December 11,
1954, when interest in advance of $143,465 was payable
by Knetsch on his aggregate indebtedness of
$4,099,000. Knetsch paid this amount on December 27,
1954. Three days later, on December 30, he received
from the company cash in the amount of $104,000, the
difference ... between his then $4,099,000 indebted-
ness and the cash or loan value of the bonds of
$4,204,000 on December 11, 1955 [, less $1,000]. He
gave the company appropriate notes and prepaid the
interest thereon of $3,640. In [his] return for the taxa-
ble year 1954 [Knetsch] deducted the sum of the two
interest payments, that is $147,105, as 'interest paid...
within the taxable year on indebtedness,' under § 163(a)
of the 1954 Code.
138
The taxpayer and the insurance company repeated these
transactions in succeeding years, the taxpayer again claiming
"interest" deductions. In form, then, the sixty-year-old taxpayer
contracted for receipt of monthly annuity payments beginning
when he reached ninety, or alternatively, for an insurance death
benefit should he die before that age. In fact, however, his
subsequent annual borrowings "kept the net cash value, on
which any annuity or insurance payments would depend at the
relative pittance of $1,000.' 13 9 The taxpayer expected to benefit
under the arrangement from the "interest" deduction claimed
for his payments. He expected to profit only because his losses
on the transaction were less than his anticipated tax benefits.
140
The Commissioner disallowed the deductions for both years,
however, and the lower courts, viewing the transactions as sham,
upheld him. Justice Brennan, for the Supreme Court, held that
the propriety of the interest deduction depended on "whether
what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which
the statute intended."' 41 He then found that the taxpayer had no
stake as insured or annuitant since the repeated annual borrow-
ing on the bonds consistently depleted their net cash value. As
the Court saw it, the transaction was devoid of economic reality,
138 364 U.S. at 362-63.
139 Id. at 366.
' The taxpayer expected a deduction for interest paid in excess of $140,000
although he would retain untaxed the $100,000 he had borrowed. Increases on the cash
surrender of the bonds, compounding at 2V2%, would be taxed only when the bonds
were surrendered or sold. (Even then they might be taxable only at the lower rate for
capital gains. See Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement of Tax Avoidance, 1961
Sup. CT. REv. 135, 137, 40 TAXEs 296, 297 (1962).) Thus, through the arrangement,
Knetsch meant to turn a taxable amount of $143,465 (in the first year, increasing each
year) into a presently non-taxed $100,000 (in the first year, increasing each year).
14! 364 U.S. at 365, quoting from Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469(1935).
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but for the presumed tax benefits. On that basis, Justice Brennan
called the transaction a sham, and the deduction was disallowed.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, 142 refused to decide "whether
what was done . . . was the thing which the statute intended."
Because he thought that the Court could not consistently apply
its definition of "interest" in future cases, Justice Douglas did not
feel obliged to seek out the Congressional purpose underlying
the deduction provision as it might apply to the case before him.
Rather, he said that he would require Congress to "particularize"
abuses of the deduction which it intended to proscribe. Thus,
although he acknowledged that the taxpayer never intended to
come out ahead in his investment apart from the income tax
deduction, Justice Douglas voted to sustain that deduction. That
result was required, he thought, because "[t]he insurance com-
pany existed; it operated under Texas law; it was authorized to
issue these policies and to make these annuity loans,"'143 and
because the documents spoke in terms of borrowed money and
interest.
Justice Douglas' view in Knetsch of the relationship between
the Court and Congress contrasts most sharply with the view he
expressed as a young Justice in Helvering v. Clifford.144 The issue
in Clifford was "whether the grantor after the trust has been
established may still be treated, under this statutory scheme, as
the owner .... ,, 45Although Justice Douglas considered only the
face of the transaction in Knetsch, his premise in Clifford was that
"[t]echnical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or con-
veyances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may
construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic
issue.' 46 Significantly, Justice Roberts, dissenting in Clifford,147
had argued that the problem was one of "drawing a line" which
only Congress should draw, precisely the approach which Justice
Douglas took in Knetsch. In Clifford, however, Justice Douglas
found that "the failure of Congress to adopt . . . [a] rule of
thumb"'148 merely left the issue to the courts for a case by case
determination of when to look beyond the formalities of the
trust.
142 364 U.S. at 370.
1
4 3 
Id.
144 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
1
45 Id. at 334.
146 Id. See also Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958) (Douglas, J.,
stating for the Court that the capital gains treatment "has always been narrowly con-
strued so as to protect the revenue against artful devices.").
141 309 U.S. at 343.
148Id. at 338.
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Several other opinions indicate Justice Douglas' willingness
during this third period to decide statutory questions in favor of
the taxpayer while affording only a vague hint of the process by
which he construed the statute. The plainest example is United
States v. Gilmore,149 an important case interpreting section
23(a)(2) of the 1939 Code' 50 which permitted a deduction for
expenses incurred for the conservation of property held for the
production of income. Justice Douglas' brief dissent' 51 in favor
of the taxpayer found the majority's reading of the deduction
provision "unjustifiably narrow" but did not explain how or why
it was to be more "broadly" interpreted.
Three cases involving the exclusion of gifts from the
recipient's gross income further illustrate Justice Douglas' ten-
dency in this period to construe the Code without telling why or
how he arrived at his interpretation. The Court's opinion in
Commissioner v. Duberstein152 disposed of two cases, Duberstein, and
Stanton v. United States. Those cases posed the question whether
certain transfers of property to a taxpayer were gifts excludable
from income under section 22(b)(3) of the 1939 Code.' 55 The
Court considered various suggested constructions of the statu-
tory term "gift," deciding finally that a gift is that which, under
all the circumstances, was given with a "detached and disin-
terested generosity, out of affection, respect, admiration, charity
or like impulses."' 54 Turning on an examination of all the
attendant facts, the Court's approach would yield a result
primarily factual in character. That rendering of the statutory
term "gift" followed the one originally employed years earlier in
Bogardus v. Commissioner. 155 The Court simultaneously reaffirmed
the doctrine of Dobson v. Commissioner,156 however, rejecting the
broad scope of review in "gift" cases which Bogardus had earlier
suggested.
Applying Bogardus, as refined by Dobson, the Court saw
evidence and findings of fact in Duberstein sufficient to support
the Tax Court's conclusion that there had been no gift; but in
Stanton it remanded to the district court for more specific
findings. Justice Douglas' dissent' 57 treated both cases alike,
149 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
1 53 Stat. 12 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212).
151 372 U.S. at 52.
152 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
153 53 Stat. 10 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 102).
154 363 U.S. at 285 (citations omitted).
155302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937).
156 320 U.S. 489, 498 n.22 (1943).
157 363 U.S. at 293.
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holding for the taxpayer in both as a matter of law. It reads:
"MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents, since he is of the view that
in each of these two cases there was a gift under the test which
the Court fashioned nearly a quarter of a century ago in Bogar-
dus v. Commissioner."'58 In the third case, however, United States v.
Kaiser,'"59 decided the same day as Duberstein, Justice Douglas
attempted in his concurring opinion160 to articulate his concep-
tion of the gift exclusion.
Applying the Duberstein rationale, a majority of the Court in
Kaiser upheld, as not clearly erroneous, a jury's finding that the
transfer in question was a gift.t 61 Citing Bogardus, Justice Doug-
las concluded that the transfer was a gift as a matter of law,
"since my idea of a 'gift' within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code is a much broader concept than that of my
Brethren."'
162
But Justice Douglas' concurrence in Kaiser merely stated his
conclusion that the gift exclusion should be "broader," without
an examination of legislative history, and without apparent ap-
preciation of the difficulties which had confronted the Service
and the lower courts. Like his dissent in Duberstein, it failed to
expose his understanding of the Bogardus test on which he relied.
In neither opinion did he explain why he differed with the
Court, except that his conception of a gift was "broader." It
would seem that Justice Douglas' position in Duberstein and Kaiser
rested on warrantless imposition of personal inferences from the
evidence. 1
6 3
2. Attitude Toward the Internal Revenue Service
Two of Justice Douglas' opinions in this period suggest a
reversal of his earlier sympathetic attitude towards the Service.'
6 4
158 Id.
159 1d. at 299.
1
60 Id. at 325.
i6i Three justices, however, also basing their approach on Duberstein, found as a
matter of law that there was no gift. See 363 U.S. at 3 7, 328 (Whittaker, J., dissenting,
with whom Harlan and Stewart, JJ., joined).6 2 1d. at 326.
163 There is some suggestion in the Kaiser concurrence as well that Justice Douglas'
conclusion was based on his own perception of the facts: "[T~he whole setting of the case
indicates to me these payments were welfare, plain and simple." Id. at 326 (emphasis
supplied).
164 These cases do not conflict directly with Justice Douglas' earlier decisions involv-
ing the weight to be given to Treasury regulations or the deference due the administra-
tive considerations of the IRS. They do strongly indicate, however, that Justice Douglas'
early apparent sympathy with IRS positions had completely dissipated by this time. But Cf.
Co rCor. v. Sau ber, 363 U.S. 709 (1960), in which Justice Douglas voted with the
majority in a per curiam decision to uphold the validity of Treasury rulings inter preting
an excise on air conditioning units. Three justices dissented. The majority result favored
the taxpayer, however.
(Vol. 122:235
DOUGLAS-FEDERAL TAX CASES
Commissioner v. Lester1 65 involved the deductibility of payments
made by a taxpayer to his former wife. The statute166 permitted
a divorced husband to deduct certain payments to his ex-wife,
but not those "which the terms of the . . .written [divorce]
instrument fix[ed]" as child support. It required further that any
amounts deductible for the husband would be taxable to the
wife. The taxpayer's settlement agreement provided for the
wife's custody of the couple's three children and for payments to
the wife which would be reduced by one-sixth upon the emanci-
pation or marriage of each child. The Commissioner contended
that the words of the divorce settlement identified a sum for the
support of minor children with sufficient clarity to render that
sum nondeductible.
I The issue was a close one of statutory inter-
pretation. 167 Seeking a rule that would lead to negotiating cer-
tainty for divorcing spouses, the Court held that payments were
deductible to the husband (and taxable to the wife) unless the
agreement "expressly speciflied] or 'fix[ed]' a sum certain or
percentage of the payment for child support.... 68 Since the
agreement did not do that in so many words, the, husband-
taxpayer was held to be entitled to the deduction.
Justice Douglas' concurrence severely criticized the Gov-
ernment for seeking relief from the courts rather than from
Congress. He said that because of the complex and intricate
nature of the revenue laws, the Government should turn "square
corners" in moving against the taxpayer. This, he thought, had
not been done with Mr. Lester. It was clear to the Court, Justice
Douglas implied, and thus should have been to the Commis-
sioner, that the language of the statute permitted the taxpayer
the deduction he sought. Therefore Justice Douglas believed
that the Commissioner was trying to use the Court to change the
meaning of the statute. He was alarmed for fear that the
Government's "purse" and "endurance," longer than those of
any taxpayer, would be the decisive factor in such litigation. But
Justice Douglas' chastisement of the Government in this case is
strange, since the Court's result, though well reasoned, was not
manifest on the face of the statute or its history.
16. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
'61 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 22(k), 23(v), 56 Stat. 816-17 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 71, 215).
167 The Commissioner contended that he was supported by administrative interpre-
tation, and, as the Court noted, "[T]here was such a contrariety of opinion among the
Courts of Appeals that the Commissioner was obliged as late as 1959 to issue a Revenue
Ruling" which was itself inconclusive. 366 U.S. at 305-06.
lId. at 303.16 5Id. at 306.
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Justice Douglas' dissent in Rudolph v. United States, 170 which
involved the deductibility of expenses connected with a
taxpayer's attendance at a convention of insurance salesmen,
emphasizes his mistrust of the IRS. He complained that the
Service had discriminated against the taxpayer because it had
permitted other professionals and businessmen to deduct con-
vention expenses. He relied particularly on a Commerce Clear-
ing House report stating that "'the Commissioner has recently
withdrawn his objections in two Tax Court cases to the deduction
of convention expenses incurred by two IRS employees.' "171 "It
is odd, indeed," Justice Douglas argued, "that revenue agents
need make no accounting of the movies they saw or the night-
clubs they attended, in order to get the deduction, while insur-
ance agents must."'1 72 He did not acknowledge the possibility that
the Commissioner might be making tooled judgments based on
factual differences in individual cases, nor did he indicate the
source of his information about the movies and nightclubs.
3. Quality of Opinions
The statistical data show that although Justice Douglas was
more frequently in dissent during this period, he chose less
frequently to state the basis of his disagreement with the major-
ity. Additionally, as the cases already discussed have indicated, 173
when he did write his positions were often unexplained or
poorly explained.
Justice Douglas' opinion in Rudolph1 74 was utterly reckless.
The taxpayer had sold insurance from a base in Texas. Because
he sold a large amount of insurance, his insurance company
offered him and his wife the opportunity to attend its convention
in New York City, together with 150 other qualifying employees
and their spouses, all at company expense. The group travelled
on special trains and stayed together in one hotel. The trip took
a week, two and a half days of which were spent in New York.
Only one morning in New York was devoted to company busi-
ness, however. The taxpayer and his wife were on their own for
the rest of the time.
The Commissioner included the value of the trip as income
170 370 U.S. 269, 278 (1962).
1
7 11d. at 284. Justice Douglas also quoted language in the circular to the effect that
the National Association of Internal Revenue Employees had announced its belief that
the Commissioner's action set a precedent which all IRS employees could rely upon in
deducting convention expenses. Id.
17 2 1 d
73 See notes 136-63 supra & accompanying text.
174 370 U.S. 269, 278 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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to the taxpayer, not subject to a business expense deduction.
Having lost in his contest of that position in the district court
and the court of appeals, the taxpayer secured a writ of cer-
tiorari. The district court had found that the trip was offered by
the company chiefly in the way of a bonus or award for work
previously done, and was accepted by the Rudolphs primarily as
a pleasure, not a business, trip. The Supreme Court subse-
quently noted the agreement of the parties that the tax conse-
quences of the trip turn upon the "Rudolphs' 'dominant motive
and purpose' in taking the trip and the company's in offering
it.' 75 Since the resolution of the controversy as thus presented
turned solely on issues of fact, subject to review only according to
the "clearly erroneous" test, the Court dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted.
1 7 6
Justice Douglas dissented from dismissal of the writ,17 7 argu-
ing that receipt of the trip was not income as that term was
defined in the Code and regulations, but that if the value of the
trip did constitute income, it was "plainly deductible." The first
part of his argument seems to be two-pronged. First, Justice
Douglas asserted that the benefits were not provided as compen-
sation for services rendered. It is not clear, however, whether he
meant that they were not added compensation for services al-
ready performed, or that they were not compensation for ser-
vices rendered during the week of the convention itself, or both.
At one point Justice Douglas said: "On this record there is no
room for a finding of fact that the 'expenses paid' were 'for
services' rendered.' 78 The only finding below to which that
statement could conceivably have referred was the trial court's
finding that the trip was a bonus for work already performed. If
Justice Douglas meant to attack that finding, then he failed to
offer any support from the record for his conclusion, and failed
to state why the district court's conclusion was wrong.17 9 If, on
the other hand, Justice Douglas intended simply to say that the
convention expenses were not paid as compensation for services
rendered during the week of the trip, then his point is of
questionable relevance. The district court had not found or even
175 Id. at 270.
176 Id. Justice Harlan, obviously responding to Justice Douglas' dissent, wrote a full
concurring opinion in support of the correctness of the decision below. Id.
'rId. at 278.
178 d at 279.
179 Furthermore, justice Douglas agreed with the district court that the taxpayer
ualified for the trip solely on the basis of the success of his earlier work. Id. at 279. With
at, there should have been no room for a finding that the trip was not offered as a
bonus for the taxpayer's employment.
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suggested that the expenses were paid in return for contem-
poraneous services; and neither Justice Harlan's opinion'80 nor
the Government's briefs' 8 ' proffered that basis of decision.
Thus, the first prong of Justice Douglas' effort to show that the
payments were not income was unjustified or irrelevant, or both.
In the second prong of his argument that the paid conven-
tion expenses were not income to the taxpayer, Justice Douglas
relied upon a Treasury regulation which provided that:
[o]rdinarily, facilities or privileges (such as entertain-
ment, medical services, or so-called 'courtesy' discounts
on purchases), furnished or offered by an employer to
his employees generally, are not considered as wages
subject to withholding if such facilities or privileges are
of relatively small value and are offered or furnished by
the employer merely as a means of promoting the
health, good will, contentment, or efficiency of his
employees.1'8 2
He relied on this regulation even though on its face it had no
relevance to the case. The regulation exempted fringe benefits
only from the wage withholding requirement, not from inclusion
in the taxpayer's income, and withholding was not in issue in the
case. The section of the Code 83 under which the regulation was
promulgated does not determine whether the benefits furnished
by the employer constitute income. Indeed, it assumes that they
are income, because it is only particular "income" which the
regulation relieves from the withholding requirement.
In the second part of his opinion Justice Douglas argued
that even if the value of the trip was income, that value was
"plainly deductible" as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense. In reaching this result he ignored the findings below that
the convention's business activity was limited to a single morning
in New York.'8 4 He thus asserted implicitly that those findings
were clearly erroneous, but he did not criticize or discuss the
evidentiary basis of the district court's conclusions. In place of
the facts found below, Justice Douglas asserted that more than
one-half of the week was devoted to business activity. He based
that conclusion on his own finding, again without citation to the
record, that the four days of travel time to and from New York
were arranged as a professional seminar.
81 JId. at 270.
1s1 Brief for the United States in Opposition to Certiorari, Rudolph v. United States,
370 U.S. 269 (1961); Brief for the United States, id.
'8 2 Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-1(b) (10) (1955).
": INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3401.
I'4 Rudolph v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 2,3 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
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Justice Douglas also concluded that the company's payment
of the wife's expenses (if income to Rudolph) was deductible,
because her presence on the trip was for a bona fide business
purpose. 185 The district judge had found it unnecessary to reach
this factual issue because he found the trip's primary purpose to
be personal.1 86 Rather than suggest a remand, Justice Douglas
apparently concluded that the record permitted only one
finding. In support of his conclusion, he cited the testimony of
an insurance executive who indicated that the convention pro-
gram included reference to the wife's role in her husband's
work, and that without the wife's presence the convention might
have degenerated into a stag party. That testimony may say
something about salesmen's conventions. To Justice Douglas it
said that a rational person could conclude only that the expenses
of Rudolph's wife were ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses for Rudolph, and not personal.
It is hard to believe that Justice Douglas took his lengthy
Rudolph dissent seriously. He seems to have reacted to an unsub-
stantiated belief that the Commissioner and the courts were
treating insurance conventions differently from all other profes-
sional meetings. He seemed particularly incensed by the
Commissioner's withdrawal of objections in the tax court cases
which permitted two IRS agents to deduct convention expenses.
Yet he made no effort to examine, analyze or distinguish away
those cases. Justice Douglas' anger comes through. His willing-
ness to base judgment on a hunch about the real world of
professional meetings and on an arbitrariness of the Commis-
sioner in dealing with them also comes through. His principle of
law does not.
The Rudolph opinion most forcefully illustrates Justice Doug-
las' increasing tendency during the second and third periods to
-apply the statute from a viewpoint most sympathetic to the
taxpayer before him. The opening statement of his concurring
opinion in Commissioner v. Lester also reflects the shift which had
taken place between the first period cases, Riley1 87 and Scaife,' 18
and the cases decided in the third period:
In an early income tax case, Mr. Justice Holmes said
'Men must turn square corners when they deal with the
Government.' The revenue laws have become so com-
plicated and intricate that I think the Government in
11 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(c) (1958).
186 189 F. Supp. at 5.
187 For the discussion of Riley, see notes 14-18 supra & accompanying text.
188 For the discussion of Scaife, see notes 19-26 supra & accompanying text.
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moving against the citizen should also turn square
corners. 18
9
In Riley and Scaife Justice Douglas told the taxpayers that the
Court was the wrong forum in which to obtain equitable relief
from the revenue laws as the Commissioner and Court were
construing them. In Lester, as in Knetsch, it was the Commissioner
whom he told to seek relief elsewhere. The opinions in these
cases portray a Justice Douglas not recognizable by reference to
the portrait formed by the cases in the first period. Concur-
rently, Rudolph and the gift exclusion cases' 90 illustrate another
disturbing development: an apparent tendency to disregard the
facts found by the factfinder. In this period Justice Douglas did
not seem to perform as a Justice in tax cases, at least insofar as
the role calls for reasoned opinions and the suppression of one's
own impressions and predilections in face of the facts as found.
This period was therefore an extreme one. Justice Douglas
was more alienated from the Court than in any other period, this
by reference both to the percentage of cases in which he dis-
sented and to those in which he dissented alone. And the
positions he took were the least justified of any period.
One wonders why this extreme behavior occurred at this
time. It is possible that Justice Douglas' attention was focused on
the congressionally sanctioned inequities that pervade the tax
code which result in privilege for some and undue burden on
others. It was in this period that Louis Eisenstein wrote his
famous indictment of the tax system, The Ideologies of Taxation.' 9'
That book, which Justice Douglas read and reviewed,' 92 may
have forced to the surface of Justice Douglas' thinking a deep-
seated conviction that so rotten a system as Eisenstein describes,
replete with special favors, ought not be supported in the way
that the Court supports it when it decides for the Government
against a taxpayer (big or little) who has not been effective in the
congressional lobbies.
D. Period 4. 1964-1973: Tempered Rebellion
The data for this period, though not projecting as extreme a
picture as that drawn in the preceding five years, continue to
189 366 U.S. 299, 306.
"90 United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 297, 325 (1960) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 293 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting), both
cases discussed at notes 152-64 supra & accompanying text.
191 (1961).
192 Douglas, Book Review, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Sept. 24, 1961, § 6 (Books), at 13,
col. 1. See text accompanying notes 439-44 infra.
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reveal a decidedly protaxpayer bent. Justice Douglas voted for
the taxpayer in 23 of the 38 cases (59%), while the Court decided
that way only 10 times (27%). Justice Douglas differed with the
Court in 35% of the cases. All of his dissents favored the
taxpayer, as they did in Period 3, but the percentage of his
solitary and mute dissents decreased significantly. Justice Doug-
las was alone in only 6 of the 38 cases or 16% of the time. He
dissented without opinion only twice; on both occasions he stood
alone.1
93
TABLE 1-4 (SUMMARY)
TAX CASES DECIDED BY SUPREME COURT, 1939-1973
Number
Douglas
Volumes Number Number Won for
Period U.S. Reports of Cases by Taxpayer Taxpayer
1(1939-1943) 307-19 91 22 16
(25%) (18%)
2 (1943-1959) 320-59 126 32 54 (of 116)
(25%) (47%)
3 (1959-1964) 360-76 35 6 24 (of33)
(17%) (73%)
4 (1964-1973) 377-93 S. Ct. 38 10 22
(27%) (59%)
TABLE 11-4
CASES IN WHICH DOUGLAS DIFFERED WITH THE COURT
Number of
Cases in Number Number
which Douglas Douglas Percentage Douglas Percentage
Period Participated in Minority in Minority Alone Alone
All Cases
1 91 6 7% 0 0%
2 116 33 28% 11 9%
3 33 18 54% 9 27%
4 38 13 35% 6 16%
Won by Taxpayer
1 22 6 29% 0 0%
2 29 4 14% 2 7%
3 6 0 0% 0 0%
4 10 0 0% 0 0%
Won by Government
1 68 0 6% 0 0%
2 87 29 33% 9 10%
3 27 18 67% 9 33%
4 28 13 48% 6 21%
193 These figures remain higher than those for any other member of the Court,
however. During this period Justice Black dissented once without opinion, and Justices
Black, Blackmun and Harlan each dissented alone once.
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TABLE 111-4
How DOUGLAS MADE HIS DISSENTING VIEWS KNOWN
Number of Number Percentage
Cases in Number Number Dissent Dissent
which Douglas Douglas Wrote Without Without
Period Participated in Minority Dissent Opinion Opinion
All Cases
1 91 6 1 1 1%
2 116 33 8 15 13%
3 33 18 8 7 21%
4 38 13 10 2 5%
Won by Taxpayer
1 22 6Y 1 1 4%
2 29 4 0 4 14%
3 6 0 0 0 0%
4 10 0 0 0 0%
Won by Government
1 68 0 0 0 0%
2 87 29 8 11 13%
3 27 18 8 7 26%
4 28 13 10 2 7%
These statistics serve in part to emphasize the extreme
nature of the preceding period. It is difficult to explain the
lowered incidence of solitary and, particularly, silent dissents in
this latest period. The ratio of silent dissents to total cases for this
period is lower than those for both Periods 2 and 3. Some of his
writing can perhaps be explained on the basis suggested by the
statistics for the prior period, 94 that he will write when he is not
alone. That will not, however, explain all the cases. Eighty-three
percent of his writing occurred in the later part of the period,
when it was clear that the personnel of the Court was in a state of
flux. 1 95 Perhaps Justice Douglas felt compelled to state his posi-
tions in writing to inform his new colleagues on the Court of his
viewpoints in tax cases, or perhaps he believed that written
opinions might persuade some of them. t 96
I. Approach to the Statute
The bare statistics and whatever rationalization aside, the
content of Justice Douglas' opinions in this period reflects the
same attitudes and trends exhibited in Period 3. His approach to
' 4 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
" Of the 12 opinions he wrote, 8 were after April, 1969. At that point it was clear
that President Nixon would soon appoint new Justices to fill the seats of both Chief
justice Warren and Mr. justice Fortas.
Justice Douglas' opinions reflect a judicial awareness of the Court's altered
makeup. In his dissent in SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 411
(1972), for example, he identified a number of decisions as representing "the present
Court's" approach to certain issues.
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statutory construction, as in Period 3, often focused on what he
considered unfairness to the taxpayer at bar, and frequently
ignored larger issues of statutory design and congressional pur-
pose.
Justice Douglas' separate dissent in United States v. Skelly Oil
Co.' 97 set the tone for his interpretation of the Code in this
period. In a prior tax year Skelly had received X dollars for sale
of depletable oil, and had taken the 27-1/2% oil depletion
deduction, 198 thus effectively reporting only 72-1/2% (X). In the
year under review the taxpayer had refunded a portion of those
X dollars to its customers. It sought to deduct the full amount of
that refund,' 99 notwithstanding the fact that it had effectively
reported only 72-1/2% of that sum as taxable income in the prior
tax years. The Court concluded that, absent a clear congressional
mafndate, it should not read the statutory scheme to permit such
a "double deduction" and, accordingly, held in favor of the
Commissioner. Justice Douglas accepted the technical construc-
tion of the statute which Justice Stewart advocated in dissent,20 0
but added his own statement to emphasize his difference with
the majority's approach. Justice Douglas read the Court's opin-
ion as an attempt to inject "equity" into the taxing statute. He
rejected that approach, saying "we do not sit to do equity in tax
cases. "201 He disdainfully detailed the great number of special
favors which Congress had deliberately placed in the Code,
concluding that it was not the Court's role to alter the meaning
of statutory schemes in the interest of equity. But it is clear from
the majority's opinion that its concern was not with "equity" as
the Justices might perceive it, but with the result most reasonable
in light of the statutory plan that Congress had fashioned. Justice
Douglas did not address the merits of the Court's inferences as
to legislative intent.202 Since his opinion makes it implicitly clear
that he personally deplored the special tax favors embedded in
the Code (such as percentage depletion 20 3), it is puzzling that he
voted in Skelly to increase their effect, despite the rational and
acceptable, if not compelling, arguments that supported the
Court's construction to the contrary.20 4
197 394 U.S. 678, 687 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
198 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
19s According to id. § 1341(a)(4 ).
200 394 U.S. at 692 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
201 394 U.S. at 687. This position is akin to that reflected in Justice Douglas' dissent
in Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960), discussed at notes 136-48 supra &
accompanying text.
20 Cf United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940) (Douglas, J.), discussed at text
accompanying notes 47-57 supra.202af text accompanying notes 439-42, 445-49 infra.204Cf Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 9 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
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Justice Douglas also asserted in Skelly Oil that the Supreme
Court should generally avoid tax cases, and accept them only in
the rare case of a clear conflict in the circuits. Tax law should be
made and modified only by Congress, he said, because inequities
could be "quickly corrected" by that body, and because the
Supreme Court lacked sufficient expertise in the field to discover
the congressional intention.- Perhaps Justice Douglas voted
and spoke as he did in Skelly Oil because he felt that Court-
sanctioned double deductions might rip the tax system apart and
force Congress to start anew with a statute free of special favors.
This would be a plausible explanation only if Justice Douglas'
view were shared by the majority. As things were, perhaps he
just would not lend his judicial support to a tax system he
believed unworthy.
Justice Douglas' dissent in United States v. Generes20 6 repeats
the view that the Supreme Court should avoid the resolution of
ambiguities in the Code. The issue was whether a now worthless
debt owed by a closely held corporation to a shareholder-officer
could be treated by the shareholder-officer as a business bad
debt, rather than a nonbusiness bad debt.20 7 Characterization as
a business bad debt would afford the shareholder-officer a
greater tax benefit. 20 8 The issue arose because of the taxpayer's
dual status in the corporation. As a salaried officer with duties to
perform, his relationship to the corporation was, for purposes of
the statute, "business," but as an investor in the corporation his
relationship was "non-business." The relevant Treasury
regulation 20 9 specified that the debt was a business bad debt if
the "loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless" bore a
"proximate" relation to the taxpayer's trade or business. At trial
the district court had charged the jury that the loss was "proxi-
mately" related if the taxpayer's assumption of the debt had a
"significant" business motivation. Applying that test the jury
found the necessary relation, and returned a verdict for the
taxpayer. The Government had argued, however, that the debt
could bear a proximate relation to business only if that "busi-
ness" (maintenance or enhancement of the employee relationship)
discussed at text accompanying notes 82-84 supra; Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S.
44, 49 (1944) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at notes 69-75 supra & accompanying
text.
205 Cohn, Mr. Justice Douglas and Federal Taxation, 45 CONN. B.J. 218, 236 n.72,
241-42 (1971) suggests that the contrary is true.
206405 U.S. 93, 113 (1972).207 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a),(d).208 See 405 U.S. at 94-95.
209Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2) (1959).
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was the taxpayer's "dominant" motive in incurring the debt, and
that the jury should have been so charged. A majority of the
Court held for the Government.
Justice Douglas' dissent in favor of the taxpayer rested on
two grounds. First, he said that the trial court had charged the
jury with the exact words of the regulation, and the jury found
the debt not proximately related. But this description of the trial
below wholly ignored the trial judge's additional instruction
which defined "proximate" for the jury. Justice Douglas' second
ground echoed the basis of his view in Skelly Oil:
I protest now what I have repeatedly protested, and
that is the use of this Court to iron out ambiguities in
the Regulations or in the Act, when the responsible
remedy is either a recasting of the Regulations by
Treasury or presentation of the problem to the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation which is a
standing committee of the Congress that regularly re-
writes t'he Act ....
Apparently finding this sufficient, Justice Douglas did not ad-
dress the majority's analysis or the derivation of its principle.
Justice Douglas also said that had he originally voted to
grant certiorari in Generes, he would have voted to dismiss the
writ as improvidently granted. That comment serves to em-
phasize an apparent inconsistency with his position in the
Rudolph case,2 11 decided in Period 3. Perhaps it is significant that
in Rudolph, where the Court's dismissal of the writ preserved a
judgment for the Government, Justice Douglas dissented from
the dismissal, and spoke to the merits in his opinion. In Skelly Oil
and Generes Justice Douglas advocated a limitation on the Court's
role that in those cases would have resulted in affirming lower
court decisions for the taxpayers.
2. Attitude Toward the Internal Revenue Service
Cases in the final period continue to reveal a certain hostility
to the Service. In his separate dissent in Skelly Oil Justice Douglas
chastised the Service for its practice of taking inconsistent posi-
tions in the lower courts, hoping to produce a conflict in the
circuits which would require Supreme Court resolution. Simi-
larly, the Generes dissent echoed Justice Douglas' protest in
210405 U.S. at 114-15.
211 370 U.S. 269 (1962).
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Commissioner v. Lester,2 1 2 a Period 3 case, that the government
works an unfair hardship on the taxpayer when it fails to resolve
ambiguities in the Code in favor of the taxpayer and instead
litigates-using the procedures which Congress has laid out for
disposition of tax controversies.
Justice Douglas' mistrust of the IRS, which seems stronger in
this period even than at the time of the Lester case, is evident as
well in United States v. Powell.213 The IRS had issued a summons
to the taxpayer requiring him to produce records relating to
four- and five-year-old tax returns. The Code2 14 sets a three-year
statute of limitations on the Commissioner's power to challenge a
tax return, unless he alleges fraud. Another section of the
Code2" 5 prohibits the Service from subjecting a taxpayer to
"unnecessary examination or investigations." The taxpayer ar-
gued that those provisions, taken together, prevented a district
court from enforcing the IRS summons unless the Service
demonstrates a reasonable basis for suspecting fraud. Justice
Harlan, writing for the Court in upholding the Commissioner,
perceived that Congress intended to put a lesser burden on such
inspections. From an examination of legislative history he con-
cluded that the extent to which Congress wanted to protect the
taxpayer was satisfied by the requirement that a superior official
in the IRS approve the inspection, and thus that the district
court should not inquire into such an administrative determina-
tion of necessity, absent some abuse shown by the taxpayer.
Justice Douglas dissented, '1 6 apparently mistrustful of allow-
ing IRS officials, rather than a district court, to determine
whether a sufficient basis existed to warrant an inspection. He
reasoned that the purpose of the congressionally ordained stat-
ute of repose required that the Service come forward and
convince the district court that it had a reasonable basis to believe
that the taxpayer had engaged in fraud.
21 7
Two additional opinions, Commissioner v. Stidger2t 8 and
United States v. Correll,2 1 9 suggest an almost complete reversal of
212 366 U.S. 299, 306 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For discussion of Lester, see text
accompanying notes 165-69 supra.
-13379 U.S. 48 (1964).
214 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a), (c)(1).
2 15 Id. § 7605(b).
216 379 U.S. at 59.
217 Ryan . United States, 379 U.S. 61 (1964), a companion to Powell, supports the
conclusion that distrust of the IRS lay at the basis of his position. Justices Stewart and
Goldberg, who had joined Justice Douglas' opinion in Powell, voted in favor of the
Commissioner in Ryan, believing that "a sufficient showing was made that the Govern-
ment was not proceeding capriciously." Id. at 63 (Stewart and Goldberg, JJ., concurring
in result). But justice Douglas again dissented.
218 386 U.S. 287 (1967).
219 389 U.S. 299 (1967). See also Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 758 (1969)
[Vol. 122:235
DOUGLAS-FEDERAL TAX CASES
Justice Douglas' early willingness to defer to the reasonable
administrative needs and judgment of the Commissioner. Stidger
posed the question whether a military officer's expenditures for
meals at a "permanent" duty post220 to which his dependents
were prohibited from accompanying him, were deductible as
business travel expenses incurred "away from home. 221 Con-
cluding that such a post constituted the taxpayer's "home" within
the meaning of the statute, the Court held the expenses non-
deductible. The majority found it unnecessary to consider
whether the Commissioner's interpretation of "home" as mean-
ing "place of business" was always correct. Rather, two considera-
tions relating specifically to military service formed the basis of
its opinion. First, the Court relied on the fact that the
Commissioner's position with respect to military personnel, that
an officer's home was his permanent duty post, was of long
standing and had been upheld in the Tax Court in 1948,222 and
that neither the courts nor Congress had rejected it since that
time. Second, the Court found that Congress had provided a
"special system of tax-free allowances for military personnel,"223
which was "designed to provide complete and direct relief from
[the particular financial problems of military families] as opposed
to the incomplete and indirect relief which an income tax deduc-
tion affords to a civilian business traveller.
224
Justice Douglas2 25 thought that the Court's result was un-
necessarily harsh. He cited a passage from Eisenstein's book 226 to
illustrate the seemingly irrational distinctions often made in the
Code. The Court, he said, should not add to the harshness of the
tax law unless Congress has plainly called for an arbitrary
classification. He thought it plain that "home" as used in the
statute meant the taxpayer's "residence," as opposed to his place
of business. Since such a definition did not lead to a harsh result,
justice Douglas said that his definition should be accepted
without further inquiry.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court discussed ques-
tions of fairness but concluded that Congress had dealt with the
problem of servicemen's expenses elsewhere. Justice Douglas,
(Douglas, J., dissenting on basis of court of appeals' opinion, 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968),
holding invalid Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1956)).
2The designation of a duty post as "permanent" is a question of military terminol-
ogy derived from "the language and policy of the statutory provisions prescribing travel
and transportation allowances for military personnel." 386 U.S. at 292.
221 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(2), reproduced at note 229 infra.
222 Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948).
223 386 U.S. at 294.
2 24 Id at 295.
2 25 Id. at 297 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
226 See text accompanying note 191 supra.
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however, in dismissing the two foundations of the majority's
argument, offered neither discussion of the overall congressional
scheme nor any attempt to persuade the reader that his position
was consonant with that scheme.
In Correl1227 the Court sustained a long-standing position of
the Commissioner (the "overnight rule"228), which restricted
application of the deduction for meal expenses incurred on
business travel "away from home"229 to only those meals taken
on trips during which the taxpayer had to stop for sleep or rest.
Although the Court recognized that the "overnight rule" was
somewhat arbitrary, it found that the Commissioner's interpreta-
tion had "achieved not only ease and certainty of application but
also substantial fairness. '230 The court of appeals had neverthe-
less held the Commissioner's interpretation invalid as contrary to
the statute's plain language. The majority of the Court rejected
this objection, explaining in some detail that "[t]he language of
the statute-'meals and lodging . . . away from home'-is obvi-
ously not self-defining."' 231 In any case, the Court held, there was
strong evidence that Congress had accepted the Commissioner's
interpretation: Congress failed to alter the rule throughout its
long life, despite its opportunity to do so in the major 1954
revision. Hence, the Court accepted the Commissioner's position
as a reasonable implementation of the congressional design.
Much could be offered in criticism of the Court's opinion in
Correl, but Justice Douglas' dissent232 against the majority's
"shrunken" interpretation of the statutory language occupies
only half a page. It begins and ends with the assertion that "away
from home can have nothing to do with overnight." He argued:
'Overnight' injects a time element in testing deductibil-
ity, while the statute speaks only in terms of geography.
As stated by the Court of Appeals: 'In an era of super-
sonic travel, the time factor is hardly relevant to the
question of whether or not travel and meal expenses are
related to the taxpayer's business and cannot be the
basis of a valid regulation under the present statute.'
233
227389 U.S. 299 (1967).
22 8 d. at 302 n.10.
229 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(2):
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging...)
while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business.
230 389 U.S. at 303.
231 1d. at 304.
232 Id. at 307.
233Id., quoting Correll v. United States, 369 F.2d 87, 89-90 (6th Cir. 1966).
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But Justice Douglas' reliance on the court below missed the issue.
As the majority opinion noted, the question was not whether
meal expenses in travel not requiring an overnight stop are
related to business; 234 the question was whether such expenses
are for "meals and lodging . .. away from home." Nor did
Justice Douglas' opinion address either of the majority's consid-
erations at all. Rather, he failed again to explain why his result
was the more consistent with the statutory scheme.
3. Quality of Opinions
Correll and Generes, cases already discussed, stand as exam-
ples of Justice Douglas' failure during this period to explain his
votes. Not all of his opinions reflect this carelessness,235 but one
additional case deserves attention.
In United States v. Davis236 a corporation redeemed some of
the stock owned by the taxpayer, its sole shareholder. The issue
was whether that distribution was "essentially equivalent to a
dividend," and hence taxable as ordinary income, or was not
equivalent to a dividend, and thus taxable only as capital gain.237
Justice Marshall's majority opinion reviewed the legislative his-
tory at length, concluding that Congress had intended, in enact-
ing section 302 in the 1954 revision, to change prior case law as it
had developed under the 1939 Code. Thus, the Court held that
such a redemption of some of a sole shareholder's stock "is
always 'essentially equivalent to a dividend,'" notwithstanding
any showing that the transaction was motivated by a bona fide
business purpose.
Justice Douglas, without citation to or discussion of the
legislative history, concluded that the business motive was
sufficient to sustain a holding that the distribution was not
equivalent to a dividend.238 He stated his reliance on the reasons
given by the courts below,2 39 which had held for the taxpayer.
But those courts had relied in part on cases arising under the
1939 Code,240 and had not considered the legislative materials
234 Id. at 305 n.19.
235 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 466 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Cf. Wolfman, Bosch, Its Implications and Aftermath: The Effect of State Court
Adjudications on Federal Tax Litigation, 3D ANN. INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING, ch. 69-2
(1969) (critical of the majority position).
236397 U.S. 301 (1970).
217 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302.
238 397 U.S. at 313 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
239 Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969), affg 274 F. Supp. 466
(M.D. Tenn. 1967).
240 Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 208(a), 64 Stat. 931-32, amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 115(g) (now INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 302). The district court opinion, Davis
v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967) relied primarily on Keefe v. Cote,
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which formed the basis of .justice Marshall's opinion. 241 Addi-
tionally, Justice Douglas concluded that the majority's rule con-
stituted statutory "revision," of a sort best left to Congress; but
this ignores the thrust of Justice Marshall's analysis, which found
that Congress had made the revision in its adoption of section
302. Thus, Justice Douglas' treatment of this statutory issue of
major significance was cursory if not cavalier.
Although one might see in the statistics for this period an
indication that the themes which developed during the second
and third periods were weakening, the cases do not seem to
support that conclusion. Justice Douglas was still hostile to the
Service. There is no evidence of a return to the approach to
statutory construction used in Period 1. Despite somewhat in-
creased written participation, his opinions were still wanting in
reasons to support their conclusions. Furthermore, Justice Doug-
las' opinion in Skelly Oil called on the Court virtually to retire
from the tax scene.
That sentiment of withdrawal is perhaps the natural out-
growth of the trends already observed. The statistics and opin-
ions suggest that in the later periods Justice Douglas has ap-
proached tax cases predisposed to vote in favor of the taxpayer.
Not often, however, has the majority of the Court decided the
cases his way. His silent dissents and careless opinions demon-
strate an indifference to the law in tax cases. It is little wonder
that one so minded, and at the same time ineffective with his
Brethren, would prefer that tax cases appear on the Court's
docket as infrequently as possible.
E. Substantive Issue Perspectives
The preceding chronology indicates that as Justice Douglas'
votes in tax cases tended increasingly through Periods 2 and 3 to
favor the taxpayer, his opinions reflected an altered approach to
applying the taxing statutes, a growing distrust of the Revenue
Service, and a greater incidence of careless and silent dissents.
Although the figures since 1964 imply a blunting of Justice
213 F.2d 651 (lst Cir. 1954), decided under the 1939 Code. Ii determining that the tests
for application of the 1939 and 1954 Codes were identical, the district court relied on
Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964), a case which did not consider the
legislative history found persuasive by Justice Marshall.
The court of appeal's opinion, Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969)
did not consider explicitly whether the applicable test had changed with the advent of the
1954 Code. In support of its consideration of the taxpayer's business motive, it cited cases
decided under the 1939 Code, e.g., Phelps v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.
1957); Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954), as well as 1954 Code cases.
241 S. R.EP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 44, 234 (1954).
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Douglas' pro-taxpayer attitude, his opinions during the final
period continued to reflect his changed approach toward both
the Code and the IRS. Furthermore, although the incidence of
opinionless dissents decreased in the last period, his opinions
were often strident and unreasoned.
A look at Justice Douglas' votes with reference to substantive
tax issues presented in the cases permits several observations.
The statistics for this purpose are set out in Table VI in the
Appendix, a summary of which is reproduced on the next
page. Although the data in Table VI provide no basis for
comprehensive or conclusive generalization, we note the
following:
242
1. Justice Douglas has generally (5 out of 6 cases) voted for
the taxpayer in construing the income tax exclusion for "gifts."
2. Justice Douglas has only rarely supported the
beneficiaries of the percentage depletion allowance, even in the
periods when he generally voted for the taxpayer.243
3. In contrast to the observation in Item 2, Justice
Douglas' votes on depreciation (8 cases) seem to have followed
his overall pattern of development.
4. Justice Douglas' votes in section 162 cases (construing
the deduction for business expenses) have also followed his
general pattern.244
5. As in the depletion area, Justice Douglas has tended to
support the Government (although less strongly than the Court
as a whole) in cases where the issue involves capital gains, even in
periods when he otherwise supported the taxpayer far more
than did the Court. In his most extreme anti-Government period
(1959-64), however, there were only two such cases, and in both
he dissented without opinion in favor of the taxpayer.
2 The Court has decided a number of corporate income tax cases during Justice
Douglas' tenure, but his votes in those cases do not seem to fall into any particular
pattern.
Justice Douglas' votes in estate tax cases, taken as a whole, follow his general pattern.
He has voted consistently(in 6 out of 7 cases) in favor of the taxpayer in deduction cases
under the estate tax. However, there are insufficient cases to delineate a pattern
regarding any more narrowly defined issue.
243Justice Douglas voted for the taxpayer in 2 out of the 9 cases. One of those was
the fourth period case, United States v. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. 678, 687 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
dissesnting), discussed at notes 197-205 supra & accompanying text. The other, Commis-
sioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956), presented 2 cases with similar
facts. Two taxpayers, one an owner of land adjacent to offshore drilling, and the other an
offshore driller, each claimed the percentage depletion allowance on the amount of oil
which the driller paid as rent to the landowner. Although he had taken inconsistent
positions in the courts below (and lost in both cases), the Commissioner contended in the
Supreme Court that the landowner was entitled to the deduction. The Court agreed.
Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. Id. at 317. He thus voted against the
government's position but against a taxpayer as well.
C1214 Justice Douglas' votes in all the cases involving deductions from gross income
(including depreciation, depletion and business expenses) have followed the overall
pattern as well.
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TABLE VI (SUMMARY)
VOTES BROKEN DOWN BY PERIOD AND TYPE OF CASE
Number Cases Number Cases Number Cases
Douglas Court for Douglas for
Type of Case Period Participating Taxpayer Taxpayer
Gifts 1 1 1 1
2 2 0 1
3 3 1 3
4 0
Totals 6 2 5
Percentage 1 1 0 0
Depletion 2 4 1 1
3 2 0 0
4 2 0 1
Totals 9 1 2
Depreciation 1 3 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 2 0 2
4 3 1 2
Totals 9 3 6
Business Expenses 1 7 0 0
2 9 2 3
3 3 0 3
4 5 1 4
Totals 24 3 10
Capital Gains 1 8 0 1
and Losses 2 3 0 1
3 2 0 2
4 6 1 2
Totals 19 1 6
Accounting 1 1 0 0
2 11 3 7
3 4 1 4
4 1 0 0
Totals 17 4 11
Procedure & 1 13 7 8
Enforcement 2 24 6 12
3 5 2 4
4 14 3 12
Totals 56 18 36
6. The statistics as to cases involving tax accounting show
an early swing away from the Government, one which continued
throughout his years on the Court, although he supported the
Government's position in the single case decided in the last
period.
7. Justice Douglas has always shown a pro-taxpayer inclina-
tion in the area of procedure and enforcement. That tendency
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has increased as his general attitude altered. This fact is consis-
tent with Justice Douglas' decisions in other fields of the law, "45
where he seems consistently to favor procedural safeguards that
restrict the reach and exercise of governmental power.
It therefore appears that Justice Douglas' affinity for the
taxpayer has its deepest roots in the areas of the gift exclusion,
depreciation, business expense deductions and tax accounting.
The taxpayers' positions in cases involving percentage depletion
and capital gains have seemed less attractive to Douglas. The
relevance of these trends will be examined in Part IV.
2 46
III. A GLANCE AT JUSTICE DOUGLAS'
PERFORMANCE IN OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW
Justice Douglas' extreme behavior in the tax field is special.
Since it is not unrelated to his conduct in other areas of the law,
however, there may be some value in examining his decisions in
several of the other fields in which federal legislation establishes
policy for an agency to administer. We have chosen our sample
from the areas of labor law, welfare law and corporate insider
regulation.247 The sharpest contrasts to Justice Douglas' ap-
proach to tax cases are found in his opinions involving corporate
insider regulation. This result may stem from the fact that he
was deeply involved in the work of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and became its Chairman, before he joined the
Court.
A. Corporate Insider Regulation
Justice Douglas' opinions in cases involving statutes which
regulate the activities of corporate insiders have received com-
prehensive analysis elsewhere.248 The treatment here' simply
245 In the areas of criminal and constitutional law, for example.
246 See text accompanying note 449 infra.
247 While the SEC is not an original party in every action brought under the statutes
regulating insiders, it frequently intervenes or participates as amicus curiae in actions
brought by private parties. As the respective footnote citations infra demonstrate, the
SEC participated as amicus curiae or party litigant in each of the cases discussed in the
text, with the exception of American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S.
138 (1940).
24SSee generally Countryman, Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 773 (1969); Hopkirk, William 0. Douglas-His Work in Policing Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 18 VAND. L. REv. 663 (1965); Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on
Corporate and Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920 (1964). All three articles are important
reviews of justice Douglas' work in this area. Hopkirk's general thesis is that throughout
his career Justice Douglas "manifested a continuity of approach to bankruptcy problems
emphasizing functional analysis." lennings contends that Justice Douglas has been a
major architect of the present rules which govern the manager-investor relationship.
Countryman's analysis seems to be that Justice Douglas decided cases so as to insure the
effective operation of federal regulation, and that he frequently accomplished that end
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illustrates that Justice Douglas' general approach to the control-
ling statutes in these cases, as contrasted with the those in tax
cases, has been consistent throughout his tenure on the Court.
2 4 9
His statements as Chairman of the SEC reflect an early aware-
ness of and commitment to the purpose and breadth of the
congressional regulatory plan. That commitment, largely de-
veloped prior to Justice Douglas' appointment to the Court,
formed the touchstone of his judicial approach from the begin-
ning, and it is reflected in even his most recent opinions which
continue to cite broad philosophical language from his early
cases.
25 0
Several of Justice Douglas' speeches as Chairman of the SEC
reflect two of the primary tenets which he attributed to the
statutory scheme to regulate insider trading. First, he thought
that Congress intended those statutes to begin a thorough re-
form of "both the organization and the management of business
and a resetting of the laws under which it operates. 25' Strong
measures were needed to halt the abuses which insiders were
committing by virtue of their positions, abuses which he thought
to be contributing causes of financial disorder. 252 Second, Justice
Douglas believed that Congress intended the SEC to have broad
discretionary powers2 53 to insure fair and equitable dealing. His
position regarding the stock exchanges is a prime example.254
Although he preferred reform initiated by the exchanges them-
selves to reform which the Commission could impose directly,
there is no doubt that the exchanges cooperated largely because
he made clear a willingness to act in their breach. Characterizing
his view of the proper relationship of the SEC to the exchanges,
Justice Douglas said, "Government would keep the shotgun, so
to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for
use but with the hope it would never have to be used.12 55
by a broad construction of the congressional delegation of power to courts and agencies.
See also Epstein, Econonic Predilections of Justice Douglas, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 531 (1949).
249 See, e.g., Hopkirk, supra note 248, at 698: "William 0. Douglas' major contribu-
tions to the field of bankruptcy law are marked by a high degree of continuity in
approach and in solutions."
250 See, e.g., Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 435, 439
(1972) (SEC, supporting petitioner, participating as "unnamed respondent," id. at 419
n.8), citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
251 W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 11 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE].2 52
ld. 8-14, 16.
253 This is of course consistent with reading a statute narrowly in order to achieve the
congressional purpose. See, e.g., Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515 (1943) (limiting power of
trustee in bankruptcy). Thus, Professor Countryman has said in connection with the
bankruptcy cases, "On ... [occasion], the Justice has deemed it a ropriate to use both
limiting and broadening interpretations to resolve difficultes which the draftsmen could
hardly have anticipated." Countryman, supra note 248, at 775.25 4See generally DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE supra note 251, at 79-91, 244-64.
255 Id. 82.
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American United Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Avon
Park25 6 illustrates an early judicial application of Justice Douglas'
views as to the purposes of the acts regulating insiders. 257 In that
Bankruptcy Act 258 case, the lower court approved the city's plan
for composition of its debts, a plan developed by the city's fiscal
agent, Crummer & Company. In an apparent effort to ensure
the statutorily required assent to the plan by two-thirds of the
city's creditors, Crummer acquired more than one-third of the
claims which others held. There was no showing, however, that
Crummer had disclosed its own status as a creditor when, acting
as the city's agent, it solicited the assents of other bondholders.
Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, reversing approval of the
plan. More significant than the mere holding, however, is Justice
Douglas' approach to an issue treated solely because it would
have to be addressed on remand. To protect outsiders, the
statute25 9 prohibited Crummer from participation in a future
vote on confirmation of the plan if its claims were "controlled" by
the city. Justice Douglas looked to the fundamental purposes of
the Act and defined "control" broadly:
The abuse at which the Act is aimed is not confined to
those cases where the holder of the claims is an agent of
the city within the strict rules of respondeat superior.
Rather, the test is whether or not there is such close
identity of interests between the claimant and the city
that the claimant's assent to the plan may fairly be said
to be more the product of the city's influence and to
reflect more the city's desires than an expression of an
investor's independent, business judgement. 260
That kind of approach to statutory interpretation fits perfectly
with the views Justice Douglas voiced as chairman of the SEC.
Cases decided during what we have termed Justice Douglas'
second period, in which his attitude toward the tax system seems
to have shifted, demonstrate a continued dedication to the im-
plementation of the broad purposes of the insider regulation
statutes. This is true, for example, in Brown v. Gerdes261 and
236311 U.S. 138 (1940).
257 For a similar approach in other early corporate regulation cases, see, e.g., Connec-
ticut Ry. & Lighting v. Palmer, 311 U.S. 544, 562 (Douglas, I., aissenting, advocating a
pragmatic approach to valuation of a 999-year lease); Pepper i'. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 312
(1939) (requring bankruptcy court, in exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to "undo"
fraudulent scheme "[n]o matter how technically legal each step in that scheme may have
been").
2 8 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-03 (1970).
59 Id. § 403(d).
260311 U.S. at 148.
261321 U.S. 178 (1944) (SEC amicus curiae). See, e.g., id. at 181:
Sec. 77B, like § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, had as one of its purposes the
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Leiman v. Gutman,262 in which the Court, Justice Douglas writing,
consolidated exclusive control over the permissible litigation fees
of the bankrupt's attorneys in the bankruptcy court itself, rather
than allow the attorneys and the estate to agree on fees. It is
more useful, however, to examine the opinions written in later
periods when, according to the statistics and our examination of
the cases, Justice Douglas' strong preference for the taxpayer
replaced a consistent approach to the tax statutes.
General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky,2 63 decided in 1956, illustrates
Justice Douglas' continued strong support for the policies of the
Bankruptcy Act.2 64 The petitioner instituted Chapter XI pro-
ceedings, and proposed an arrangement of its debts. The SEC,
together with a single stockholder, moved for a dismissal of those
proceedings unless the debtor also complied with the more
drastic requirements265 of Chapter X. The sole issue was the
propriety of the district court's selection of Chapter X as the
course of proceeding. Justice Frankfurter's dissent 266 argued
that the district court had based its decision on an
oversimplification of SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement
Co. 267 in holding that Chapter X was proper simply because the
debtor was a large corporation. Furthermore, he maintained, the
congressional elimination of the statutory requirement that a
Chapter XI arrangement be "fair and equitable" constituted "the
clearest possible indication that Chapter XI should be given a
more generous scope than even the narrowest reading of United
States Realty might suggest. 2 68 Nevertheless, Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, upheld the district court. His opinion
agreed that the Realty case did not create a strict rule which
determined the type of proceeding simply on the basis of the size
establishment of more effective control over reorganization fees and expenses
... in recognition of the effect which a depletion of the cash resources of the
estate may have on both the fairness and feasibility of the plan of reorganization.
... And Ch. X of the Chandler Act which took the place of § 77B set up an even
more comprehensive supervision over compensation and allowances.
262 336 U.S. 1 (1949) (SEC amicus curiae). See, e.g., id. at 6, 8: "The aim of the
expanded controls over reorganization fees and expenses is clear. . . . A statute
establishing such broad supervision ... cannot be presumed to be niggardly in its grant
of authority ....
For another manifestation of the spirit of Brown and Leiman during Period 2, see
AnderSon v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 363 (1944) ("dealing-... with a principle of liability
which is concerned with realities not forms" in applying provisions of the National
Banking Act).
263-350 U.S. 462 (1956) (SEC party respondent).
264 11 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970).
265 Including the court's submission of the reorganization plan to the SEC for an
advisory report, id. § 572.
266 350 U.S. at 468.
267310 U.S. 434 (1940).
268 350 U.S. at 472.
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of the corporation involved. The essential discrimination was not
to be "between the small company and the large company but
between the needs to be served"26 9 in the resolution of the
particular case. Reasoning from this basis, Justice Douglas
avoided the "fair and equitable" difficulty raised by Justice
Frankfurter, and concluded that "the paramount issue at present
concerns what is 'feasible'- 270 according to the realities of the
marketplace. Then, apparently ignoring Justice Frankfurter's
other objection, Justice Douglas found that the lower court had
concluded, within the proper range of discretion, that feasibility
required proceeding according to Chapter X.
271
SEC v. Drexel Co., 27 2 decided during the same period, illus-
trates Justice Douglas' willingness to adopt a construction sup-
portive of the SEC's administration of the regulatory statutes.
273
As part of its reorganization under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935,274 Bond & Share Company was to divest
itself of a subsidiary known as Electric, which was itself involved
in further reorganization. The Commission consolidated the
proceedings on the two companies' coordinated plans, and en-
tered one order. It approved the Bond & Share plan, and also
approved the Electric plan, but explicitly reserved jurisdiction
over certain fees and expenses in connection with Electric's
"[p]lan . .. [and] the transactions incident thereto. 275 By virtue
of sections 10276 and 12277 of the Act it was clear that the
Commission had power to scrutinize the fees in connection with
Bond & Share's part of the plan, just as it was clear that it had
such power under section 11278 to scrutinize fees in connection
26 9 1d. at 466.2 70 1d. at 467-68.
271 Id. at 468. For additional instances of a functional approach to corporate ques-
tions during this period, see, e.g., Justice Douglas' dissent, joined by justices Burton and
Minton, in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298, 321, (1954),
dealing with tie ICC's power to impose a merger upon a railroad in bankruptcy
reorganization. Professor Countryman terms the dissenters' position in St. Joe Paper
"[cjertainly. . . the most realistic, and fair interpretation of section 77's ... reference to
the merger provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act." Countryman, supra note 248, at
823. See also Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957); Swanson V. Traer, 354 U.S. 114
(1957) (majority of Court in both cases, per Douglas, J., adopting the more realistic
course in regard to diversity questions in shareholders' derivative suits); General Protec-
tive Comm. v. SEC, 346 U.S. 521 (1954) (unanimous court, per Douglas, J., finding no
abuse of SEC discretion in submitting only part of reorganization plan for approval and
enforcement by district court).
272 348 U.S. 341 (1955).
272 General Protective Comm. v. SEC, 346 U.S. 521 (1954), also demonstrates Justice
Douglas' concern for the administrative necessities of the agency. For evidence that the
same concern prevailed in later years, see note 292 infra & cases cited therein.
24 15 U.S.C. § 79a et seq. (1970).
275 348 U.S. at 346.
276 15 U.S.C. § 79j (1970).
277
1d. § 791.2
78 Id. § 79k.
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with Electric's part. The sole question, which divided the Court,
was whether the Commission had retained jurisdiction over the
fees charged in connection with Bond & Share's half of the plan.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, ruled that the
Commission had retained jurisdiction over the fees charged
Bond & Share because the Commission's proceedings were con-
solidated and because its order referred not to fees incurred in
connection with Electric's plan, but to those incurred in connec-
tion with its transactions. "The latter," he argued, "obviously
included the matters under § 10 and § 12, for they were the
chief collateral ones before the Commission. '279 The difficulty
with this reasoning is simply that it is not convincing, given the
Commission's apparently separate treatment of the two corpora-
tions in its order. Justice Douglas' two observations do not
require his conclusion, but only a conclusion that the Commis-
sion intended to retain jurisdiction. Contrary to Justice
Frankfurter's close and discriminating approach to the statute in
dissent,2 80 Justice Douglas referred to the most general legisla-
tive purposes:
Congress was explicit in making [fees payable by a
registered holding company] in connection with the
transactions covered by § 10 and by § 12, subject to
Commission approval. Congress had before it the de-
tailed record of holding company activities and knew
that many of them had a proclivity for predatory prac-
tices. The fees were not only large; they were often
loaded on affiliated companies .... Congress decided to
put an end to the worst of these practices and control
the critical ones. When it came to the intricacies of
holding company finance, Congress expressed the de-
sire to have the amount of the fees paid brought to light
and to have the Commission decide who pays them and
what amounts are reasonable. 8 1
On this broad statutory base, he rested his conclusion: "We
cannot be faithful to that statutory design without granting the
Commission the jurisdiction asserted here. 282
Justice Douglas wrote General Stores and Drexel Co. at a time
when his voting pattern in tax cases had become substantially
anti-Government. 28 3 Nevertheless, his attitude towards the stat-
279 348 U.S. at 346.
28Id. at 349. (The dissent was joined by Burton, J.).
2'11d. at 348-49 (footnote omitted).
2'82Id. at 349.
283See Appendix, Table I, infra.
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utes regulating corporations and their administration had not
changed. Throughout the last decade Justice Douglas has held to
his original view of the acts' purposes, and his determination to
give them support. Now, however, that view places him fre-
quently in dissent.
In Blau v. Lehman,2 4 decided in 1962, a stockholder of Tide
Water Associated Oil Company sued on behalf of the corpora-
tion to recover short swing profits on sales of Tide Water stock.
Pursuant to section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,285 the company could recover such profits realized by a
director of the corporation.8 6 In fact, Lehman Brothers, a
partnership engaged in investment banking, had realized the
profit, but one partner was a director of Tide Water. The facts
showed that in its purchases and sales of Tide Water stock
Lehman Brothers did not implement or have access to any inside
knowledge which the director-partner might have had. Thus the
issue was whether the partnership should be found, as a matter
of law, to come within the reach of section 16(b) and be required
to forfeit its profits. The court, per Justice Black, held Lehman
Brothers not liable chiefly because Congress had not overruled
an earlier Second Circuit decision so holding.
2 8 7
Justice Douglas, dissenting, 288 refused to rely on congres-
sional silence to "give § 16(b) a strict and narrow construc-
tion. '28 9 Rather, he based his view that Lehman Brothers was
within the broad reach of the statute on two considerations.
First, finding "the root of the present problem [to be]
the scope and degree of liability arising out of fiduciary re-
lations,' 2 90 Justice Douglas cited familiar general support in
legislative history which emphasized a desire to curtail insider
exploitation of information and position. Thus armed with a
legislative purpose, he found, second, that the practical effect of
the Court's result was to thwart that purpose by "substantially
[eliminating] 'the Great Wall Street trading firms' from the
284 368 U.S. 403 (1962) (SEC participating as amicus curiae).
285 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
286 The statute provides in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, of officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer. . . within any
period of less than six months.., shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer . ...
Id.
287 Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
288 368 U.S. at 414.
2 89 1d. at 419.
29 0 1d. at 416.
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operation of § 16(b)."' 29 1 In his view, such an unrealistic position
was untenable. Blau v. Lehman was decided, of course, during the
period in which Justice Douglas' tax opinions appear most con-
sistently to have supported the taxpayer over the Government.
Two of Justice Douglas' opinions from the 1971 Term
illustrate his continued commitment to statutory purpose and
congressional design. Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co.292 arose in connection with the following alleged
scheme. One Begole obtained a $5,000,000 check from Irving
Trust Company, although he had no funds on deposit at the
time. He then used that check to buy all the stock of Manhattan
Casualty Company from Bankers Life. Finally, Begole's cohort,
the president of Manhattan, sold all of Manhattan's United
States Treasury bonds in order to cover the original check from
Irving Trust. "As a result, Begole owned all the stock of Manhat-
tan, having used $5,000,000 of Manhattan's assets to purchase
it."' 293 Petitioner, a representative of Manhattan, sued under rule
lOb-5, 294 alleging a fraud on Manhattan in connection with the
sale of Manhattan's United States Treasury bonds, which were
"securities" covered by the Act.2 95 The critical issue in deciding
291Id. at 414.
292 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (SEC amicus curiae). See also, e.g., Caplin v. Marine
Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972) (SEC, supporting petitioner,
participating as "unnamed respondent," iid. at 419 n.8) (holding that trustee in
Chapter X Bankruptcy Act proceeding does not have standing to raise claims of
misconduct by an indenture trustee; Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, White and
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting, at 435, on the ground that the majority "decision
reflects a misunderstanding of the important [functions] which a reorganization
trustee . . is supposed to perform"). Perhaps. the clearest. example of Justice
Douglas' construction of a corporate regulation statute in response to the
administrative needs of the SEC, also arsi ng in this period, is SEC v. New
England Elec. System, 384 U.S. 176 (1966). Justice Douglas, speaking for the
majority, concluded, upon an examination of certain legislative history, that
[T]he phrase [of the statute to be construed] is admittedly not crystal clear.
But the Commission's construction seems to us to be well within the permissible
range given to those who are charged with the task of giving an intricate
statutory scheme practical sense and application.
Id. at 185. Justice Harlan's vigorous dissent rebutted Douglas' conclusion, id. at 185,
making plain the practical difference between the two possible interpretations consi-
dered, and persuasively demonstrated the weakness of the majority's interpretation in
light of the specifics of the le islative history.
293 404 U.S. at 8. Another layer of deception was laid on the scheme as well, but is
irrelevant here.
294 17 C;F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ...
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) ...or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
95 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
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whether the district court had properly dismissed the claim was
whether Congress had designed section 10(b), which allows the
SEC to prescribe rules "as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors, ' 29 6 to apply to this
type of fraud.
The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Douglas,
agreed with the lower courts that "Congress by § 10(b) did not
seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than
internal corporate mismanagement. '297 However, the statute was
to be read "flexibly, not technically and restrictively" and since
fraudulent practices "constantly vary . . . . broad discretionary
powers ' 298 were to be recognized in the agency charged with
defining the limits of the statute's proscriptions. Thus, because
Manhattan was injured "as a result of deceptive practices touch-
ing its sale of securities as an investor"299 in them, even though
the ultimate victims were Manhattan's creditors, the statute
properly applied to the scheme in question and the trial court's
dismissal of the action was error.
The Court decided Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric
Co. 30 0 narrowly, literally. Like Blau v. Lehman, it involved section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;301 Reliance dealt
with the applicability of the forfeiture provisions to the short
swing profits of a beneficial owner of ten percent of the out-
standing stock of the corporation whose stock was traded. Emer-
son had purchased 13.2% of the stock of Dodge Manufacturing
Company in June of 1967 in an attempt to take control of
Dodge. When the attempt failed, Emerson sold out its shares in
two sales which occurred in August and September. The August
sale reduced Emerson's holdings to 9.96% of the Dodge stock,
and in September it sold the remainder. Emerson argued with
respect to the second sale that it was not a ten-percent owner of
the Dodge stock "both at the time of the purchase and sale, or
the sale and purchase"30 2 as required for application of the
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
296404 U.S. at 10 n.6.29 7 1d. at 12.
298 d.
299 Id.
300 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
S0 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
302 In so holding, the majority refused to accept an alternative construction (sug-
gested by the SEC as amicus curiae) of the critical requirement that a beneficial owner 15e
such both at the time of purchase and sale. The profferred reading construed the
requirement as simply intended to provide an exception to the Act for a person upon
whom ownership of the securities devolved involuntarily. 404 U.S. at 425-27.
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statute. The majority, finding no legislative history directly on
the issue, concluded that the express language of the statute
required a holding that Emerson's second sale was not within its
terms.
Justice Douglas' dissent303 noted both that the prophylactic
purpose of the statute was to preclude "sure-thing" speculation
on the basis of insider knowledge, and that that purpose had
been flexibly and broadly applied in the past, "even departing
where necessary from the literal statutory language." 30 4 The
dissent criticized the majority's interpretation as poorly fitted to
achieve the policy of the statute. Furthermore, Justice Douglas
argued, "the literal language of the statute would not preclude
an analysis in which the two transactions ... [were] treated as
part of a single 'sale.' 305 Following this analysis, he said the
statute should be construed as allowing "a rebuttable presump-
tion that any such series of dispositive transactions will be
deemed to be part of a single plan of disposition, and will be
treated as a single 'sale' for the purposes of § 16(b).
30 6
Justice Douglas' Reliance opinion is not striking for its dedi-
cation to an interpretation based on the statute viewed as a
whole, for that approach is common to his opinions in this area.
However, one is struck by the sharp contrast between Justice
Douglas' approach in Reliance and that in the tax case of Knetsch
v. United States,30 7 decided in 1960. Both are essentially cases in
which a party thought that he had found a loophole in the
statutory scheme, yet Justice Douglas construed the tax statute
according to its letter, and the securities act in spite of it. Reliance
contrasts with Justice Douglas' recent tax opinions in another
respect as well. In both Skelly Oil30 8 and Generes,30 9 for example,
303 Id. at 427. The dissent was joined by Justices Brennan and White. Since Justices
Powell and Rehnquist took no part, the decision was 4-3.
304 Id. at 433, quoting Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir.
1969).
305 404 U.S. at 434.
306 id. at 438.
307 364 U.S. 361 (1960). For discussion of Knetsch, see notes 136-43 supra & accom-
anying text. Cf. Shanahan, Court Holds the Letter of the Law, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1972,
3 (Business & Finance), at 3, col. 5 (criticizing the Reliance decision as contrary to
normal judicial decisionmaking). Ms. Shanahan said that the courts have held and should
hold that if a transaction is of a type which Congress had sought to prohibit, then the
statute prohibits it, even if the language reveals that Congress had not foreseen the
particular transaction. She indicated that Justice Dou las' dissent rested on just that point
and she concluded with the fearful speculation that if the majority's approach in Reliance
were used in tax cases there might be little "Government revenues left to regulate
business or anything else." Id. at 11, col. 8. Ms. Shanahan was correct, albeit unaware that
Justice Douglas' approach in tax cases is precisely like that of the Courts in Reliance. See
United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 113 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at
text accompanying notes 206-11 supra.
308 394 U.S. 678 (1969). For discussion of Skelly Oil, see notes 197-205 supra &
accompanying text.
309 405 U.S. 93 (1972). For discussion of Generes, see text accompanying notes 206-33
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he asserted that the Court should not take tax cases only to "iron
out ambiguities" in the Code. 310 In Reliance, however, Justice
Douglas maintained that it was necessary to stretch the terms of
the statute beyond the meaning they might require, to whatever
meaning they would "allow"'31' in order to reach the result which
he thought would effectuate congressional policy.
The corporate insider cases which we have discussed are, of
course, too few in number to be conclusive.312 They suggest
strongly, however, as do the exhaustive analyses of Professor
Countryman31 3 and others,314 that Justice Douglas' commitment
to the grand design which Congress fashioned, and to the agency
which implements it, did not undergo the erosion in this area of
the law which we have detailed in the tax field.
Justice Douglas nowhere explains his dissimilar treatment of
these two areas of the law. It may be that during the 1930's,
particularly as an SEC Member and Chairman, he developed a
strong, well-defined sense of what the corporate regulation stat-
utes meant and what they were enacted to do. Perhaps he
retained that outlook because it had been reached through his
substantial involvement in the creation and administration of the
statutes. It may be that because Justice Douglas lacked a similar
background in tax law he allowed his commitment to the system
which Congress had created in that field to disintegrate.
3 1 5
3 1oId at 113, 114-15. Justice Douglas' articulated reason for protesting resort to the
Court to solve tax code ambiguities is that the Treasury and the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation are "much abler than are we to forecast revenue needs and
spot loopholes where abuses thrive." But this reasoning avails nothing in its application to
any given case, since the legislative and adniiiistrative'branches cannot eiminate all
ambiguity, and they are rendered less capable when they are denied'the parallel
development and articulation of a consistent judicial extrapolation of the statutory
scheme.
311 404 U.S. at 431-34. A number of cases may be contrasted in the same way as
Generes and Reliance. Tax opinions consistent with Generes are cited therein, 405 U.S. at
114-15. For other corporate regulation cases similar to Reliance, in which the opinion
contrary to Justice Douglas' recommends resolution of the problem by congressional
means, see, e.g., Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416,434-35 (1972);
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411-12 (1962). The flexible, functional approach noted in
the insider regulation cases may be contrasted with the analysis in each of a number of
Justice Douglas' later tax opinions.
312 Tables were not prepared for this section because they were not thought neces-
sary. The groundwork for analysis of Justice Douglas' opinions in this area has been
amply laid elsewhere, see authorities cited supra note 248.313 See Countryman, supra note 248.
314 See authorities cited, supra note 248.
315 Interestingly, Justice Douglas' opinion in United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513
(1971), concerns the resolution of a conflict.between the Bankruptcy Act and the Internal
Revenue Code. The bankruptcy court (under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970)) had required the corporate debtor to maintain a separate
bank account for the deposit of payroll taxes withheld from employees; withdrawali from
that account could be used only to pay such taxes to the government. The debtor
withheld the required taxes, but ailed to deposit them as directed. After the debtor was
adjudicated a bankrupt, the Government sought to have its tax claim paid prior to the
costs and expenses of administration of the bankruptcy proceedings. The Government's
position was based on INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7501(a), which provided that withheld
taxes constituted a trust in favor of the Government.
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B. Labor Law
The labor cases are too numerous for an exhaustive study in
an article concerned primarily with tax cases. Our purpose here,
then, is more restricted. First, we will draw some statistical
comparisons between the seeming patterns of Justice Douglas'
votes in the tax and labor cases. Second, we will illustrate by
reference to a limited number of opinions an apparent inconsis-
tency in Justice Douglas' approach to the federal labor legisla-
tion, and a growing distrust of the National Labor Relations
Board itself.
The statistics 316 for the labor law cases permit several impor-
tant observations. First, unions have generally prevailed over
employers in the opinions both of the Court (in 74% of the cases)
and of Justice Douglas (in 79%). Second, the incidence of union
preference by both the Court and Justice Douglas does not vary
significantly from period to period, although in the last decade
Justice Douglas has sided with the union somewhat less often
than before.
Additionally, both the Court (in 75% of the cases) and
Justice Douglas (in 73%) usually have voted to uphold the Labor
Board. When in dissent, however, Justice Douglas has favored
the Board in only 31% of the labor cases.
The Court has supported the Board in 75% or more of the
cases in each period except Period 3.317 In contrast to the Court's
Justice Douglas wrote for a 5-4 majority, denying the Government's claim. In answer
to the Government's contention based upon § 7501(a), he said simply that "the debtor-
in- possession failed to segregate the taxes so withheld; hence there was no trust." 401
U.S. at 515. The Government's counterargument was that the misconduct of the
debtor-in-possession, a court-appointed officer, should not defeat the trust. Furthermore,
the Government argued, a holding for the Government would not unfairly harm the
creditors since the taxes withheld were never an asset of the estate. That is, as the dissent
pointed out, id. at 518 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), absent the withholding scheme the
moneys involved would have been paid as gross income to the employees, and would not
have been available for the creditors anyway.
Justice Douglas did not dispute that argument on its own terms. He concluded
rather that the "Bankruptcy Act... is an overriding statement of federal policy on this
question of priorities." Id. at 515 (majority opinion). Although the Bankruptcy Act did
not explicitly resolve the issue, Justice Douglas noted "a progressive legislative develop-
ment that (1) marks a decline in the grant of a tax preference to the United States and (2)
marks an ascending priority for costs and expenses of administration." Id. at 516. On that
basis, he held against the Government.
316The sample for these statistics includes all cases decided under the -National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970), in which justice Douglas participated,
whether or not he wrote an opinion, and whether or not the National Labor Relations
Board was a party. Cases such as Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746
(1963); Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); and Guss v. Utah Labor Bd.,
353 U.S. 1 (1957), dealing primarily with federal labor law preemption of or conflicts
with the state labor regulation are not included. Also omitted is Travis v. United States,
364 U.S. 631 (1961), involving a venue issue in criminal prosecution for making false
affidavits of Communist Party nonmembershi p. The statistics are based only on "'rele-
vant" cases; cases arising out of a conflict between two unions are not considered
relevant to union or employer preference statistics." 317 In Period 3 Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in 4 related cases holding against
the Board: Typographical Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705 (1961); NLRB v. News
[Vol. 122:235
DOUGLAS-FEDERAL TAX CASES
relative consistency, however, Justice Douglas' percentages are
quite uneven. He voted to uphold the Board in 90% of the first
period labor cases, but in only 62% of the cases in the fourth
period. This pattern is most noticeable in his dissents. In period
one, 100% of Justice Douglas' dissents favored the Board; in
period four, 17%. Significantly, the trend of Justice Douglas'
votes against the Board resembles the trend of his votes against
the IRS in tax cases.
Some specific contrasts between the labor and tax cases are
worth noting. Justice Douglas' positions regarding the Labor
Board, as reflected in his dissents, vary (as in tax cases) over the
periods, but since 1943 he has dissented considerably less fre-
quently in labor. Additionally, he has registered far fewer dis-
sents Without opinion in labor cases, and far fewer dissents in
which no other member of the Court joined him. Finally,
throughout his tenure Justice Douglas has continued to write a
fair share of labor opinions for the Court.
1. Approach to the Statute
Inconsistencies in Justice Douglas' approach to statutory
construction are readily apparent in the labor cases although no
particular trend emerges. In Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB 318 the
Court held that the Board's back pay order could not include
restitution to government agencies for work relief paid to
wrongfully discharged employees. Justices Douglas and Black
dissented in a joint opinion, 319 combining a literal statutory
"TABLE VIII-1
DOUGLAS' VOTES IN ALL LABOR CASES
Number Court Douglas Number Court Douglas
Relevant pro pro Relevant pro pro
Period Cases Union Union Cases Board Board
1 20 14 17 19 14 17
(70%) (85%) (74%) (90%)
2 59 42 49 58 45 40
(71%) (83%) (78%) (69%)
3 16 15 14 23 13 10
(94%) (88%) (57%) (43%)
4 33 24 21 36 30 22
(73%) (64%) (83%) (62%)
Totals 128 95 101 137 103 100
(74%) (79%) (75%) (73%)
Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961);
Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961). Were these 4 cases counted as 1, the
percentage of relevant cases decided by the Court in favor of the Board during that
period would be 65%.
318311 U.S. 7 (1940).
3 19 Id. at 13.
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TABLE VIII-2
DOUGLAS' DISSENTS IN LABOR CASES
Dissents pro Dissents pro Dissents pro Dissents con
Period Union Employer Board Board
1 3 0 3 0
(100%) (100%)
2 12 5 6 11
(71%) (35%)
3 0 1 0 3
(0%) (0%)
4 4 7 2 10
(36%) (17%)
Totals 19 1 11 24
(59%) (31%)
TABLE VIII-3
DOUGLAS' VOTES IN LABOR CASES IN WHICH
HE WROTE AN OPINION
Number Court Douglas Number Court Douglas
Relevant pro pro Relevant pro pro
Period Cases Union Union Cases Board Board
1 6 3 4 6 3 4
(50%) (67%) (50%) (67%)
2 12 8 8 11 8 4
(67%) (67%) (73%) (36%)
3 5 4 4 9 3 2
(80%) (80%) (33%) (22%)
4 9 7 5 12 11 6
(78%) (56%) (92%) (50%)
Totals 32 22 21 38 25 16
TABLE VIII-4
TYPES OF DOUGLAS' OPINIONS IN LABOR CASES
Number Number Number Number Number
Cases Douglas Number Douglas D6uglas Douglas
Douglas Wrote for Douglas Wrote Silent Solitary
Period Participating Court Dissents Dissents Dissents Dissents
1 20 3 3 1 0 0
(15%)
2 60 7 17 6 1 1
(28%)
3 23 5 3 1 2 2
(13%)
4 36 5 12 7 1 3
(33%)
Totals 139 20 35 15 4 6
(25%)
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construction with what they felt best effectuated the purpose of
the Wagner Act. Since back pay served both a remunerative as
well as a punitive function, the dissent saw no reason to lessen
the erring employer's burden by deducting from the back pay
order any amount earned through work relief. "The 'back pay'
provision is clear and unambiguous. Hence, it is enough here for
us to determine what Congress meant from what it said.
3 20
When what Congress said did not suffice to determine what
Congress meant, however, Justice Douglas discounted the
former. In Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB321 the Court deter-
mined that the term "employee," defined in the Taft-Hartley
Act3 22 as "any employee," included foremen. In so construing
the Act to protect the unionization of foremen, the majority
refpsed to consider legislative history, since there was "no am-
biguity in this Act to be clarified. '323 Justice Douglas,
dissenting, 324 rejected the majority's literal method of interpreta-
tion which would, he said, mean that vice presidents and all
other management except directors would be granted the Act's
protection in their attempts to unionize. Rather, he argued that
"[t]he term 'employee' must be considered in the context of the
Act, ' 325 and that the court should consider "[t]he evil at which
the Act was aimed, 326 legislative history, and related legislation.
These considerations convinced Justice Douglas that, in drafting
the Act, Congress was not concerned with the bargaining prob-
lems of foremen, and in fact was "legislating against the activities
of foremen, not on their behalf. '327 Congress later amended the
Act to accord with Justice Douglas' reading.328
Writing for the Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 32 9 Justice Douglas adhered to this underlying policy ap-
proach to statutory construction and upheld specific enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement under section 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act.3 3 0 That section, which Justice
Frankfurter's dissent called "plainly procedural" 331 provided that
"[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
320 Id. at 14-15.
321 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
322 Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2 (49 Stat. 450), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
323 330 U.S. at 492.
324 Id. at 493.
325 Id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
3261d. at 496.
327 Id. at 499.
328 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (1970).
329 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
330 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
331 353 U.S. at 461 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1973]
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labor organization representing employees in an industry affect-
ing commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . ." Justice
Douglas rejected the literal view that the statute merely extended
jurisdiction, and held that it provided a substantive federal
remedy as well: "It seems, therefore, clear to us that Congress
adopted a policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to
arbitrate grievance disputes . . . . We would undercut the Act
and defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly as only conferring
jurisdiction over labor organizations. 332
But Justice Douglas again shifted position in NLRB v. Local
825, Operating Engineers,333 involving a union's strike against two
co-contractors to pressure a third co-contractor to accept a cer-
tain plan of job assignments. The primary issue was whether
section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act3 34 pro-
scribed the union's strike because its "object" was to force the two
co-contractors to "cease doing business" with the third co-
contractor. The majority concluded in the affirmative: "To hold
that this flagrant secondary conduct with these most serious
disruptive effects was not prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(B) would be
largely to ignore the original congressional concern."335 Justice
Douglas approached the statute literally and, without discussing
legislative intent, dissented. 336 Thus, he opened his opinion
stating simply: "If we take the words of the Act, rather than what
the courts have interpolated, and lay them alongside the facts of
this cause, I do not see how we can fairly say that Local 825
engaged in an 'unfair labor practice' within the meaning of §
8(b)(4)(B)."
'337
That rather simplistic approach conflicts, in turn, with Jus-
tice Douglas' later opinion for the Court in NLRB v. Nash-Finch
Co.338 In Nash-Finch Justice Douglas found implied authority to
enable the Labor Board to obtain injunctive relief in a federal
district court against state action which trespassed on the exclu-
'
32 Id. at 456 (majority opinion). See also id. at 457-58, considering "whether jurisdic-
tion to compel arbitration of grievance disputes is withdrawn by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101:" "Though a literal reading might bring the dispute
within the terms of the Act ... we see no justification in policy for restricting § 301(a) to
damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes to
the inapposite procedural requirements of the Act." (footnote omitted).
333 400 U.S. 297 (1971). See also Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 674
(1961), discussed at notes 348-49 infra & accompanying text: "There being no express ban
of hiring halls in any provisions of the Act, those who add one, whether it be the Board
or the courts, engage in a legislative act." (emphasis added).
334 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970).
335 400 U.S. at 305.33 6id. at 306.337 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
338404 U.S. 138 (1971).
(Vol. 122:235
DOUGLAS-FEDERAL TAX CASES
sive federal labor jurisdiction and held that the Board, as a
federal agency, was not bound by the anti-injunction statute.33
9
The contradictions in Justice Douglas' approach to statutory
construction are clear, although a more exhaustive study might
reconcile some inconsistencies. Even more clearly established is a
developing mistrust of the National Labor Relations Board.
2. Attitude Towards the Labor Board
In tracing the shift in Justice Douglas' attitude toward the
NLRB, one finds that his early opinions reflect respect for the
Board's discretion and autonomy. This respect is illustrated, for
instance, in Machinists' Lodge 35 v. NLRB .34° The Board had
determined that an employer committed an unfair labor practice
by assisting the efforts of an ultimately successful union, the
Machinists, to compete with another union, the UAW, in an
organizational drive. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
upheld the Board's factual findings of employer involvement,
saying that, in a complex situation such as the one before it,
"[t]he detection and appraisal of... imponderables are indeed
one of the essential functions of an expert administrative
agency."'341 The Board had additionally determined that the
wrong should be righted by compelling the employer to bargain
with the UAW. Broadly embracing the Board's independent
power, Justice Douglas upheld the Board's remedy:
Where as a result of unfair labor practices a union
cannot be said to represent an uncoerced majority, the
Board has the power to take appropriate steps to the
end that the effect of those practices will be dissipated.
That necessarily involves an exercise of discretion on
the part of the Board-discretion involving an expert
judgment as to ways and means of protecting the free-
dom of choice guaranteed to the employees by the Act.
It is for the Board, not the courts, to determine how the
effect of prior unfair labor practices may be
expunged.
Similarly, in NLRB v. Express Publishing Co.343 Justice Doug-
las disagreed with the Court's modification of a Board order
339 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970): "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." (emphasis added).
340 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
341Id. at 79.
34
2 Id. at 82.343 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
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against an employer who had refused to bargain. The Board had
issued an order restraining the employer from unfair labor
practices which he had not been found to commit and which
were unrelated to the unfair practice proven against him. The
Court ruled, however, that the Board had no authority to re-
strain the employer from such unproven and unrelated activities.
Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion,344 would have let the
Board's discretion as to the appropriate remedy prevail, as the
order was not "patently ultra vires''345 the Board.
I think it is important to remind that we do not sit as
an administrative agency with discretion to adjust
the remedies accorded by the Act to what we think are
... the exigencies of specific situations, with the duty to
pass on the wisdom of administrative policies. Congress
has invested the Board, not us, with discretion to choose
and select the remedies necessary or appropriate for the
evil at hand.
Whether the remedy chosen by the Board was
reasonably necessary in this case is not for us to
determine.346
In recent years Justice Douglas' opinions have been consid-
erably less deferential. This is most true of the cases chiefly
concerned with the definition of, or remedy for, an unfair labor
practice. 347 In Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB,348 for example,
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the Board could
not condemn a hiring hall agreement between a union and
employer as illegal per se, but rather could strike down such an
agreement only upon a finding of actual discrimination against
nonunion employees: "Where, as here, Congress has aimed its
sanctions only at specific discriminatory practices, the Board
cannot go farther and establish a broader, more pervasive reg-
ulatory legislative scheme. 349
This attitude is further developed in his dissent in NLRB v.
Strong.350 The Board had required an employer who had com-
3 44 Id. at 439.345 Id at 440 (Douglas, J., dissenting).346 1d. at 441, 442 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147 But see H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 110 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in favor of upholding NLRB power to impose contract term about which employer had
refused to negotiate).
348365 U.S. 667 (1961).
391d. at 676. justice Clark's argument in dissent, id. at 685, 691, echoed Justice
Douglas' earlier positions. Justice Clark argued that the Board had permissibly relied on
its experience in evaluating the discriminatory effects of the hiring hall practice, and that
concerning "the gravity of such a situation the Board is the best arbiter and best
equipped to find a solution." Id. at 691.
5 0 393 U.S. 357, 362 (1969).
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mitted an unfair labor practice by refusing to sign a collective
bargaining agreement and to make retroactive payments of
fringe benefits specified in the contract. The Court, considering
only the authority to direct payment of the fringe benefits,
upheld the Board. Justice Douglas' dissent noted first that while
ordinary back pay awards were explicitly authorized by
statute,35 ' the award of fringe benefits in this situation was not.
Justice Douglas believed that arbitration, not the Labor Board,
was the appropriate institution for determining whether such
fringe benefits were to be paid as a remedy for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement, and he commented on the
Board's encroachment into the area of contract enforcement.
"The jurisdiction of any agency or branch of government has a
built-in impetus for growth and expansion. Seldom does a de-
partment restrict its powers narrowly and assume a self-denying
attitude. The tendency is to construe express powers broadly.
The organism grows by subtle and little-noticed extensions of
authority. 352
While Justice Douglas' opinion in NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.
353
may suggest a tendency to accord the Board greater leeway in
cases involving predominantly procedural questions, his dissent
in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.354 is strongly to the contrary. In
Wyman-Gordon the Labor Board had ordered an employer to
furnish a list of employee names and addresses in connection
with a representation election. The Board based its order on a
rule laid down in a previous decision, Excelsior Underwear, Inc.
355
That rule, however, had not been promulgated according to the
rulemaking procedures specified in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.35 6 While Justice Douglas and a plurality of the Court
were in agreement that the Board should have gone through a
proper rulemaking procedure, a different plurality of the Court
nevertheless upheld the order. Justice Douglas, in an opinion
highly critical of the Board's disregard for proper procedure,
dissented on the ground that only rulemaking could insure
responsible administrative action.357 He would, he said, "hold the
agencies governed by the rule-making procedure strictly to its
'51 National Labor Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1970).
352 393 U.S. at 364.
353 404 U.S. 138 (1971). For the discussion of Nash-Finch, see text accompanying
notes 338-39 supra.
354 394 U.S. 759, 775 (1969).
355 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
3r, 5 U.S.C. § 1553 (1970).
357 394 U.S. at 775.
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requirements and not allow them to play fast and loose as the
National Labor Relations Board apparently likes to do. 358
Justice Douglas' more recent opinions also reflect a some-
what restricted view of the Court's role in the labor cases. In his
Strong359 dissent, after commenting on the tendencies of agencies
to expand their own power, Justice Douglas continued, "Courts
are no exception; and part of their tendency to find easy exten-
sions of their authority was seen in their early contest with
administrative agencies. '360 This view is manifest as well in two
other dissents since 1961 in which, echoing his view in tax
cases,361 Justice Douglas expressed the opinion that the Court
should not consider the cases because "the problem presented
was in the keeping of the Court of Appeals ' 362 and "the courts of
appeals, and not this Court, are the watchdogs of the Board. 363
These cases and statistics suggest, then, that neither union
nor employer preference has been a dominant theme in Justice
Douglas' approach to labor cases, but that in recent periods he
has been concerned with limiting the expanding power of the
Board. These attitudes may be undergoing a shift, however, as
the individual employee becomes a common litigant in labor
cases. In the recent case of NLRB v. Boeing Co. 364 the Court
affirmed the Board's abdication of any power on its part to
review the reasonableness of union-imposed fines, leaving review
only to state courts. Justice Douglas dissented, 365 thereby voting
against the Board's position, but in favor of expanding its power
to protect a union member from the union itself: "The Labor
Board, which knows the nuances of this problem better than any
other tribunal, is the keeper of the conscience under the Act."366
Additionally, in NLRB v. Marine Workers367 and NLRB v. Textile
3 58 1d. at 779.
359 For the discussion of Strong, see text accompanying notes 350-52 supra.3 60 Id. at 364 (Douglas, J., dissenting).3 61 See text accompanying notes 205, 211 supra.
362Local 761, Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 682 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). See also NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 266 (1969)
(Douglas, J., dissenting, voting to dismiss certiorari as improvidentl granted). justice
Dog as thought certiorari should not have been granted in Electrical Workers as well, and
both opinions rely, in this respect, on Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
363 1) NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 268 (1969) (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
364412 U.S. 67 (1973).
365Id. at 79.
366
Id. at 83.
367 391 U.S. 418, 428 (1968) (relying on Labor Management Reporting and Disclos-
ure Act, § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970) to hold that the Labor Board "might
consider whether a particular [union] procedure [for processing grievances against the
union] was 'reasonable' and entertain [a] complaint even though those procedures had
not been 'exhausted' ").
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Workers, Local 1029368 where the Board had acted to protect the
rights of the individual laborer against his union Justice Douglas
wrote for the Court affirming such action. Thus, one may
speculate that his previously voiced disappointment with ad-
ministrative action might give way to a sympathy for the agency
consistent with the agency's protection of the individual, an
attitude similar to that evident in Justice Douglas' welfare opin-
ions.
C. Welfare Law
The welfare cases are particularly relevant because in many
ways they represent the other side of the tax system. No chang-
ing or evolutionary trend in Justice Douglas' attitude toward
statutory construction or the administrative agency is apparent in
the welfare cases, perhaps because all but one of the Court's
relevant 369 welfare cases date from 1968, and perhaps also
because the identity of the underdog has always been clear.
While the sample is small, the statistics are striking. Justice
Douglas has favored the welfare recipient in 17 out of the 19
relevant cases decided (89%).370 In those cases the Court decided
in favor of the recipient 11 times (58%). Thus, Justice Douglas
has dissented in favor of the recipient in 6 cases (32%), and has
never dissented against him.
This voting pattern in favor of the welfare recipient mirrors
Justice Douglas' preference for the taxpayers in tax cases arising
during the last two periods. 371 Unlike his action in the later tax
cases, however, Justice Douglas has frequently written opinions
in welfare cases. In 19 cases before the Court, he has written 4
368 409 U.S. at 213 (1972) (unfair labor labor practice for union to fine employees
who had been union members, but had resigned during a lawful strike and returned to
work).
"' The Court has decided 20 welfare cases (not including those dealing with
collection of the social security tax). One of those cases, Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko,
327 U.S. 358 (1946) (involving determination of whether back pay award granted under
NLRA is to be considered as wages for purposes of credit on old age and survivorship
insurance under the Social Security Act), is only tangentially relevant to our discussion,
and is not listed on Table IX. (Justice Douglas di[ vote in favor of the employee in
Nierotw, however.) Also omitted from Table IX are per curiam orders vacating and
remanding lower court opinions without passing on the merits: Richardson v. Wright,
405 U.S. 208 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in favor of the recipient on the merits);
Wyman v. Rothstein, 398 U.S. 275 (1970) (Douglas, J., participating in Court's holding
not in favor of the recipient).
370 In Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S. 530 (1968), 1 of the 2 cases in which Justice
Douglas did not vote for the welfare recipient, he held for the recipient's lawyer in a
dispute over attorney's fees. In the other case, New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Dublino, 93 S. Ct. 2507 (1973), the Court held that the work incentive provisions of the
Social Security Act did not preempt the work rules of the New York Social Welfare Law
for persons participating in AFDC programs. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented,
93 5. Ct. at 2518.
371Justice Douglas' percentage of dissents in favor of taxpayers were: Period 1
(1939-1943), 0%; Period 2 (1944-1958), 33%; Period 3 (1959-1963), 67%; Period 4
(1964-1973), 48%.
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TABLE IX
DOUGLAS' POSITIONS IN WELFARE CASES
Douglas'
Result
Case Name Favored
Flemming v. Nestor
Hopkins v. Cohen
King v. Smith
Shapiro v. Thompson
Goldberg v. Kelly
Rosado v. Wyman
Dandridge v. Williams
Lewis v. Martin
Citation
363 U.S.
603
390 U.S.
530
392 U.S.
309
394 U.S.
618
397 U.S.
254
397
471
552
400 U.S.
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'ype of Opinion
Wrote dissent
Wrote for Court
Wrote concurrence
M
M
Wrote concurrence
Wrote dissent
Wrote for Court
309 Wyman v. James Recipient Wrote dissent
402 U.S.
121 Calif. Dep't Human Recipient Wrote concurrenc(
Resources v. Java
389 Richardson v. Perales Recipient Wrote dissent
403 U.S.
365 Graham v. Richardson Recipient M
404 U.S.
23 Engelman v. Amos Recipient M
78 Richardson v. Belcher Recipient Wrote dissent
282 Townsend v. Swank Recipient M
406 U.S.
535 Jefferson v. Hackney Recipient Wrote dissent
598 Carleson v. Remillard Recipient Wrote for Court
409 U.S.
413 Philpott v. Essex County Recipient Wrote for Court
Welfare Bd.
93 S. Ct.
2507 New York State Dep't Agency M
of Social Serv. v.
Dublino
majority opinions and 3 concurrences in addition to his 5 dis-
sents. He has never dissented silently or alone in a welfare case.
The Social Security Act3 72 is so imprecisely drawn that a
judge without further guidance than the language of the statute
37242 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970).
Recipient
Recipient's
lawyer
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
Recipient
e
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may often find support for whatever interpretation he favors.
Justice Douglas' approach has not diminished the difficulty this
presents. In his interpretation of the Social Security Act, Justice
Douglas has adhered to the canon that this Act, as remedial
legislation, should be liberally construed,373 and that the Court
"should enforce [these rules] in the spirit in which they were
written. '374 This has led him to discount statutory language to
the extent he finds it inconsistent with or less demanding than
what he believes to be the statute's general purpose.
While this attitude is most apparent in Justice Douglas'
dissents375 in favor of the recipient, it is also evident in his
majority opinion in Hopkins v. Cohen 376 favoring the recipient's
attorney. The case involved the interpretation of a provision in
the Social Security Act which allows an attorney representing a
claimant in a court action for social security benefits to receive a
fee "not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due
benefits to which the claimant is entitled. . . ,,377 In the case
before the Court, the lawyer had recovered benefits for the
claimant as a disabled person. 8 On the basis of that recovery
the Bureau of Disability Insurance sent an allowance to the
claimant's faimly, who were entitled to recover as relatives of an
eligible disabled person,379 as well. The claimant's family had not
been parties to the claimant's suit in the district court, however,
and the claimant argued that the attorney was entitled to a fee
computed on the basis of the claimant's recovery alone, and not
on his family's award. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas
held that the attorney's fee was to be based on the entire family
"package" of disability benefits recovered, and he rejected the
alternative argument as "too technical a construction of the Act
which we need not adopt.
380
In Dandidge v. Williams,38' Justice Douglas dissented 382 from
the Court's determination that Maryland's family maximum
grant regulation was neither inconsistent with the Social Security
3 73 E.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 554 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
"Finally, by giving the Social Security Act a miserly interpretation, the Court disregards
the canon that remedial legislation, such as the Social Security Act, is to be interpreted
liberally to effectuate its purposes." (citation omitted).
374 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 414 (1971) (Douglas,!., dissenting).
375 E.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 554 (1972); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 414 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 504-505 (1970).
376 390 U.S. 530 (1968).
377 Social Security Act § 206(b)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1970).
318 On the basis of id. § 223, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970).
379 On the basis of id. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1970).
380 390 U.S. at 534.
381 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
3 82 d. at 490.
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Act, nor violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Justice Douglas interpreted the language in section
402(a)(10) of the Act (having to do with the furnishing of aid to
all eligible individuals), to mean that grant maximums were
inconsistent with the Act's purpose and therefore impermissible.
The majority relied in part upon the fact that Congress had
acknowledged the existence of maximum grant limitations when
it added section 402(a)(23)38 3 to the Act to provide a cost of
living increase to AFDC recipients:
[The State shall] provide that by July 1, 1969, the
amounts used by the State to determine the needs of
individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully
changes in living costs since such amounts were estab-
lished, and any maximums that the State imposes on the
amount of aid paid to families will have been propor-
tionately adjusted ...
Constrained to explain away Congress' obvious recognition of
the existence of family grant maximums, Justice Douglas was
forced to read words out of the Act in order to effectuate what
he saw to be its purpose:
Congress was, to be sure, acknowledging the existence
of maximum grant regulations. But every congressional
reference to an existing practice does not automatically
imply approval of that practice. The task of statutory
construction requires more. It requires courts to look to
the context of that reference, and to the history of
relevant legislation. In the present context, the refer-
ence to maximum grants was necessary to preserve the
integrity of the cost-of-living adjustment required by the
bill. No further significance can legitimately be read into
that reference.
8 4
No well-defined, consistent attitude towards the administra-
tive agency comes through in Justice Douglas' welfare opinions.
In some cases he attached considerable weight to administra-
tive rulings or regulations. For example, in King v. Smith38 5 the
Court found that an Alabama regulation which denied AFDC
386
benefits to a child whose mother "cohabits," in or outside the
home, with a man not required by law to support those children,
38342 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1970).
384 397 U.S. at 504-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
385 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
386 Aid to families with dependent children. See Social Security Act, §§ 401-10, 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970).
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was inconsistent with the federal statute,38 7 and thus invalid.
Justice Douglas, concurring, 3s8 reached the Court's result on
constitutional grounds. He resorted to constitutional, rather than
statutory, grounds for decision, he said, only because of "insur-
mountable" problems of statutory construction. The problem as
he saw it was that "longstanding administrative construction"
approved indistinguishable state AFDC plans, and that that
administrative construction was "entitled to great weight."389 In
his dissent in Dandridge v. Williams, however, Justice Douglas
took an apparently different approach to the significance of the
agency's failure to challenge a state plan:
HEW seldom has formally challenged the compliance of
a state welfare plan with the terms of the Social Security
Act.... The mere absence of such a formal challenge,
whatever may be said for its constituting an affirmative
determination of the compliance of a state plan with the
Social Security Act, is not such a determination as is
entitled to decisive weight in the judicial determination
[here] .390
.In Lewis v. Martin,39 1 a subsequent case, Justice Douglas
wrote for the Court in overruling the determination of a three-
judge court that an HEW regulation 392 promulgated in response
to King v. Smith was invalid. That regulation provided that only
the resources of natural parents or those stepparents with a
uniformly similar legal duty of support could be considered as
available for the use of a child for purposes of determining
AFDC eligibility. The regulation thus contradicted and super-
seded California provisions393 requiring consideration of the
resources of either a nonadoptive stepfather or a "man assuming
the role of spouse" to the child's mother, whether or not those
resources were actually available or legally required to be avail-
able for the support of the child. Justice Douglas said: "Nothing
in this record shows that this administrative judgment does not
correspond to the facts. We give HEW the deference due the
agency charged with the administration of the Act .... -394
387 In that it adopted a definition of the term "parent" different from that the Court
read into § 406(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970), and thus resulted
in a failure to provide benefits to eligible children, contrary to § 402(a)(9) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(9).
388 392 U.S. at 334.
9 Id. at 334-35.
390 397 U.S. 471, 507-08 (1970).
391 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
39233 Fed. Reg. 11290 (1968).
393 CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE, PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES MANUAL
§§ 42-531, 42-535, 44-113.242, 44-133.5 (1967).
394 397 U.S. at 559.
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Justice Douglas' deference turned to disdain, however, in a
heated dissent in Richardson v. Perales.395 In that case the Court
sustained the denial of relief in a disability claim hearing where
the only evidence against the claimant was hearsay: medical
examiners' written reports, which were orally evaluated by a
medical expert who had no connection with their preparation.
Justice Douglas argued that hearsay evidence could not meet the
statutory requirement of "substantial evidence" 396 in support of
the administrator's determination, and criticized "[t]he use by
HEW of its stable of defense doctors without submitting them to
cross-examination [as] the cutting of corners-a practice in which
certainly the Government should not indulge.
397
Perhaps more significant than the details of Justice Douglas'
approach to statutory interpretation and attitude toward the ad-
ministrative agency in welfare opinions is the philosophy he
articulated in some of those cases. The opinions reveal a grave
mistrust of the power of government to invade and oppress the
lives of individuals, and a profound concern that the
government's power may be used to discriminate unfairly.398 In
his Perales dissent, for example, Justice Douglas took the occasion
to protest:
This case is miniscule in relation to the staggering
problems of the Nation. But when a grave injustice is
wreaked on an individual by the presently powerful
federal bureaucracy, it is a matter of concern to
everyone, for these days the average man can say:
'There but for the grace of God go I.'3 9
These concerns are strongly pronounced in Justice Douglas'
dissent in Wyman v. James,400 a case in which the Court upheld
home visits by case workers as valid conditions of receiving
AFDC assistance. Justice Douglas' dissent centered on a discus-
sion of the "new property"401 and the implications of govern-
ment largesse. The basic question, as he saw it, was "whether the
395402 U.S. 389,-411 (1971).
396 Social Security Act, § 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
397 402 U.S. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also id. at 413: "The use [by HEW] of
circuit-riding doctors who never see or examine claimants to defeat their claims should be
beneath the dignity of a great nation."
1 On the issue of discrimination in particular, see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 557-58 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84-88
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604 (1972)
(Douglas, J., writing for the Court); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 335 (1968) (Douglas, J,
concurring).
399 402 U.S. at 413.
40-400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
4I See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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government by force of its largesse has the power to 'buy up'
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. ' 40 2 His conclusion, of
course, was negative. Justice Douglas adamantly protested
against the application of a dual standard of constitutional pro-
tections:
If the regime under which Barbara James lives were
enterprise capitalism as, for example, if she ran a small
factory geared into the Pentagon's procurement pro-
gram, she certainly would have a right to deny inspec-
tors access to her home unless they came with a
warrant. 4
03
For Justice Douglas this dual standard paralleled that being
applied in the dissimilar policing of expenditures to differently
situated recipients of government largesse:
Judge Skelly Wright has stated the problem suc-
cinctly: 'Welfare has long been considered the equiva-
lent of charity and its recipients have been subjected to
all kinds of dehumanizing experiences in the
government's effort to police its welfare payments. In
fact, over half a billion dollars are expended annually
for administration and policing in connection with the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.
Why such large sums are necessary for administration
and policing has never been adequately explained. No
such sums are spent policing the government subsidies
granted to farmers, airlines, steamship companies, and
junk mail dealers, to name but a few. The truth is that
in this subsidy area society has simply adopted a double
standard, one for aid to business and the farmer and a
different one for welfare.'40 4
Such discrimination, as Justice Douglas argued, is improperly
imported into the constitutional sphere. The opinion concludes
with a comment on governmental power, the power of the
"lumbering" bureaucracy, to intrude into individual lives. The
concern with governmental oppression of the individual man-
ifested in these cases will be discussed further in Part IV.
IV. AN ATTEMPT AT EXPLANATION
Our effort in this part is to seek an explanation for Justice
Douglas' shifting approaches in tax cases to both the Internal
402 400 U.S. at 328 (footnote omitted).
4031&. at 331.
40 4 Id. at 332-33, quoting Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DuKE
L.J. 425, 437-38.
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Revenue Code and the Service. For this it seems helpful to begin
with a summary of the important trends we have already noted.
Early in Justice Douglas' tenure he wrote frequently for the
Court in federal tax cases, and usually voted to support the
Government's position. His opinions were marked by attention
to detail and a search for legislative intent. Later years saw an
increasing tendency to vote in favor of the taxpayer, a develop-
ing antipathy towards the IRS and a failure to explain his votes
with reasoned opinions.
In the labor cases we noted that Justice Douglas' percentage
of opinions in favor of unions over employers has remained
fairly constant throughout his years on the Court and that
neither preference for union nor for employer has been a
dominant theme. While we could discern no consistent mode of
statutory construction, in recent periods he appears to have
become disenchanted with the administration of the Labor
Board.
In the welfare cases Justice Douglas has voted with remark-
able consistency in favor of the recipient. Although he has not
articulated any particular philosophy as to the role of the na-
tional administrative agency, he has deferred in cases in which
regulations by that agency limited the discretion of local au-
thorities to impose restrictions on welfare eligibility or to allocate
funds less generously to welfare recipients; but he has been
critical in other cases where the national administration has
worked to the detriment of individual welfare recipients.
In the field of corporate insider regulation Justice Douglas'
positions have remained consistent, giving breadth to the stat-
utes in light of their most general purpose and scope to the
areas of agency discretion. Justice Douglas' approach in cases
involving corporate insider regulation thus stands in striking
contrast to the trends observed in relation to the other statutory
areas we have reviewed, a contrast perhaps explainable by the
strength of Justice Douglas' early association with the SEC, his
agency.
The cases in other fields suggest, then, that a growing
dissatisfaction with administrative agencies generally, and their
expanding exercise of power, may partially explain Justice Doug-
las' behavior in tax cases. While the best evidence for this
speculation lies in the cases themselves, the theory finds addi-
tional support in Justice Douglas' extrajudicial writings.
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A. Dissatisfaction with Administrative Agencies
The problem of administrative government has been a cen-
tral concern in Justice Douglas' writings,4 °5 but the sympathies
those writings reflect have changed profoundly. Justice Douglas
came to the Court in 1939 from the Chairmanship of the SEC.
He came with the faith of a New Dealer and a respect and
enthusiasm for the institution of the administrative agency.4 °6
"Administrative government is here to stay," he said in 1938, "It
is democracy's way of dealing with the over complicated social
and economic problems of today. 40 7 At that time Justice Doug-
las faced the challenge of maintaining the dedication and high
standards of professionals in administrative government, 40 8 and
yet was confident of success. 40 9 He later wrote proudly of his
days with the SEC:
We had an able, earnest, and dedicated group of
people administering these acts. We had youth and
idealism on our side. We had caught some of the vision
of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the manifest destiny he
represented. We were not concerned with ideas of per-
sonal gain or preferment. None in those early days
would have dreamed of leaving his government post to
go to work for the people we regulated. If anyone had
done it, he would have been ostracized.
There doubtless is much sentiment in my recollec-
tions of what we did. But as I look back and see the
long-term acceptance our work has enjoyed, and view
the impressive scholarly record of Commission rulings
and opinions that shine through such books as Loss,
Securities Regulation (1951) I am proud of the men and
women who came to Washington, D.C., for these
pioneer undertakings. I think we did much to raise the
level of performance of the administrative agency in a
turbulent and exciting age.
410
But Justice Douglas' perception of the administrative agen-
cies did not remain fused with the original vision. His evolving
41' See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 78-88 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
POINTS OF REBELLION]; W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 161-91, 236-43 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as WE THE JUDGES]; DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 251, at 243-70; Douglas,
Legal Institutions in America in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND ToMoRRoW 274-78 (M.
Paulsen ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as Legal Institutions in America]; Douglas, Law and the
American Character, 37 CAL. STATE B.J. 753, 759-64 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Law and
the American Character].406 See DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 251, at 243-67.40 7Id. 246.400 Id. 247.409 Id. 255.
410 Douglas, Foreword, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 5 (1959).
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
skepticism and distrust paralleled the gradual demise of the New
Deal and the influx of uncommitted petty bureaucrats into
positions once filled by men and women with the Roosevelt
ideal. 411 Thus, in a 1962 address, Justice Douglas spoke of the
institution of the "administrative agency which some call 'profes-
sional' government but which over-all deserves no such
accolade. ' 412 In particular he found at that time a "need to bring
into harness, the activities of agencies that today are free-
wheeling, that make momentous decisions within the bureau-
cracy, and that need not and do not give the public any opportu-
nity to be heard. '413 Furthermbre, he said, unreviewed adminis-
trative power was subject to corruption and political pressure.41 4
Similarly, in his 1956 book, We the Judges, Justice Douglas said,
speaking of the administrative agency, "Reforms of its practices
have been numerous. Judicial surveillance over it has been close.
Yet, in spite of all the reforms and all the surveillance, abuses
will continue when there is absent a high standard of the public
service. 415 In a more recent work, Points of Rebellion, Justice
Douglas expressed a disillusionment with the present state of
administrative agencies that is polar to his New Deal view. One
of the great tasks before America, he pleaded, "is the problem of
creating some control or surveillance over key administrative
agencies,' 41 6 that powerful bureaucracy which had been cap-
tured by the Establishment it was intended to regulate.
Significant to this view is the perceived ubiquity of agency power.
As Justice Douglas wrote in Wyman v. James,
The bureaucracy of modern government is not
only slow, lumbering, and oppressive; it is omnipresent.
It touches everyone's life at numerous points. It pries
more and more into private affairs, breaking down the
barriers that individuals erect to give them some insula-
tion from the intrigues and harassments of modern
life.417
This perception, of course, is particularly relevant to the reach of
the taxing authorities, first because the tax system produces one
of the most frequent and direct government-citizen contact
411 Cf. Legal Institutions in America, supra note 405, at 278.
4 2 Law and the American Character, supra note 405, at 759.
413 Id. 762-63.
414 Id. 763. A 1951 address by Justice Douglas focused on the problem of corruption
in government and throughout society. Douglas, Honesty in Government, 4 OKLA. L. Rav.
279 (1951).
15 WE THE JUDGES, supra note 405, at 190-91.
416 POINTS OF REBELLION, supra note 405, at 64.
417 400 U.S. 309, 335 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (1971).
[Vol. 122:235
DOUGLAS-FEDERAL TAX CASES
points, and second because, as Justice Douglas has said, "The
income tax . . . has also given centralization [of power in the
national government] a powerful push. 418
In a very strong sense his disillusionment and his mistrust of
the exercise of governmental power appear to underlie Justice
Douglas' solicitude for the taxpayer at bar (big or little). Re-
peatedly he expressed concern that administrative procedures
afford insufficient protection to defenseless persons, 419 demand-
ing that ambiguities in the statute should not be resolved by
litigation,420 and that the Government should "turn square cor-
ners" in dealing with the taxpayer.421 His fear of misuse of
agency power surfaces in complaints that regulations are chang-
ing the meaning of the statute.42 2 Concerned with protection of
privacy, Justice Douglas also warned in Points of Rebellion that:
Big Brother in the form of an increasingly power-
ful government and in an increasingly powerful private
sector will pile the records high with reasons why pri-
vacy should give way to national security, to law and
order, to efficiency of operations, to scientific advance-
ment, and the like. The cause of privacy will be won or
lost essentially in legislative halls and in constitutional
assemblies. If it is won, this pluralistic society of ours
will experience a spiritual renewal. If it is lost we will
have written our own prescription for mediocrity and
conformity.4 23
The same theme lies behind his dissent in the fourth period case
of United States v. Powell,424 in which he urged that the IRS
4 18 WE THE JUDGES, supra note 405, at 42-43.4 19 See id. 182, 190; Legal Institutions in America, supra note 405, at 276; Law and the
American Character, supra note 405, at 762-63. See also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 755, 759 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at text accompanying notes
354-58 supra. Cf POINTS OF REBELLION, supra note 405, at 79-80.
420 See, e.g., United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 113 (1972) (Douglas,J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 687 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
For discussion of Generes and Skelly Oil, see notes 197-211 supra & accompanying text.
421 Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 306 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring),
discussed at text accompanying notes 165-69 supra.
422 See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 297 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For
discussion of Correl and Stidger, see notes 218-34 supra & accompanyin text. But cf.
United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 114 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissentIng), discussed at
text accompanying notes 206-11 supra, arguing that ambiguiies in the Code should be
clarified, inter alia, through the promulgation of regulations; United States v. Skelly Oil
Co., 394 U.S. 678, 691 n.4 (1999) (Douglas, J., dIssenting).
423 POINTS OF REBELLION, supra note 405, at 29. See also Douglas, Foreword: Project, The
Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1371, 1374 (1968). This attitude of course extends over into other fields as well. See, e.g.,
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(protesting Court's upholding of constitutionality of Commission's requirement that
streetcars carry radio receivers fixed tuned to a particular station).
424 379 U.S. 48, 59 (1964), discussed at notes 213-17 supra & accompanying text.
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should be powerless to subpoena certain tax records without
supervision by a district court. Other cases reflect, though less
directly, a similar skepticism toward the exercise of governmen-
tal power.425
Thus, Justice Douglas' antipathy towards IRS is consistent
with a general distrust of government and those who govern. In
a 1951 address,426 he warned of growing corruption at all levels
of state and federal government. "How far its rot has extended
no one knows. But it is time America made a close inquiry into
these doings. ' 427 In the same year Justice Douglas dissented in
United States v. Wunderlich,428 protesting the Court's failure to
review closely the decision of a government agent given author-
ity for resolving disputes over a government dam contract:
Law has reached its finest moments when it has
freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler,
some civil or military official, some bureaucrat. Where
discretion is absolute, man has always suffered. At times
it has been his property that has been invaded; at times,
his privacy; at times, his liberty of movement; at times,
his freedom of thought; at times, his life. Absolute
discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of
freedom than any of man's other inventions.
42 9
At least to some extent Justice Douglas may see his role in tax
cases as one of checking the expansion of government power
and its concurrent abuse of discretion, in order to protect the
rights of citizens, 430 even though he has never explained why the
IRS in particular poses this threat.
B. Antipathy to the Internal Revenue Code
In We the Judges, Justice Douglas expounded the conven-
tional wisdom as to judicial construction of statutes: "Some words
of a statute may be words of art, having a definite meaning.
Others may take their meaning from their setting in a statute
and be defined only in light of the purpose of the legislature and
425 Compare, e.g., Law and the American Character, supra note 405, with Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 9 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 82-86 supra; Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 49 (1944) (Douglas,.
dissenting), discussed at notes 69-75 supra & accompanying text. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at notes 400-04 supra & accom-
panying text.4 26 W. Douglas, Honesty in Government, 4 OKLA. L. REv. 279 (1951).42 7 Id.
428342 U.S. 98 (1951).42 9 1d. at 101 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
430See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the objective sought to be reached."' 4 ' To the same effect, he
wrote in 1959:
A judge worthy of the tradition does not draw from the
well of his prejudices in construing statutory words....
The problem is to stick with the legislative scheme and
determine which construction is most consonant with it.
What may be the clear meaning of words to some
creates ambiguities for others. The truth is that while
we start with the words of the act, that is the beginning,
not the end of the search. For words are inexact tools to
say the least.
... [T]he recent tendency in the federal system has
been to ransack the entire legislative history for what
light can be thrown on the problem of interpretation.
More and more does the search for the meaning of
words take one through the morass of legislative his-
tory, looking for help from any competent source.432
But these passages fail entirely to explain Justice Douglas' own
conduct in the later tax cases. In early cases, such as Maguire v.
Commissioner433 and Clifford,43 4 he did seem to look for the
purposes underlying the statutes. And in some cases this was
entirely consistent with taking precise statutory language at face
value.435 But in recent cases, such as Correll,436 he looked rather
simplistically to the words of the statute alone, refusing to probe
for legislative purpose. Similarly, in the early case of United States
v. Stewart,437 Justice Douglas considered exhaustively the legisla-
tive history of the statutory language, while in the fourth period
Davis43 8 case, in which the majority's analysis rested on legislative
history contrasting the 1939 and 1954 versions of the Code,
Justice Douglas relied on the authority of 1939 Code cases,
ignoring the pressing thrusts of legislative history. Justice Doug-
las has not adhered to the doctrines of statutory construction
suggested in his own writing, and his votes in tax cases in the
431 WE THE JUDGES, supra note 405, at 179.
4 32 Legd Institutions in America, supia note 405, at 289-90.
433 313 U.S. 1, 5 (1941), discussed at text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
414 For discussion of Clifford, see notes 29-35 supra & accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523 (1943), discussed at
text accompanying notes 58-64 supra; Scaife Co. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 459 (1941),
discussed at notes 19-24 supra & accompanying text; J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner,
311 U.S. 55 (1940), discussed at notes 14-18 supra & accompanying text. Cf. Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), discussed at notes 318-97 supra.
436 For discussion of Correll, see text accompanying notes 227-34 supra.
437311 U.S. 60 (1940), discussed at text accompanying notes 47-57 supra.
438 For discussion of Davis, see notes 236-41 supra & accompanying text.
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recent periods seem more closely tied to his own preferences
than to a reasoned elaboration of congressional design.
The thread connecting most of his later tax decisions, espe-
cially those of the 1960's, may be a contempt for the Internal
Revenue Code and the burdens which he believes it unfairly
imposes on those not able to lobby successfully for their special
preference. In Justice Douglas' 1961 review of Louis Eisenstein's
provocative book, The Ideologies of Taxation,439 he lauded the
author's effort to expose some of the tax system's inequities.
According to Justice Douglas: "Our tax system was not designed
by noble men only to be subverted by base people. It represents
a series of victories by special interest groups, each motivated by
selfish ends. 44 ° Justice Douglas touched approvingly on several
of the Eisenstein exposures, dwelling particularly on the various
"incentives" for business and investment. "Should not artists,
poets, and authors need incentives as well as businessmen?
44
He spoke to the fallacy behind the wildcat driller rationale for
percentage depletion, since it no longer takes the major oil
companies nine holes to strike oil in one. And he opted for
reform "unless one thinks that repeal of percentage depletion
would make us, as a people, appear ungrateful for all the oil
companies have done for US.1 4 4 2 In the area of capital gains,
Justice Douglas was outraged by the subtle classifications of
income-producing activity:
Inventors are taxed on the basis of capital gains, while
authors are taxed on the basis of ordinary income. Who
but an author would think the two were birds of a
feather? It also seems obvious that profits on the sale of
pigs unbred are plainly ordinary income unlike profits
on the sale of pigs bred, which are taxed as capital
gains. Pigs and turkeys are alike, are they not? Pigs and
chickens are unlike? The ways of equity are mysterious;
but plainly all are equal "whom the law has elected to
equalize" as Edmund Cahn once said.
443
The review concluded in a spirit of radical reform, as Justice
Douglas united his conscience with Eisenstein's. Taxation, he
said, "is the heart of the political process. The few have mainly
succeeded in being protected from the many. The task ahead is
439 L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961), reviewed, Douglas, N.Y.
Herald Tribune, Sept. 24, 1961, § 6 (Books), at 13, col. 1.4 4 0 Id.
4411d.
442 Id.
443 Id.
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largely making sure that the many are protected from the
few. 444 Specific references to Eisenstein surface in two of Justice
Douglas' dissenting opinions, Stidger4 45 and Skelly Oil,4 4 6 and the
spirit of the Eisenstein review echoes in still other opinions
447
and writings. In Points of Rebellion, for example, Justice Douglas
criticized the unequal treatment resulting from the capital gains
preference, and he contrasted the tax system with the welfare
system:
I believe it was Charles Adams who described our
upside down welfare state as 'socialism for the rich, free
enterprise for the poor.' The great welfare scandal of
the age concerns the dole we give rich people. Percen-
tage depletion for oil interests is, of course, the most
notorious. But there are others. Any tax deduction is in
reality a 'tax expenditure,' for it means that on the
average the Treasury pays 52 per cent of the deduction.
When we get deeply into the subject we learn that the
cost of public housing for the poorest twenty per cent of
the people is picayune compared to federal subsidy of
the housing costs of the wealthiest twenty per cent.
Thus for 1962, Alvin Schoor in Explorations in Social
Policy, computed that, while we spent 870 million dollars
on housing for the poor, the tax deductions for the top
twenty per cent amounted to 1.7 billion dollars.448
It is not surprising, then, that in cases involving capital gains and
depletion-two areas singled out for particular criticism in these
extrajudicial writings-Justice Douglas has generally voted
against the taxpayer.449
Exposure of the Code's inequities through a popular book
like Eisenstein's may be one step toward reforming the tax
system, but Justice Douglas' reaction to the Tax Code has not
been limited to extrajudicial disapproval of the statute's inten-
tional preferences, or to rejection of taxpayer claims for capital
gains or depletion allowance benefits. He may feel that Govern-
ment victories against taxpayers, even big and rich taxpayers,
help preserve an undeserving and evil structure. Or so one can
speculate when confronted with his enigmatic behavior. His
444 Id.
445 386 U.S. 287, 298 n.2 (1967). For discussion of Stidger, see notes 218-26 supra &
accompanying text.
446394 U.S. 678, 687 (1969). For discussion of Skelly Oil, see notes 197-205 supra &
accompanying text.
" 7 See, e.g., Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 278 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), discussed at notes 170-86 supra & accompanying text.448 POINTS OF REBELLION, supra note 405, at 68-69.449 See notes 243, 246 supra & accompanying text.
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attitude toward the Code seems to have led to a refusal, as a
Justice, to support the tax system created by Congress. Thus he
asserted in Skelly Oil4 50 and Generes451 that the Court should
avoid tax cases virtually altogether, leaving the burden on the
lower courts and Congress. Justice Douglas' own failure to
reason on the meritg of cases before the Court, and indeed his
tendency to dissent without any opinion at all seem to reflect the
same attitude of eschewal.452 Significantly, both in the cases in
which he wrote dissents suggesting the Court should not review,
and in those cases where he dissented without opinion, Justice
Douglas' result would favor the taxpayer.
45 3
Furthermore, Justice Douglas has attempted to blunt the
effect of the Code's intended preferences by an expansive in-
terpretation of deductions and exclusions. Often when he has
written, as in Stidger,4 5 4 he has seemed to justify his vote for the
taxpayer on a premise, not inferable from the facts 'of the case,
that only a victory for the litigant taxpayer could equalize that
taxpayer and others with the pressure groups which have ob-
tained a congressionally mandated preference.455
A populist philosophy such as that expressed in Points of
Rebellion might have led another judge to the injudicious support
of all revenue protecting efforts of the Government, at least
when the cases involve rich corporate taxpayers. Yet taxpayers
like the Skelly Oil Company are the beneficiaries of Justice
Douglas' tax votes despite his cry for support of the public
against the special interest groups. The result of Justice Douglas'
position in Skelly Oil would have been to expand the special
dispensations allowed to oil companies to which he so strongly
objected in his alliance with Eisenstein. Indeed, since usually only
450 For discussion of Skelly Oil, see notes 197-205 supra & accompanying text.
451 For discussion of Generes, see text accompanying notes 206-11 sipra.
452 In Generes Justice Douglas said that he would have voted to dismiss the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted, were he not constrained by the necessary implication
of the "rule of four." 405 U.S. at 115-16 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43 See text accompanying notes 133-34, 138 supra.
454See, e.g., 386 U.S. at 298 (Douglas, J., dissenting):
While equity is seldom an ingredient of the tax laws, while they are indeed
inherently discriminatory in many ways, reflecting perquisites obtained by pres-
sure groups, we need not increase their harshness by giving simple words
unusual or strained meanings-unless of course Congress has plainly made an
arbitrary choice.
For discussion of Stidger, see notes 218-26 supra & accompanying text.
455 Cf United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 52 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 326 (1960) (Douglas, J., concurring); Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 293 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting), in which Justice
Douglas supported a "broader" interpretation of tax benefits. For discussion of these
cases, see text accompanying notes 149-64 supra. Cf Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S.
269, 282 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at notes 170-86 supra & accompanying
text.
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the taxpayef with a substantial amount at stake wends his way
through litigation up to the Supreme Court, most of Justice
Douglas' dissents work to the immediate benefit of the affluent.
If Justice Douglas' bent for the welfare recipient is a manifesta-
tion of his social philosophy, that philosophy gives way in his
handling of tax cases.
V. CONCLUSION
We have seized on filmy threads, reaching far afield from
taxation, in our effort to understand Justice Douglas' puzzling
record in tax cases. At best, our theories explaining his behavior
are speculative, made the more difficult because Justice Douglas
has so often refused to reason or explain as he recorded his vote.
But wholly apart from his motive, it is the result and the
significance of his disturbing performance as a Justice in the tax
court of last resort that requires appraisal.
In his rather caustic review of Justice Douglas' The Anatomy
of Liberty456 and Freedom of the Mind,457 the political scientist Yosal
Rogat observed: "[I]t is clear that Douglas rejects the austerity
and detachment traditionally imposed upon a judge. Indeed, he
has come to think of himself as no mere judge, but a moralist, a
political visionary, a universal philosopher. ' 458 Rogat, while deal-
ing chiefly with Justice Douglas' extrajudicial writings, noted the
same attitude in Justice Douglas' judicial opinions: "He seems to
think that Supreme Court Justices should answer legal questions
by directly applying their beliefs about the overall needs of the
coufitry, or even about the world. '459 Further criticizing his
expository writing, Rogat accused Justice Douglas of adopting a
simplistic view of both the universe and the Constitution.
[H]e reduces the most complex political and legal
difficulties to a few abstract moral principles, and the
sharpest antagonisms to a flabby and homogeneous
togetherness ...
... [A] case does not present a tangle of competing
principles, but a single transcendent principle-for in-
stance, free speech or religious freedom--which need
only be identified for the solution to be plain. In this
way, he avoids the task, so basic to legal analysis, of
reconciling competing principles. Instead, he substitutes
simple labels and lines: 'the abuse of speech can be
456 (1963).
457 (1964).
458 Rogat, Book Review, N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 22, 1964, at 5.
459 Id. 6. See also id. n.*.
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punished but the right itself cannot be.' Unfortunately,
few cases are so simple.460
As Rogat demonstrated, Justice Douglas' expression of every
concept in universal terms leads inevitably to contradictions. 461
Similar conflicts, reflecting Justice Douglas' changing attitude
toward the taxpayer, are manifest in his tax decisions. For
example, holding in favor of the government in Clifford462 Jus-
tice Douglas proclaimed for the Court in 1940 that: "Technical
considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the
legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct as a
refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic issue. 4 6 3
Thus he read the statutory term "income" to have a sweep that
ultimately required legislation to contain.464 But in 1960, in
Knetsch,465 Justice Douglas refused to accept the Court's holding
that because the uneconomic "loan" transaction in question was
entered only for the purpose of avoiding taxes, the taxpayer
should not escape taxation:
Tax avoidance is a dominating motive behind
scores of transactions. It is plainly present here .... The
remedy is legislative. Evils or abuses can be par-
ticularized by Congress. . . . Since these transactions
were real and legitimate in the insurance world and
were consummated within the limits allowed by insur-
ance policies, I would recognize them tax-wise.466
More significant than merely highlighting contradictions
among cases, however, Justice Douglas' undiscriminating ap-
proach obscures conflicting factors within a given case, so that he
fails to come to grips with their details and significance, and
rarely clarifies the actual determinants of his votes.467 Thus
460 Id. 5-6.
461 Compare, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 425 (1953) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("[E]ven a reasonable regulation of the right to free speech is not compatible
with the First Amendment.") with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 585 (1951)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There comes a time when even speech loses its constitutional
immunity.'). But cf. Casper, The Liberal Faith: Some Observations on the Legal Philosophy of
Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas, 22 FED. B.J. 179, 180 (1962) (attempting to reconcile the
statements). Compare zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306.313 (1952) (Douglasj.)("Wearea
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.") with United States v.
Balard, 322 U.S.78, 87 (1944) (Douglas, J.) ("Man's relation to his God was made no
concern of the state.") But cf. Louisell, The Man and the Mountain: Douglas on Religious
Freedom, 73 YALE L.J. 975, 982 (1964) (suggesting that another sentence in the same
paragraph of the, Ballard quotation foreshadowed the Zorach quotation).
S2or discussion of Clifford, see notes 29-35 supra & accompanying text.
463 309 U.S. at 334.464 
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 673-75. But cf. B. BITTER & L. STONE, FEDERAL
INCOME, ESTATE AND GirF TAXATION 390 (4th ed. 1972).465 For discussion of Knetsch, see notes 136-48 supra & accompanying text.
466 364 U.S. at 371 (Douglas, J., dissenting).4 67 We must take issue with the evaluation by Rodell, Justice Douglas: An Anniversary
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Justice Douglas did not recognize the conflict presented by
Clifford when he wrote his Knetsch dissent. Similarly, in Generes
468
Justice Douglas dissented:
I protest now what I have repeatedly protested, and
that is the use of this Court to iron out ambiguities in
the Regulations or in the Act, where the responsible
remedy is either a recasting of the Regulations by
Treasury or presentation of the problem to the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation which is a
standing committee of the Congress that regularly re-
writes the Act and is much abler than are we to forecast
revenue needs and spot loopholes where abuses
thrive.469
Yet while he referred in Generes to similar views he had ex-
pressed in his opinions in Skelly Oil,470 Lester4 7 1 and Knetsch, he
ignored the active and farreaching role he had forged for the
Court in Clifford. And he ignored, too, that his dissents were but
dissents, thus remaining unforgiving and unreformed, unwilling
to accept the Court's rejection of his now more limited view of
the Court's role, long after that rejection had been made clear.
47 2
Similar failures to attend to the detail required by respectable
legal process punctuate Justice Douglas' tax opinions throughout
the last two periods. The prime example of course is the Rudolph
dissent,47 3 in which Justice Douglas cited a regulation limited to
the withholding tax for the proposition that the award of an
expense free trip to a salesmen's convention was exempted from
the income tax altogether. And certainly the suggestion is simply
unacceptable that the expense of the wives' attendance should be
deductible because their presence was necessary in order to
prevent the convention from degenerating into a stag party.
Only an overwhelming orientation to result seems to explain
Fragmentfo a Friend, 26 U. CH. L. REv. 2, 4 (1958), referring specifically to Justice
Douglas' opinions in such areas as tax, labor, patents and economics: "And the quality ofhis opinions, backed by his technical expertise and inspired by his concern for FDR's
'common man,' has been uniformly high."
468 For discussion of Ceneres, see text accompanying notes 206-11 supra."69405 U.S. at 114-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).40 For discussion of Skelly Oil, see notes 197-205 supra & accompanying text.
471 For discussion of Lester, see text accompanying notes 165.69 supra.
42 In this connection it is interesting to note Justice Douglas' treatment of United
States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951), in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 9(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at text accompanying notes 82-84supra, and his
treatment o iPoe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), in Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S.
44, 49 (1944) (Douglas, J., dissenting), discussed at notes 69-75 supra & accompanying
text. Compare Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72COLoM. L . h469, 484 (192)  in which Professor Lesnick emphasizes Justice Harlan's
commitment to the law laid down in an earlier decision of the Court although he had
dissented in the earlier case.
41 For discussion of Rudolph, see notes 170-86 supra & accompanying text.
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such an opinion.4 74 Professor Rogat's comments on Justice Doug-
las' expository writing seem applicable here as well:
[H]ow can such a man, trained in the law, with its
scruples and its insistence on detail, become so careless?
The answer lies, apparently, in indifference to the tex-
ture of legal analysis, which arises from an exclusively
political conception of the judicial role.4 75
In Commissioner v. Estate of Noel,47 6 the Court, in a short,
direct and clear-cut opinion, reversed the court of appeals and
held that the proceeds of a flight insurance policy were includ-
able, as life insurance proceeds, in a decedent's gross estate for
estate tax purposes.47 7 There were two possible bases for tax-
payer victory in Noel. One, adopted by the court of appeals, but
convincingly rejected in the Supreme Court's opinion, distin-
guished the decedent's accident insurance from "life insurance"
includable according to the statute. The other, rejected by the
Tax Court478 and the court of appeals47 9 as well as the Supreme
Court, would have required a finding that the decedent had
retained no incidents of ownership in the insurance policy.
Justice Douglas alone dissented, and dissented without explana-
tion, without a word. He may have thought the reasons for his
dissent were obvious. They are not to us. Such a response to the
case and judgment fails to square with Justice Douglas' duties to
the Court, to the parties before him, and to all who look for
understanding to Supreme Court opinions, whether majority,
concurring or dissenting. And certainly the carelessness of his
opinions when he does write casts great doubt on whether a
reasoned basis in law underlies his silent dissents.
474 If one wonders whether to pin the blame on aii inartful research job by Justice
Douglas' law clerk, it is interesting to note the comments of William Cohen, Justice
Douglas' law clerk in an earlier period, in his articleJustie Douglas: A Law Clerk's View, 26
U.iCH. L. REv. 6, 7 (1958):
Nor is there a cavalier disregard for detail. Particularly, each statement of fact
must be checked carefully against the record in the case. Discussion of back-
ground state law must be scrupulously accurate. His law clerk soon learns that
the one failing that can never be excused is the imprecise and inaccurate
utilization of legal material.
475 Rogat, supra note 458, at 6. He noted additionally that,
[t]o a lesser extent, the same kind of carelessness characterizes Douglas' work on
the court. True, many of his decisions have been courageous and admirable. But
at issue is the texture of legal reasoning; not the similarities in what Douglas and
Mr. Justice Black decide, but the difference in how they decide.
Id n.*.
47 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
477 See INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2042(z).
478 39 T.C. 466 (1962).
479 332 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1964).
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In a 1949 speech, Justice Douglas addressed the importance
of explained decisions, and compared the Supreme Court of
1886 with that of 1941: "[W]hatever the view on the merits all
will agree, I think, that the recent Court was more faithful to the
democratic tradition. It wrote in words that all could understand
why it did what it did. That is vital to the integrity of the judicial
process. ' '480 Although in that passage he was discussing majority
opinions of the Court, Justice Douglas recognized that the same
standards must be met by dissenting opinions as well. In a 1948
speech defending the dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas em-
braced the view of Chief Justice Hughes:
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error
into which the dissenting judge believes the court to
have been betrayed.48 '
Eight years later in We the Judges Justice Douglas described the
Court as "one of the great cohesive forces in America" and
lauded the "respect and reverence" the people of this nation
have for the Court "born of decades of experience. ' 482 Although
he is a person who appreciates the importance of reasoned
opinions, as a Justice he has been repeatedly unwilling to write a
reasoned basis for his judicial vote in tax cases. Such a Justice
does not enforce the cohesion nor can he long attract the respect
to the Court which he says he values so highly.483
The conception of the judiciary which Justice Douglas ex-
presses in We the Judges is an undisputably noble one:
It can and should, in the critical crises that affect
the reputations and fortunes of men, be alert to create
480 Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 739 (1949).
411 Douglas, The Dissenting Opinion, 8 LAwYERs GuxID REv. 467, 469 (1948).
482 WE THE JUDGES, supra note 405, at 82.
483 Nor have Justice Douglas' dissents lived up to the role of the dissent outlined by
Chief Justice Vinson in 1949, who added three more limited points to Chief Justice
Hughes' dictum:
The dissenting opinion itself is of value in many different respects. For
example, an opinion circulated to the Court as a dissent sometimes has so much
in logic, reason, and authority to support it that it becomes the opinion of the
Court. ....
In the second place, the dissent gives assurance to counsel and to the public
that the decision was reached only after much discussion, thought, and
research-that it received full and complete consideration before being handed
down.
In the third place, a dissent may have far-reaching influence in bringing to
public attention the ramifications of the Coures opinion and by sounding a
warning note against further extension of legal doctrine, or the dissenter's
conviction that existing doctrine has been unduly limited.
Work of the Federal Courts, 69 U.S. v, (1949).
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if necessary, new safeguards for the liberty of the citi-
zen. The judiciary sits in a quiet and dignified place,
one that is far removed from the tumult and passion of
crowds.484
But Justice Douglas does not seem to have detached himself
from that tumult and passion. If impatience with the long,
tortuous road to total legislative reform of the tax code and an
inequity-free statute lies behind Justice Douglas' action in tax
cases, that is unfortunate indeed. One need not favor a negative
income tax system to understand that in many respects welfare is
but one side of the federal pulley, with tax on the other. Respect
for the Court's decisions in welfare cases, like the money for the
welfare recipients, depends on the Court's willingness to enforce
the tax statute as it is, in accordance with congressional purpose,
with the Court seeking it out diligently and honestly. We have
not the luxury of time or resources to apply the tax statute to
none until it applies to all, even if this were our preference.
Taxation is too important, the Court's role too fundamental,
and Justice Douglas too capable for him to continue refusing to
judge in tax cases. We trust that in his remaining years on the
Court this Justice, whose tenure exceeds all others' and whose
vision of a free America in a system of law has often provided
hope and guidance, will judge tax cases as he has stated judges
should judge, and that he will reason and will share his reason-
ing with us.
484 WE THE JUDGES, supra note 405, at 443.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
TAX CASES DECIDED BY SUPREME COURT, 1939-1973
Douglas
Volume Number Won by for
U.S. Reports of Cases Taxpayer Taxpayer
Period 1 (1939-1943)
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
Totals
4
91
0
3
2
3
0
2
0
2
0
16
(18%)
0
22/
(25%)
Period 2, First Part (1942-1959)
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
Totals
3
3
0
6
4
3
3
1 (of3)
0
0
1
2
2
1
0
1
1
0 (ofl)
0 (of0)
1 (of l)
2
0
0
0 (of2)
34 (of 76)
(45%)
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
1
0
0
1
22
(26%)
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TABLE I (Continued)
Douglas
Volume Number Won by for
U.S. Reports of Cases Taxpayer Taxpayer
Period 2, Second Part (1952-1959)
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
Totals
Totals for
combined
period 2
1
3
1
0
3
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
2
2
1
0
20
(50%)
2
0
0
1
0
2
2
0
0
10
(25%)
32
(25%)
Period 3 (1959-1964)
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
Totals
54 (of 116)
(47%)
1
2
0
2 (of3)
5
1
2
1
0
2
1
0
3
1
1
1 (of2)
24 (of 33)
(73%)
0
6
(17%)
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TABLE I (Continued)
Douglas
Volume Number Won by for
U.S. Reports of Cases Taxpayer Taxpayer
Period 4 (1964-1973)
377 0 0 0
378 0 0 0
379 0 0 0
380 3 2 3
381 4 0 0
382 0 0 0
383 4 3 3
384 1 0 0
385 0 0 0
386 1 0 1
387 2 1 2
388 0 0 0
389 1 0 1
390 1 0 0
391 1 0 0
392 0 0 0
393 1 0 V
394 2 0 2
395 1 0 1
396 0 0 0
397 3 0 1
398 1 1 1
399 0 0 0
400 1 0 0
401 0 0 0
402 0 0 0
403 2 0 1
404 0 0 0
405 3 1 2
406 0 0 0
407 0 0 0
408 1 1 1
409 0 0 0
410 2 0 1
411 1 1 1
93 S. Ct. 2 0 1
Totals 38 10 22 2
(27%) (59%)
Totals for
1939-1973 290 70 116 (of 278)
(24%) (41%)
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TABLE II
CASES IN WHICH DOUGLAS DIFFERED WITH THE COURT
Number of
Cases in Number Number
which Douglas Douglas Percentage Douglas Percentage
Period Participated in Minority in Minority Alone Alone
All cases
6
19
14
18
182
71
Won by Taxpayer
6
2
7% 0 0%
65% 8%
0 .0%
1
2 (First
Part)
2 (Second
Part)
3
4
Totals
1
2 (First
Part)
2 (Second
Part)
3
4
Totals
1
2 (First
Part)
2 Second
Part)
3
4
Totals
Won by Government
0
17
12
18
13
60
0% 0 0%
5 9%
4
9
6
24
2 20%
0 0%
0 0%
I0 16%
22V
19
10
6
10
67
68
57
30
27
28
210
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TABLE III
How DOUGLAS MADE HIS DISSENTING VIEWS KNOWN
Number of Number Percentage
Cases in Number Number Dissent Dissent
which Douglas Douglas Wrote Without Without
Period Participated in Minority Dissent' Opinion Opinion
All cases
6
19
14
18
13 2
71
Won by Taxpayer
6
2
2
0
0
10
Won by Government
0
17
12
18
13
60
1 1%
7 9%
1
5
3
8
10
27
1
0
0
0
0
1
1 4%
2 10%
1
2 (First
Part)
2 (Second
Part)
3
4
Totals
1
2 (First
Part)
2 (Second
Part)
3
4
Totals
1
2 (First
Part)
2 Second
Part)
3
4
Totals
I Where Justice Douglas is listed as having written no opinion, but is not listed as
dissenting without opinion, he joined the opinion of another justice.
0 0%
5 9%
22
19
10
6
10
67
68
57
30
27
28
210
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TABLE IV
SOLITARY DISSENTS IN TAX CASES
Losing
United States Reports Case Justice Party
2
Vol. Page
307 277 Woodrough Butler T
309 149 Fitch McReynolds T
310 69 Fuller Reed G
310 381 Sunshine Anthracite McReynolds T
311 60 Stewart Roberts T
311 504 Hammel Roberts T
318 176 Smith Roberts T
318 184 Robinette Roberts T
324 177 Smith Roberts T
324 303 Wemyss Roberts T
324 542 Wheeler Roberts T
325 293 Angelus Milling Douglas T
326 465 Flowers Rutledge T
326 480 Estate of Holmes Douglas T
326 521 Talbot Mills Rutledge T
326 599 Kirby Petroleum Douglas G
327 404 Wilcox Burton G
332 524 Liberty Glass Douglas T
332 535 Noble Douglas T
337 733 Culbertson Jackson T
339 583 Brown Shoe Black G
339 619 Korell Black G
340 590 Lewis Douglas T
343 711 Robertson Jackson T
345 278 Healy Douglas T
348 426 Glenshaw Glass Dqugas T
350 308 Southwest Exploration Douglas T
352 82 Putnam Harlan T
353 180 Automobile Club of Michigan Harlan T (1 issue)
353 380 Libson Shops Douglas T
354 271 Korpan Douglas T
354 351 Calamaro Burton G
357 63 Flora Whittaker T
360 446 Hansen Douglas T
363 278 Duberstein Douglas T
364 122 Hertz Douglas T
364 131 Gillette Motor Transport Douglas T
365 753 Bulova Watch Douglas T
369 499 Bilder Douglas T
373 193 Whipple Douglas T
374 65 Braunstein Douglas T
375 59 Zacks Black T
37 503 Jackson Douglas T
380 678 Estate of Noel Douglas T
383 569 Malat Black T
394 741 Bingler Douglas T
395 316 Estate of Grace Douglas T
400 4 Maryland Savings Harlan T*
403 345 Lincoln Savings Douglas T
405 93 Generes Douglas T
410 441 Bayse Douglas T
93 S. Ct. 2820 Fausner Blackmun T*
2 T denotes taxpayer; G denotes government. * signifies that the dissenter would set
the case for full argument.
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TABLE IV (Continued)
Totals
Solitary Losing
Justice Dissents Party
Douglas 26 (25T, 1 G)
Roberts 7 (all T)
Black 4 (2T, 2G)
Harlan 3 (all T)
Burton 2 (both G)
Jackson 2 (both T)
McReynolds 2 (both T)
Rutledge 2 (both T)
Butler 1 (for T)
Reed 1 (for G)
Whittaker I (for T)
Blackmun 1 (for T)
19731
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TABLE V
DISSENTS WITHOUT OPINION IN TAX CASES'
Losing
United States Reports Case Justice Party
Vol. Page
309 149 Fitch McReynolds T
310 80 Leonard Hughes T
Roberts
McReynolds
311 83 Neuberger Roberts T
Douglas
Black
324 308 Merrill Roberts T
325 293 Angelus Milling Douglas T
326 425 Hercules Gasoline Burton T
326 480 Estate of Holmes Douglas T
326 599 Kirby Petroleum Douglas G
328 25 Burton-Sutton Oil Douglas G
Black
332 524 Liberty Glass Co. Douglas T
332 535 Noble Douglas T
333 496 South Texas Lumber Co. Douglas T
Burton
343 118 Lykes Black T
343 711 Robertson Jackson T
344 167 Alison Douglas G
Burton
345 278 Healy Douglas T
346 335 Lober Douglas T
Jackson
348 254 Koppers Co. Douglas T
Reed
348 426 Glenshaw Glass Douglas T
350 55 Anderson, Clayton & Co. Douglas G
Burton
350 308 Southwest Exploration Co. Douglas T
353 382 Libson Shops Douglas T
360 446 Hansen Douglas T
364 131 Gillette Motor Transport Co. Douglas T
365 753 Bulova Watch Co. Douglas T
372 53 Patrick Douglas T
Black
373 193 Whipple Douglas T
374 65 Braunstein Douglas T
376 503 Jackson Douglas T
380 678 Estate of Noel Douglas T
383 569 Malat Black G
410 441 Bayse Douglas T
3 The list of caies includes those in which the following language was used: "Mr.
Justice Douglas dissents," "Mr. Justice McReynolds thinks that the judgment below
should be affirmed." It does not include cases with such language as "Mr. Justice Black
agrees with the Court of Claims and would affirm its judgment," or "Mr. Justice Roberts
would affirm for the reasons given in the opinion below." Nor does it include cases in
which a precedent is cited or a reason for the dissent is given in a short sentence or
paragraph.
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TABLE V (Continued)
Totals
Silent Losing
Justice Dissents Party
Douglas 25 (20T, 5G)
Black 5 (2T, 3G)
Burton 4 (2T, 2G)
Roberts 3 (2T, IG)
Jackson 2 (2T)
McReynolds 2 (2T)
Hughes 1 (T)
Reed 1 (T)
Silent
Dissents Losing
Justice4  Alone Party
Douglas 18 (17T, IG)
Black 2 (IT, IG)
4 Justices Burton, Jackson, McReynolds, and Roberts each dissented once silently and
alone for the taxpayer.
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TABLE VI
GASES SUBDIVIDED By TYPE5
Taxable Event
Bruun
Davis
Definition
Bruun
Anderson
Stewart
Sprouse
Griffiths
Wilcox
Brown Shoe
Rutkin
Robertson
Gen. Am. Inv.
Glenshaw
Anderson-Clayton
Haynes
James
Johnson
Mitchell
Anticipatory Assignment
Horst
Eubank
Joliet
Harmon
Sunnen
Bayse
A. Substantive Income Tax Issues
1. Income and Realization
Attributing Trust's
Income to Grantor
309 U G Wood
370 U G Clifford
Stuart
309 U
309 G
317 T
Attributing Income of
Family Partnership to Father
Tower 327 G G
Lusthaus 327 G G
Culbertson 337 G G
Exemption from Tax Laws
Scottish Am. 323 U G
Maximov 373 U G
Alimony Included in
Husband's Income
Fitch 309 G G
Leonard 310 G G
Fuller 310 T T
Pearce 315 G GI
Lester 366 U T"
Section 102 Gifts
Am. Dental
Jacobson
LoBue
Duberstein
Stanton
Kaiser
2. Deductions from Gross Income
308 G G
312 U G
313 U G
313 U G
314 U G
315 U G
319 G G
320 U T
326 G G
328 T G
Depreciation
Lazarus
Va. Hotel
Detroit Ed.
Brown Shoe
Hertz
Massey
Waterman S.S.
Fribourg
Chi. B.Q.R.
5 Each entry in this table consists of an abbreviated case name, the volume of United
States Reports in which the case may be found, the party for whom the Court decided
(except that U denotes a unanimous decision for the party listed to the right), and the
party for whom Justice Douglas voted. Table VII provides the complete citation to each
case.c The wife, who was the taxpayer, lost.
The husband was permitted to deduct.
Section 162
Dupont
Higgins
Pyne
City Bank
Textile Mills
Spreckles
Interstate
Transit
Heininger
Flowers
Burton-Sutton
Oil
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TABLE VI (Continued)
Obsolescence
Real Title Co.
Depletion
Wilshire Oil
Douglas
Kirby Petroleum
S.W. Exploration
Parsons
Cannelton
Monolith
Paragon Jewel
Skelly Oil
Lykes
T.T. Rentals
Sullivan
Hoover
Peurifoy
Cammarano
Rudolph
Patrick
Gilmore
Tellier
Stidger
Correll
Lincoln
Fausner
Interest
Dupont
Equitable
Knetsch
Miss. Chem.
Taxes
Supplee
Dixie Pine
Wis. Gas
Losses
Smith
Price
Boehm
Bad Debts
Putnam
Whipple
Generes
343 G
356 U
356 U
356 U
358 G
358 U
370 G
372 G
372 G
383 U
386 G
389 G
403 G
93 S.Ct. G
308 G
321 U
364 G
405 U
316 U
320 U
322 G
308 G
309 U
326 U
309 U G
miums
369 U T
311 U T
349
349
353
323 G
325 U
397 U
397 U
369 G T
3. Accounting, Year of Income or Deduction, Claim of Right
Enright
Dixie Pine
Security Flour
Putnam
Wilcox
Elec. Storage Batt.
S. Tex. Lumber
312 U G
320 U G
321 G T
324 U T
327 T T
329 G G
333 G T
Lewis
Alison
Arrowsmith
Healy
Auto. Club Mich.
Hansen
Consol. Edison
AAA
Schlude
Catto
4. Capital Gains and Losses
313 U G
317 U G
350 U G
356 U G
364 G T
381 U G
381 U G
383 T T
Sale or Exchange
McClain 311 U
Hammel 311 U
Flaccus 313 U
Brown 380 G
Collapsible Corporations &
Corporate Distributions
Braunstein 374 G
Gordon 391 U
Davis 397 G
Amortization of Bond Prei
Hanover
Insurance Co. Reserves
Ore. Mut. Life
Net Operating Loss
Olympic Radio
Lewyt
Libson Shops
Section 212
McDonald
Bingham
Woodward
Hilton Hotel
Section 213
Bilder352 G
373 G
405 G
Capital Asset
Hort
Kisselback
Corn Prods.
P. G. Lake
Gillette Motor
Midland-Ross
Dixon
Malat
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TABLE VI (Continued)
313 G G
313 G G
331 G T
Holding Period
Gambrill 313 G Ts
5. Constitutionality of Income, Estate or Gift Tax as Applied
Griffiths
Rompel
Weiner
Atlas Life Ins.
Md. Sav.
T G
U G
U G
U G
G G
Nonrecognition
Section 351
Cement Inv.
Reorganization
LeTulle
Ala. Asphaltic
Palm Springs
Bondholders
S.W. Consol.
Bedford
Munter
Bazley
Phipps
Libson Shops
Turnbow
Nash
Dividends Rec. Credit
Am. Chicle
Excess Profits Tax
Olympic Radio
G.D. Searle
6. Corporations
Identity of Taxpayer
Individual or Corporation
316 U T Griffiths
Moline Properties
U G
U T
U T
U G
U G
U G
U G
G T
G G
G T
U G
T T
316 U G
349 U G
367 U G
Parent or Subsidiary
Interstate Transit
Nat'l Carbide
United Gas Pipe
Line
First Security
Undistributed Profits in G
Hercules Gasoline
Ogilvie Hardware
Dividends Paid Credit
Credit Alliance
Sabine Transp.
Indebtedness Credit
N.W. Steel
Ohio Leather
Accumulated Earnings Tax
Donruss Co. 393
308 U G
319 U G
319 G G
336 U G
386 G T
405 T T
eneral
326 G G
330 T T
316 T G
318 T G
311 U G
317 G G
G T
Neuberger
7. Partnerships
311 T G
B. Estate Tax
1. Gross Estate
Transfer to Take
Effect at Death Transfer in Contemplation of Death
Hallock 309 G G Trust Co. of Ga. 326 U T
LeGierse 312 G G City Bank 323 U T
Goldstone 325 G T
Holmes 326 G T
Spiegel 335 G G
Church 335 G G
8 This characterization applies to the Court's holding only on this issue.
Basis
Maguire
Reynolds
Crane
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TABLE VI (Continued)
Asset or Income in Gross Estate
Maass 312 T G
Lober 346 G T
Fidelity Phila. 356 T T
Noel 380 G T
Decedent's Power ofAppointment
General
Morgan
Safe Deposit
Rogers
O'Malley
Grace
Byrum
Jointly Held Property
Chandler
309 U
316 G
320 G
Special
383 G
395 G
408 T
410 U G
Expenses
Stapf
Marital Deduction
Meyer
Jackson
N.E. Penna Bank
Cartwright
Sanford
Humphreys
Rasquin
Ryerson (1)
Smith
Robinette
Harris
Hutchings
Pelzer
Ryerson (2)
Disston
2. Deductions
Charitable Deduction
375 U G Northern Trust 311 U
Merchants Nat'l Bank 320 G
Union Planters
364 G T Banks 335 G
376 G T Sternberger 348 G
387 T T
3. Valuation
411 T T
C. Gift Tax
1. Existence and Amount of Gift
308 U G
308 U T
312 U G
312 U G
318 G G
318 G G
340 T T
2. Annual Exclusion
312 U T
312 U G
312 U G
325 U G
D. Selective Excises
Sunshine
Winchester
Merion
Wash. Balt. &
Annap. Realty
Colgate
Palmolive
Goodrich
Seattle First Nail
G G
U G
U G
U G
U G
U G
U T
Fitch 323 U G
Wis. Elec. Power 336 U G
Sanchez 340 U G
Kahriger 345 G T
Calamaro 354 T T
Korpan 354 G T
Cory 363 G G
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TABLE V1 (Continued)
E. Regulations: Validity
Wash. Bait. &
Annap. Realty
Credit Alliance
Mother Lode Co.
Douglas
Cammarano
Hertz
Massey
Cartwright
316 U G
316 T G
317 U G
322 G G
358 U G
364 G T
364 G T
411 T T
F. Procedure and Enforcement
1. Refund
Timeliness of Claim
Kreider
Kales
Rosenman
Liberty Glass
Noble
Elec. Storage
Batt.
313 U
314 U
323 U
332 G
332 G
329 G
Sufficiency of Claim
Angelus Milling
Interest on Overpayment
Bulova Watch
Payment of Deftciency
as Condition on Bringing Suit
Flora 357
Flora 362
325 G T
365 G T
G G
G G
2. Res Judicata
314 U T
3. Definitions
"First Return" as
Including Amendments
Haggar Co.
Riley
Scaife Co.
308 U T
311 U G
314 U G
4. Assessment: Statute of Limitations
Germantown Trust
Lane-Wells Co.
Colony Inc.
309 U T
321 U G
357 T T
5. Review of Tax Court (not inclusive)
Chi. Stockyards
Gooch Milling
Dobson
Dixie Pine
Equitable
318 U G
320 U G
320 U T
320 U G
321 U G
Claridge
Boehm
Talbot Mills
John Kelley Co.
Crane
Haggar Co.
Wilshire Oil
F.H.E. Oil
Janney
Taft
Textile Mills
308 U
308 U
308 U
311 U
311 U
314 U
Is T Barred?
Kales
Is G Barred?
Nunnally
Sunnen
Int'l Bldg.
316 G
333 G
345 U
,Willfully"
Spies
Marchetti
Mathis
Donaldson
Couch
Bishop
Price
Powell
Ryan
Habig
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TABLE VI (Continued)
6. Application of Due Process Developments in Tax Evasion Cases
Powell 379 G T Sansone 380 G T
Ryan 379 G T Grosso 390 T T
Jaben 381 G T
7. Lien (Existence, not Priority)
Stern 357 T T Sims 359 U G
Bess 357 U G Meyer 375 T T
8. Court of Claims: Jurisdiction
Wilson & Co. 311 U G
9. Effect of State Law Characterization
Bosch 387 G T
10. Joint Return
Taft 311 U T Janney 311 U T
11. Interest on Deficiency
Koppers Co. 348 G T
12. Finality of Decision
Simpson & Co. 321 G T
13. Penalty
Acker 361 T T
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
TABLE VII
A SUMMARY OF DOUGLAS' VOTES IN
307 U.S.
277 O'Malley v. Woodrough
308 U.S.
39 Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r
54 Rasquin v. Humphreys
90 Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co.
104 F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Comm'rt
252 Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co.
355 Griffiths v. Comm'r
389 Haggar Co. v. Comm'r
415 LeTulle v. Scofield
473 Higgins v. Smith
488 Deputy v. DuPont
309 U.S.
13 Real Estate Land Title & Trust
Co. v. U.S.
78 Morgan v. Comm'r
106 Helvering v. Hallock
149 Helvering v. Fitch
304 Germantown Trust Co. v. Comm'r
331 Helvering v. Clifford
344 Helvering v. Wood
409 Helvering v. Price
461 Helvering v. Bruun
310 U.S.
69
80
381
404
311 U.S.
46
Helvering v. Fuller
Helvering v. Leonard
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins
Anderson v. Helvering
Helvering v. Northwest Rolling
ALL TAX CASES, 1939-19739
G7-1 M
G 8-0
T 8-0
G 7-0
G 7-0
T 7-0
G 8-0
T 8-0
G 8-0
G 6-2
G 6-2
G 6-0
G 8-0
G 6-2
G 7-1
T 9-0
C 7-2
T 9-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
T 8-1
G 6-3
G 8-1
G 9-0
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
M
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
M
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Steel Mills, Inc. G 9-0
54 Crane-Johnson Co. v.
Helveringt G 9-0
55 J.E. Riley Inv. Co.
v. Comm'r G 9-0 Wrote for Court
60 U.S. v. Stewart G 8-1 Wrote for Court
83 Neuberger v. Comm'r T 6-3 Dissent without opinion
104 Wilson & Co. v. U.S. G 9-0
112 Helvering v. Horst G 6-3 M
122 Helvering v. Eubank G 6-3 M
9 Cases in this table include income, estate, gift and excise tax cases but not cases
involving social security taxes. M denotes a case in which Justice Douglas voted with the
majority, D denotes a case in which Justice Douglas joined in dissent. * signifies a one
paragraph dissent in which justice Douglas joined with one or more other ustices, and
for which authorship in unclear. These opinions are counted as though Justice Douglas
had joined the opinion of another Justice. f denotes an extremely short opinion in which
the Court disposed of a case on all fours with a companion case in which it wrote a full
opinion. Such cases are omitted from Tables I, II, III, IV, V & VI. * denotes a case
dealin rimaril with criminal law and procedure. Such cases are omitted from Tables I,
II, I, V &V
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TABLE VII
189 Helvering v. Janney
195 Taft v. Helvering
267 Helvering v. Oregon Mut. Life
272 Helvering v. Pan-American
Lifet
504 Helvering v. Hammel
513 Electro-Chemical Engraving Co.
v. Comm'rt
527 McClain v. Comm'r
312 U.S.
212 Higgins v. Comm'r
254 Guggenheim v. Rasquin
259 Powers v. Comm'r
260 U.S. v. Ryerson
393 Helvering v. Hutchings
399 U.S. v. Pelzer
405 Ryerson v. U.S.
443 Maass v. Higgins
531 Helvering v. LeGierse
543 Estate of Keller v. Comm'r
636 Helvering v. Estate of Enright
646 Pfaff v. Comm'rt
313 U.S.
1 Maguire v. Comm'r
11 Helvering v. Gambrill
15 Helvering v. Campbell
28 Hort v. Comm'r
121 City Bank Farmers Trust Co.
v. Helvering
127 U.S. v. Pyne
247 Helvering v. Flaccus Leather
Co.
428 Helvering v. Reynolds
441 Cary v. Comm'rt
443 U.S. v. A.S. Kreider Co.
314 U.S.
186 U.S. v. Kales
326 Textile Mills Corp. v. Comm'r
459 Scaife Co. v. Comm'r
463 Helvering v. Lerner Stores
315 U.S.
32 White v. Winchester Club
42 Merion Cricket Club v. U.S.
44 U.S. v. Joliet & Chicago R.R.
179 Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic
L. Co.
185 Palm Springs Holding Corp. v.
Comm'r
189 Bondholders Comm. v. Comm'r
194 Helvering v. Southwest
Consol. Corp.
543 Pearce v. Comm'r
626 Spreckels v. Comm'r
(Continued)
T 8-0
T 8-0
T 9-0
T 9-0
G 8-1
G 8-1
G 9-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
T 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
T 7-2
G 6-2
G 6-2
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 6-2
G 6-2
G 6-2
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 6-2
G 6-2
G 8-0
T 8-0
G 8-0
G 9-0
G 9-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
T 8-0
T 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 7-2
G 8-0
M
M
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
D*
M
M
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
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TABLE V11 (Continued)
316 U.S.
56
69
107
258
394
450
527
317 U.S.
102
154
222
399
476
492
318 U.S.
176
184
306
322
371
604
693
319 U.S.
98 Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm'r
436 Moline Properties Inc. v.
Comm'r
523 Virginian Hotel Corp. v.
Comm'r
590 Interstate Transit Lines v.
Comm'r
Merchant's Nat'l Bank v.
Comm'r
Estate of Rogers v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Gooch Milling Co.
Colgate-Palm-Peet Co. v. U.S.
Comm'r v. Heininger
Dobson v. Comm'r
Dixie Pine Products Co. v.
Comm'r
G 5-4 M
Helvering v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co.
Magruder v. Walsh., Bait. &
Annap. Realty
Helvering v. Credit Alliance
Corp.
U.S. v. Nunnaly Investment Co.
Magruder v. Supplee
American Chicle Co. v.
U.S.
Helvering v. Cement Investors,
Inc.
Helvering v. Ohio Leather Co.
Helvering v. Stuart 0
Mother Lode Co. v. Comm'r
Kisselbach v. Comm'r
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co.
Spies v. U.S.*
Smith v. Shaughnessy
Robinette v. Helvering
Helvering v. Sabine Transp.
Co.
Helvering v. American Dental
Co.
Helvering v. Griffiths
Helvering v. Sprouse
Helvering v. Chicago
Stockyards Co.
Wrote for Court
G 9-0
T 5-3
T 5-3
G 9-0
G 9-0
T 9-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
T 8-0
G 7-1
G 7-1
T 5-3
T6-2
T 5-3
T 5-3
G 9-0
G 8-0
G 9-0
G 5-4
G 6-3 M
G 7-2
G 5-2
G 9-0
G 7-0
T 9-0
T 9-0
G 9-0
Wrote dissent
M
" Government and taxpayer each won one issue. Justice Douglas joined Justice
Stone's dissent, holding for the Government on both.
M
M
D
M
Wrote dissent
M
Wrote for Court
320 U.S.
256
410
418
422
467
489
516
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TABLE VII (Continued)
321 U.S.
126
219
225
281
560
583
322 U.S.
275
526
323 U.S.
44
57
119
141
582
594
658
324 U.S.
1
18
108
113
164
177
303
308
331
393
542
325 U.S.
283
293
365
442
687
326 U.S.
287
340
367
425
465
480
521
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S.
Comm'r v. Lane-Wells Co.
R. Simpson & Co. v. Comm'r
Security Flour Mills Co. v.
Comm'r
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
v. Comm'r
U.S. v. Seattle-First Natl
Bank
Douglas v. Comm'r
Wisconsin Gas & Elec. Co.
v. U.S.
Comm'r v. Harmon
McDonald v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Scottish Amer.
Investment Co.
Claridge Apts. Co. v. Comm'r
F.W. Fitch Co. v. U.S.
City Bank Farmers Trust Co.
v. McGowan
Rosenman v. U.S.
Choate v. Comm'r
Fondren v. Comm'r
Fidelity-Philadelphia v.
Rothensies
Comm'r v. Estate of Field
Webre-Steib Co. v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Smith
Comm'r v. Wemyss
Merrill v. Fahs
Comm'r v. Court Holding Co.
Estate of Putnam v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Wheeler
Comm'r v. Estate of Bedford
Angelus Milling Co. v. Comm'r
Trust of Bingham v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Disston
Goldstone v. U.S.
Boehm v. Comm'r
Fernandez v. Wiener
U.S. v. Rompel
Hercules Gasoline Co. v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Flowers
Comm'r v. Estate of Holmes
Talbot Mills v. Comm'r
John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r
Wrote dissent
Wrote dissent
Wrote for Court
M
M
G 9-0
G 9-0
G 6-3
G 7-2
G 9-0
T 9-0
G 6-2
G 8-0
G 7-2
G 5-4
T 9-0
T 9-0
G 9-0
T9-0
T 9-0
T 9-0
G 9-0
G 9-0
G 9-0
T 7-2
G-8-1
G 8-1
G 5-4
G 9-0
T 9-0
G 8-1
G 9-0
G 8-1
T 9-0
G 9-0
G 7-2
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 8-0
G 5-3
G 7-1
G 7-1
G 7-1
T 6-2
Wrote dissent
D
Wrote for Court
Wrote concurrence
Wrote concurrence
M
M
M
D
M
Dissent without opinion
D
Wrote concurrence
Wrote concurrence
M
M
Dissent without opinion
M
M
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599
630
327 U.S.
280
293
404
512
328 U.S.
25
329 U.S.
296
Kirby Petroleu
Allen v. Trust
TABLE VII (Continued)
m Co. v. Comm'r T 7-1
Co. T 8-0
G 6-2
G 6-2
T 7-1
G6-0
Comm'r v. Tower
Lusthaus v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Wilcox
Comm'r v. Fisher
Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v.
Comm'r
Rothensies v. Elec. Storage
Batt.
330 U.S.
709 U.S. v. Ogilvie Hardware Co.
331 U.S.
1 Crane v. Comm'r
210 Comm'r v. Munter
694 McWilliams v. Comm'r
737 Bazley v. Comm'r
332 U.S.
524 Jones v. Liberty Glass Co.
535 Kavanagh v. Noble
333 U.S.
496 Comm'r v. South Texas Lumber Co.
591 Comm'r v. Sunnen
334 U.S.
no cases
335 U.S.
595 Henslee v. Union Planters
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
632 Comm'r v. Estate of Church
701 Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r
336 U.S.
28 Comm'r v. Jacobson
176 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.
v. U.S.
410 Comm'r v. Phipps
422 National Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r
Dissent without opinion
Wrote for Court
M
M
M
Douglas took no part
T 5-3 Dissent without opinion
G 6-3 M
T 7-2 M
G 6-3
G 9-0
G 8-0
G 7-2
G 8-1 Dissent without opinion
G 8-1 Dissent without opinion
G 7-2 Dissent without opinion
G 7-2 M
D
M
M
D
Concurrence without
opinion
G 5-3 Took no part
G 8-1 M
Comm'r v. Culbertson G8-1 M
337 U.S.
369
733
Comm'r v. Wodehouse
Comm'r v. Culbertson
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G 6-3
G 6-3
G 6-3
G 7-2
G 9-0
G 9-0
G 9-0
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338 U.S.
258
411
442
451
561
692
339 U.S.
583
619
340 U.S.
42
106
590
U.S. v. Sanchez
Harris v. Comm'r
U.S. v. Lewis
Lilly v. Comm'r
Lykes v. U.S.
Rutkin v. U.S.*
Robertson v. U.S.
G 7-0
G 7-0
G 8-0
T 8-0
G 8-0
G 5-3
Douglas took no part
Douglas took no part
Douglas took no part
Douglas took no part
Douglas took no part
Douglas took no part
Comm'r v. Connelly
Wilmette Park Dist. v.
Campbell
Reo Motors, Inc. v. Comm'r
U.S. v. Cumberland Pub.
Serv. Co.
Manning v. Seeley Tube &
Box Co.
U.S. v. Benedict
Brown Shoe Co. v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Korell
G 9-0
T 5-4
G 8-1
T8-0
G 6-3
G 5-4
G 7-1
Arrowsmith v. Comm'r
Alison v. U.S.
U.S. v. Kahriger
Healy v. Comm'r
U.S. v. Int'l Bldg. Co.
Watson v. Comm'r
Lober v. U.S.
Comm'r v. Estate of Sternberger
U.S. v. Koppers Co.
Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co.
General Am. Investors Co. v. Comm'r
U.S. v. Olympic Radio &
Television, Inc.
Lewyt Corp. v. Comm'r
Wrote for Court
Wrote dissent
Douglas took no part
M
D
Wrote for Court
G 6-3 Wrote dissent
T 7-2 Dissent without opinion
G 6-3
G8-1
G 9-0
G 6-3
D
Dissent without opinion
Wrote for Court
D
G 7-2 Dissent without opinion
G 7-2
G 7-2
G7-1
G 8-0
D
Dissent without opinion
Dissent without opinion
Concurrence without
opinion
343 U.S.
90
118
130
711
344 U.S.
6
167
345 U.S.
22
278
502
544
346 U.S.
335
347 U.S.
no cases
348 U.S.
187
254
426
434
349 U.S.
232
237
T8-1 M
T 6-1 Douglas took no part
341-342 U.S.
no cases
G 8-0 Wrote for Court
T 5-3 Wrote for Court
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350 U.S.
46
55
308
383
456
351 U.S.
243
352 U.S.
82
306
313
353 U.S.
81
180
382
354 U.S.
271
351
355 U.S.
no cases
356 U.S.
27
30
38
260
274
357 U.S.
28
39
51
63
358 U.S.
59
498
359 U.S.
108
215
360 U.S.
446
Comm'r v. Sullivan
Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r
Hoover Motor Express Co. v.
Comm'r
Comm'r v. P.G. Lake
Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v.
Smith
Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Stern
U.S. v. Bess
Flora v. U.S.
Peurifoy v. Comm'r
Cammarano v. U.S.
Sims v. U.S.
Parsons v. Smith
Comm'r v. Hansen
Corn Products v. Comm'r
U.S. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.
Comm'r v. Southwest Exploration
Co.
U.S. v. Leslie Salt Co.
Millinery Center Building Corp.
v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. LoBue
Putnam v. Comm'r
U.S. v. Allen Bradley Co.
Nat'l Lead Co. v. Comm'r
Haynes v. U.S.
Auto. Club v. Comm'r
Libson Shops Inc. v. Koehler
U.S. v. Korpan
U.S. v. Calamaro
Dissent without opinion
Dissent without opinion
G 8-0
T 7-2
G 7-1
T 9-0
G 9-0
G 9-0
G 8-1
G 9-0
G 9-0
T 6-2
G 5-3
G 7-1
G 8-1 Wrote short dissent
T7-1 M
T 9-0
G 9-0
G 9-0
G 9-0
Wrote for Court
Wrote for Court
T 6-3 M
T 7-2
T 6-3
G 9-0
G 8-1
G 6-3 Wrote dissent
G 9-0 Wrote concurrence
G 9-0
G 9-0
G 7-1 Dissent without opinion
M
M
M
Dissent without opinion
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361 U.S.
87
304
362 U.S.
145
363 U.S.
194
278
299
709
Comm'r v. Acker
U.S. v. Price
Flora v. U.S.
U.S. v. Mfr.'s Nat'l Bank
Comm'r v. Duberstein
U.S. v. Kaiser
Cory Corp. v. Sauber
364 U.S.
76 U.S. v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe
Co.
92 Massey Motors v. U.S.
122 Hertz Corp. v. U.S.
130 Comm'r v. Gillette Motor Transp.
Co.
361 Knetsch v. U.S.
410 Meyer v. U.S.
365 U.S.
753 Bulova Watch Co. v. U.S.
366 U.S.
213 James v. U.S.$
299 Comm'r v. Lester
380 U.S. v. ConEd Co.
367 U.S.
303
687
368 U.S.
337
369 U.S.
499
672
370 U.S.
65
269
371 U.S.
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.
Am. Auto. Ass'n v. U.S.
Turnbow v. Comm'r
Comm'r v. Bilder
Hanover Bank v. Comm'r
U.S. v. Davis
Rudolph v. U.S.
T 6-3 M
G 7-2 Wrote short dissent
G 5-4 M
G 8-0
G 8-1
T 6-3
G 5-4
G 9-0
G 5-4
G 8-1
G 8-1
G 6-3
G 6-3
Did not participate
Wrote short dissent
Wrote concurrence
M
D
Wrote short dissent
Dissent without opinion
Wrote dissent
Wrote dissent
G 8-1 Dissent without opinion
T 7-2 Joined partial
concurrence"
T 9-0
T 9-0
G 9-0
G 5-4
G 9-0
G6-1
T7-0
G 7-0
G 5-2
Wrote concurrence
D
Wrote short dissent
Wrote dissent
537 Riddell v. Monolith Portland
Cement Co. G 8-0
'1 Justice Douglas joined Justice Black's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
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U.S. v. Gilmore
U.S. v. Patrick
Schlude v. Comm'r
Maximov v. U.S.
Whipple v. Comm'r
Braunstein v. Comm'r
G 7-2
G 7-2
G 5-4
G 9-0
G 8-1
Wrote short dissent
Dissent without opinion
D
Dissent without opinion
372 U.S.
39
53
128
373 U.S.
49
193
374 U.S.
65
375 U.S.
59
118
233
376 U.S.
503
377-378
no cases
379 U.S.
48
61
380 U.S.
343
563
624
678
381 U.S.
54
68
214
233
252
382 U.S.
no cases
383 U.S.
272
569
627
687
384 U.S.
102
G 7-1
G 9-0
T 6-3
U.S. v. Zacks
U.S. v. Stapf
Meyer v. U.S.
Jackson v. U.S.
Douglas took no part
M
G 8-1 Dissent without opinion
U.S. v. Powell*
Ryan v. U.S.4
Sansone v. U.S.$
Comm'r v. Brown
Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v.
Comm'r
Comm'r v. Noel
U.S. v. Midland-Ross Corp.
Dixon v. U.S.
Jaben v. U.S.*
U.S. v. Atlas Life Ins. Co.
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. U.S.
Fribourg Navigation Co. v.
Comm'r
Malat v. Riddell
U.S. v. O'Malley
Comm'r v. Tellier
U.S. v. Catto
G 6-3 Wrote dissent
G 8-1 Dissent in above opinion
G 7-2
T 6-3
T 7-2
G 8-1
G 9-0
G 9-0
G 6-3
G 9-0
G 9-0
D
M
M
Dissent without opinion
T 6-3
T 7-1
G 7-2
T9-0
G 9-0
G 8-1 Dissent without opinion
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385 U.S.
no cases
386 U.S.
287 Comm'r v. Stidger G 6-3 Wrote dissent
387 U.S.
213 Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. U.S. T 6-3 M
456 Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch G 6-3 Wrote dissent
388 U.S.
no cases
389 U.S.
299 U.S. v. Correll G 5-3 Wrote short dissent
390 U.S.
39 Marchetti v. U.S.* T 7-1 M
62 Grosso v. U.S.* T 7-1 M
222 U.S. v. Habig G 8-0
391 U.S.
I Mathis v. U.S.* T 5-3 M
83 Comm'r v. Gordon G 8-0
392 U.S.
no cases
393 U.S.
297 U.S. v. Donruss Co. G 6-3 Joined partial concurrence
12
394 U.S.
678 U.S. v. Skelly Oil Co. G 6-3 Wrote dissent
741 Bingler v. Johnson G 8-1 Wrote short dissent
395 U.S.
316 U.S. v. Estate of Grace G 6-1 Wrote dissent
396 U.S.
nfo cases
397 U.S.
301 U.S. v. Davis G 5-3 Wrote dissent
572 Woodward v. Comm'r G 8-0
580 U.S. v. Hilton Hotels Corp. G 8-0
398 U.S.
1 Nash v. U.S. T 6-2 Wrote for Court
399 U.S.
no cases
2 Justice Douglas joined Justice Harlan's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
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I
400 U.S.
4
517
401-402 U.S.
no cases
403 U.S.
190
345
405 U.S.
93
298
394
408 U.S.
125
409 U.S.
322
410 U.S.
441
257
411 U.S.
546
412 U.S.
346
401
93 S. Ct.
2820
G 9-0
G 8-1
G 6-1
G 8-0
T 6-3
T 6-3
G 7-2
G 8-1
G 9-0
T 6-3
G 8-1
G 6-2
G 8-1
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TABLE VII (Continued)
J.S. v. Md. Savings-Share
Ins. Corp. G 8-1 M
)onaldson v. U.S.$ G 9-0 Wro
Wrote dissent
Wrote dissent
M
M
Wrote dissent
Dissent without opinion
M
Wrote dissent
Wrote dissent
M
U.S. v. Mitchell
Comm'r v. Lincoln Sav. &
Loan Ass'n
U.S. v. Generes
U.S. v. Miss. Chem. Corp.
Comm'r v. First Security
Bank
U.S. v. Byrum
Couch v. U.S.$
U.S. v. Basye
U.S. v. Chandler
Cartwright v. U.S.
U.S. v. Bishop*
U.S. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.
Fausner v. Comm'r
te concurrence
DOUGLAS-FEDERAL TAX CASES
TABLE VIII'
3
DOUGLAS' POSITIONS IN LABOR CASES
Court Douglas' Position
Cite Case Name Vote Party NLRB Type Opinion
309 U.S.
206 NLRB v. Waterman S.S.
Corp.
261 Amalgamated Util. Workers
v. Consol. Edison Co.
350 Nat'l Licorice Co. v.
NLRB
8-0 Union
8-0 Employer
8-0 Union
pro M
M
pro Separate opinion 4
310 U.S.
318
311 U.S.
7
72
514
584
312 U.S.
426
313 U.S.
23
146
NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing
Ass'n
Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. NLRB
H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB
NLRB v. Link-Belt Co.
NLRB v. Express
Publishing Co.
NLRB v. White Swan Co.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. NLRB
177 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 7-0
212 Continental Oil Co. v. NLRB 7-0
314 U.S.
469 NLRB v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co. 7-0
315 U.S.
100 Southport Petroleum Corp.
v. NLRB 6-2
685 NLRB v. Elec. Vacuum
Cleaner Co. 8-1
Union pro M
6-2 Union
9-0 Union
8-0 Union
8-0 Employer
Wrote dissent
Wrote for Court
M
Wrote for Court
8-0 Union pro Separate opinion15
Employer
Union
Union
Union
Wrote for Court
M
Joined concurrence
Indicated concurrence
in accord with
Phelps Dodge
Union pro M
Union pro M
Union pro M1
6
13 M denotes a case in which Justice Douglas voted with the majority; D denotes a
case in which Justice Douglas joined in dissent. * signifies a one paragraph dissent in
which Justice Douglas joined with one or more otherJustices, and for which authorship is
unclear. Such opinions are counted as though Justice Douglas had joined the opinion of
another Justice.
1
4 Justice Douglas' concurrence went further than the Court in support of the
NLRB s position.
sJustice Douglas' concurrence went further than the Court in support of the
NLRB s position.
16 The majority's decision favored one union over the employer and rival unions.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
TABLE VIII (Continued)
S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB
NLRB v. Ind. & Mich.
Elec. Co.
50 NLRB v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co.
533 Va. Elec. & Power Co.
v. NLRB
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB
Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB
5-4 Union pro D
5-3 Union pro D
Union
Union
8-1 Union pro M
7-2 Union pro M
8-0 Union pro M
322 U.S.
111 NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc.
643 Polish Nat'l Alliance v.
NLRB
323 U.S.
248
324 U.S.
9
793
325 U.S.
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB
Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB
Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB
Union
Union
M
Joined concurrence
5-4 Union pro M
9-0 Union
8-1 Union
335 Int'l Union of Mine Workers v.
Eagle-Picher Mining &
Smelting Co. 5-4
697 Inland Empire Council,
Lumber Workers v. Millis 8-la
pro M
pro M
Union
Union
May Dep't Stores Co. v.
NLRB 5-3
NLRB v. Cheney Lumber Co. 8-0
Union pro
Union pro M
17 The majority's decision favored a certified union over a rival.
316 U.S.
31
317 U.S.
no cases
318 U.S.
9
319 U.S.
320 U.S.
no cases
321 U.S.
332
678
702
326 U.S.
376
327 U.S.
385
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TABLE VIII (Continued)
328 U.S.
no cases
329 U.S.
324
330 U.S.
219
485
331 U.S.
398
416
332-335 U
no cases
336 U.S.
226
337 U.S.
217
656
338 U.S.
355
339 U.S.
563
577
340 U.S.
361
474
498
341 U.S.
322
665
675
694
707
NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co. 6-3
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. 5-4
.S.
NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co. 6-3
NLRB v. Crompton-Highland
Mills, Inc. 6-3
NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co. 8-0
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.
v. NLRB 6-2
NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills,
Inc. 7-2
NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co. 7-2
NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co. 8-0
Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB 7-2
NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co. 9-0
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg.
Co. 6-2
NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling
Co. 9-0
NLRB v. Denver Bldg.
Trades Council 6-3
Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB 6-3
Local 74, Carpenters
v. NLRB 6-3
8-1 Union pro
Union
Employer
M
M
Wrote dissent
Union
Union
Union pro
Union pro D*
Union pro M
Took no part
Union
Union
Union
Union
Employer
Union
Union
Union
Union
Union
pro M
pro M
pro M
pro D*
con M
pro Wrote dissent
pro M
con Wrote dissent
con D*
con D*
NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co.
NLRB v. Donnelly Garment
Co.
Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:235
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342 U.S.
237
343 U.S.
395
344 U.S.
344
375
345 U.S.
Longshoremen's Union v.
Juneau Spruce Corp.
NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. 6-3
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling
Co. 6-3
NLRB v. Dant 9-0
71 NLRB v. Rockaway News
Supply Co.
100 Am. Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n v. NLRB
117 NLRB v. Gamble
Enterprises, Inc.
346 U.S.
464
482
347 U.S.
NLRB v. Local 1229
Howell Chevrolet Co.
v. NLRB
17 Radio Officer's Union v.
NLRB 7-2
501 Capital Serv. Inc. v. NLRB 7-1
348 U.S.
96
349 U.S.
no cases
350 U.S.
107
264
Brooks v. NLRB
NLRB v. Warren Co.
NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.
270 Mastro Plastics Corp.v.
NLRB
351 U.S.
105
149
352 U.S.
145
153
282
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co. 8-0
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co. 6-3
Leedom v. Mine Workers 9-0
Meat Cutters v. NLRB 9-0
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co. 6-2
9-0 Employer Wrote for Court
Union pro Joined dissent
Employer con Wrote dissent
Union pro M
Union pro D
Employer con Wrote dissent
Union pro M
Union con D
Employer con Dissent without
opinion
Employer con D
Union pro Wrote for Court
8-0 Union pro M
Union pro M
Union pro M
Union pro M
Employer con M
Union pro M
Union con Wrote for Court
Union con Wrote for Court
Union pro M
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TABLE VIII (Continued)
NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Union
Office Employees Union v.
NLRB
Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills
Employer
Union
7-1 Union
353 U.S.
87
313
448
354 U.S.
no cases
355 U.S.
453
356 U.S.
342
357 U.S.
I
10
93
357
358 U.S.
184
359 U.S.
no cases
360 U.S.
203
301
361 U.S.
398
477
362 U.S.
274
411
363 U.S.
no cases
364 U.S.
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co. 9-0
NLRB v. Fant Milling Co. 9-0
NLRB v. Deena Artware Inc. 8-0
NLRB v. Ins. Agent's Int'l
Union 9-0
NLRB v. Drivers Local Union 9-0
Machinists Local 1424 v.
NLRB 7-219
Wrote for Court
Employer con
Union pro M
Union pro Wrote for Court
pro Wrote for Court
Union con Wrote short dissent
Union con D
Union con M
Union pro M
Union pro M
Union
Union
Union
Wrote for Court
M
con M
con M
573 NLRB v. Radio Eng'rs 9-020 con M
1 The Court's result apparently went against both union and employer.
"The NLRB brought this action against both the employer and the union.
20 The case involved a dispute between two unions.
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NLRB v. Mine Workers
Union 9-0
NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp. 6-3
NLRB v. Duval Jewelry 9-0
Lewis v. NLRB 9-018
Carpenter's Union v. NLRB 6-3
NLRB v. United Steelworkers 6-3
Leedom v. Kyne 7-2
5
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TABLE V1II (Continued)
365 U.S.
651 Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB 7-1
667 Teamsters Local 357 v.
NLRB 6-2
695 NLRB v. News Syndicate Co. 6-221
705 Typographical Union v.
NLRB 6-2
Union con Wrote for Court
Union con Wrote for Court
con Wrote for Court
Union con Wrote for Court
Elec. Workers v. NLRB
Garment Workers v. NLRB
366 U.S.
667
731
367 U.S.
no cases
368 U.S.
318
369 U.S.
736
370 U.S.
9
371 U.S.
no cases
372 U.S.
10
24 Incres Steamship Co. v.
Int'l Maritime Workers
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. 9-0
NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp. 8-0
9-0 Employer pro
7-222 con
Wrote concurrence
Wrote dissent
con Dissent without
opinion
3
7-0 Union pro M
7-0 Union pro M
con
con
Wrote single
concurrence for
both cases.
24
Union pro M
Union pro M
405 NLRB v. Parts Co. 9-0 Union pro M
21 The Court's position favored both union and employer.
22 Douglas' opinion favored both employer and minority union.
23 The Court held the Board's order against the unions and the employer valid as
originally entered.
24 The Court's result favored a foreign union over a domestic one.
NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer
Corp.
NLRB v, Katz
NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum
Co.
McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional
373 U.S.
221
734
374 U.S.
no cases
375 U.S.
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Boire v. Greyhound Corp. 8-1
United Steelworkers v. NLRB 8-0
376 U.S.
473
492
377 U.S.
46
58
378 U.S.
no cases
379 U.S.
21
203
380 U.S.
263
278
300
438
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc. 8-1
Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB 8-0
Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. Co. 7-0
NLRB v. Brown 8-1
Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 9-0
NLRB v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. 8-1
Employer con
Union pro
Dissent without
opinion
Concurrence without
opinion
Union pro M
Douglas took no part
Union
Union
Union pro
Employer con
Employer con
Employer con
Wrote for Court
Joined concurrence
M
M
M
Wrote short dissent
381-384 U.S.
no cases
385 U.S.
421 NL
Co
432 NL
386 U.S.
612
664
387 U.S.
no cases
388 U.S.
26
175
389 U.S.
375
RB v. C & C Plywood
rp. 9-0
RB v. Acme Indus. Co. 9-0
Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n
v. NLRB
Insulation Contractors Ass'n
v. NLRB
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc.
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co.
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co.
Union pro M
Union pro M
Employer con
Employer con
Union pro
Employer con
8-0 Union pro M
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NLRB v. Servette, Inc.
NLRB v. Local 760, Fruit
Packers
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NLRB v. United Ins. Co.
of Am.
NLRB v. Marine Workers
Union
390 U.S.
254
391 U.S.
418
392 U.S.
no cases
393 U.S.
357
394 U.S.
423
759
395 U.S.
575
396 U.S.
258
397 U.S.
99
398 U.S.
25
399 U.S.
no cases
400 U.S.
297
401 U.S.
137
402 U.S.
600
403 U.S.
no cases
404 U.S.
116
138
157
NLRB v.J.H. Rutter-Rex
Mfg. Co.
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB
NLRB v. Raytheon Co.
NLRB v. Local 825,
Operating Eng'rs
Magnesium Casting Co. v.
NLRB
NLRB v. Natural Gas Util.
NLRB v. Plasterers, Local 79 9-0
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co. 7-2
Alkali Workers, Local I v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 6-1
7-0 Union pro M
8-1 Employee 25 pro
Employer con
Union pro
Employer con
Wrote for Court
Wrote dissent
M
Wrote dissent
Union pro M
5-3 Employer con Wrote dissent
4-2 Union pro Wrote dissent
9-0 Union pro M
7-2 Union con Wrote dissent
9-0 Union pro Wrote for Court
Employer con
Employer pro
Union pro
M
Wrote for Court
Union con Dissent without
opinion
" The cases involved an employee-union dispute.
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NLRB v. Strong 8-1
Scofield v. NLRB 7-1
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. 7-2
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 8-0
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NLRB v. Scrivener
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security
Serv.
Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB
405 U.S.
117
406 U.S.
272
407 U.S.
539
408 U.S.
no cases
409 U.S.
48
213
9-0 Union pro M
9-0 Employer con M
5-4 Union pro M
6-3 Union pro D
Union pro M
Employee pro Wrote for Court
410-411 U.S.
no cases
412 U.S.
67 NLRB v. Boeing Co.
84 Booster Lodge 405,
Machinists
Employee con
Employer pro
Wrote dissent
M
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NLRB v. Int'l Van Lines
NLRB v. Textile Workers,
Local 1029
